Industrial Relations in Privatized UK Mining: A Contingency Strategy?
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8543.00215 |
| Author | Emma Wallis,Jonathan Winterton |
| Published date | 01 December 2001 |
| Date | 01 December 2001 |
Industrial Relations in Privatized UK
Mining : A Cont ingency St rate gy ?
Emma Wallis and Jonathan Winterton
Abstract
This paper explores variations in the pattern of colliery level industrial
relations following the privatization of British Coal in four pits operated by the
largest coal mining company in the UK. Differences are explained in terms of
the competing institutions representing mineworkers and, most significantly, in
relation to whether the mode of acquisition of the colliery required the manage-
ment to maintain existing terms and conditions as a result of the Transfer of
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981.
1. Introduction
The transformation of labour relations in Britain under the Conservatives
represented a departure from the traditional pluralist approach that became
the predominant policy orientation during the 1960s, even if in practice
unitary approaches flourished beneath the surface (Ahlstrand 1990). In a
context of higher levels of unemployment and a more hostile legal environ-
ment for the unions than at any other time in the postwar period, managers
were able to adopt a more robust approach to labour relations. Instances of
trade union derecognition and exclusion became more common during the
1980s (Claydon 1989; Gall and McKay 1994; Smith and Morton 1993,
1994), and continued through the 1990s (Cully et al. 1999). The 1984–5
miners’ strike marked a major defeat for the militant trade union tradition,
with a symbolism reminiscent of the 1926 General Strike (Golden 1997;
Richards 1996).
There is controversy surrounding the extent to which management in the
coal mining industry capitalized on the defeat of the 1984–5 strike. Some
authorities concluded that the National Coal Board did not launch a
sustained assault upon organized labour within the industry (Richardson
Emma Wallis is a Post Doctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Sociology/School of
Education, University of Sheffield. Jonathan Winterton is Director of Research and Professor
of Human Resource Development at the Toulouse Business School, France.
British Journal of Industrial Relations
39:4 December 2001 0007–1080 pp. 565–583
#Blackwell Publishers Ltd/London School of Economics 2001. Published by Blackwell Publishers Ltd,
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and Wood 1989), and emphasized the continuity apparent in local bargain-
ing institutions (Edwards and Heery 1989). Others argued that industrial
relations were systematically restructured (Winterton and Winterton 1989,
1993a) as managerial prerogatives were reasserted (Leman and Winterton
1991; Tomaney and Winterton 1995), collective agreements were unilaterally
abandoned (Winterton 1994) and new procedures were introduced that
favoured the moderate Union of Democratic Mineworkers (UDM) and
marginalized the more militant National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)
(Taylor 1988; Clapham 1990).
In December 1994, the majority of the core collieries privatized by the
Conservative government were acquired by RJB Mining Ltd. This company
had earlier purchased a number of mines offered for sale under the lease/
license arrangements, and when the privatization of the coal industry was
completed, RJB had secured ownership of over 60 per cent of the deep mines
in the UK. As in the period following the miners’ strike, opinions varied
as to the impact of privatization on labour relations. Some observers
anticipated that privatization would have an ambivalent influence upon
industrial relations, and that it was therefore possible that organized labour
might benefit from ownership change in some circumstances (Edwards
and Heery 1989; Fairbrother 1994), especially where countervailing forces
would constrain a more confrontational approach (Ferner and Colling
1991). Noting that many of the changes in industrial relations occurred
in preparation for the return of public enterprises to private ownership,
Pendleton and Winterton (1993) found that some privatized enterprises
demonstrated considerable continuity of pluralist structures, while others
exhibited very substantial changes, most of which were to the detriment of
labour. Other empirical studies found both continuity and change in the
patterns of labour relations after privatization (Avis 1990; Blyton 1992;
Colling 1991; Colling and Ferner 1992; O’Connell-Davidson 1990, 1991;
Ogden 1993, 1994).
In the case of the privatized coal mining industry, Parry et al. (1997: 176–7)
considered the extent to which there was a continuity with the uncom-
promising macho-management of British Coal or a change to ‘residual
respect for the traditional trade union role’. It is perhaps more meaningful
to speak of ambiguity rather than continuity or change, since the macho-
management style of the last years of public ownership, originating in
the arrival of MacGregor as NCB chairman and the 1983 overtime ban,
represented a dramatic break from the mainstream tradition of the nation-
alized era.
Anticipating that uniformity in industrial relations would be unlikely,
given the diversity of forms of ownership in privatized coal mining, Parry
et al. (1997) concluded that union marginalization was most prevalent in the
largest company, RJB Mining, whereas, predictably, the trade unions had
greater influence at Tower Colliery, owned by the cooperative Goitre Tower
Anthracite. However, Parry et al. did not consider any of the collieries acquired
by management buyout teams, and subsequent research has shown that
566 British Journal of Industrial Relations
#Blackwell Publishers Ltd/London School of Economics 2001.
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