Indirect accountability of political appointees
| Author | Christopher Li |
| DOI | 10.1177/09516298211027229 |
| Date | 01 July 2021 |
| Published date | 01 July 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2021, Vol.33(3) 383–396
ÓThe Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/09516298211027229
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Indirect accountability of
political appointees
Christopher Li
Department of Economics and Department of PoliticalScience, Vanderbilt University,
Nashville, TN, USA
Abstract
This paper explores the indirect accountability of political appointees. The appointee’s quality is
uncertain, and voters hold the politician accountable for the appointee’s performance. The politi-
cian has better information aboutthe appointee than voters do, but electoral concerns inducethe
politician to make inefficient retention decisions. Specifically, there is over-retention of appointees
relative to the social optimum. If the quality of candidates for appointment is low, then improving
the pool of candidates can help reduce distortions and, in fact, it is in the interest of the politician
to do so. I also show that more public information about the appointeereduces over-retention.
Keywords
accountability; government hierarchy; political appointments
1. Introduction
Accountability and delegation are two important aspects of democratic govern-
ance. Voters sit on top of the hierarchy, delegating certain authority to and holding
accountable elected politicians, who in turn act as the principle to the bureaucracy
(Strøm, 2000). A powerful instrument of control at the politicians’ disposal is the
appointment and dismissal of senior level bureaucrats. The most prominent exam-
ple of political appointees are cabinet secretaries or ministers, but the extent of
political appointments can, in fact, be quite substantial. In the United States, about
4000 federal government officials are political appointees.
1
Political appointees
Corresponding author:
Christopher Li, Departmentof Economics and Department of Political Science,VanderbiltUniversity, 230
Appleton Place, Nashville, TN 37203-5721,USA.
Email: christopher.m.li@hotmail.com
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