Information Disclosure in Global Energy Governance

AuthorAnn Florini,Saleena Saleem
Published date01 September 2011
Date01 September 2011
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2011.00135.x
Information Disclosure in Global
Energy Governance
Ann Florini
Brookings Institution and National University of Singapore
Saleena Saleem
National University of Singapore
Abstract
The lack of global consensus on how to deal with complex energy governance challenges has led to the emergence
of information disclosure initiatives as governance tools in and of themselves. This article assesses the effectiveness of
disclosure mechanisms as tools of energy governance by looking at the motivations and desired outcomes behind a
series of disclosure-based initiatives in the energy sector, namely: making energy markets work more eff‌iciently;
inducing corporations to internalize their climate change externalities; and improving democratic processes that lead
to better energy governance outcomes. The disclosure initiatives assessed in this article adopt different strategies to
achieve their objectives, mobilizing either users of information or holders of information, with varying effectiveness.
Where pressures for secrecy exist, voluntary disclosures without formal sanctions to incentivize compliance have
limited impact. Where users of information are primarily mobilized as drivers of change, the disclosures have to be
easily understood to have impact; this is no easy task when it comes to the energy sector. Disclosure mechanisms
that use a strategy of engagement and building of wide networks have perhaps the best potential to inf‌luence (or
pressure) holders of information to change their behavior accordingly. However, disclosure mechanisms underpinned
by western-inf‌luenced values of governmental transparency may not be as effective in countries that lack democratic
systems.
Policy Implications
Disclosure is not an alternative to regulation; it is a different form of regulation, one that can be carried out to some
extent on a voluntary and self-regulatory basis.
Disclosure mechanisms that aim to mobilize users of information as drivers of change have to provide information
that is easily understood by them.
Disclosure mechanisms that use a strategy of engagement and building of wide networks have the best potential
to inf‌luence (or pressure) holders of information to change their behavior accordingly.
Disclosure mechanisms underpinned by western-inf‌luenced values of governmental transparency may not be as
effective in countries that lack democratic systems.
Information f‌lows are a key component of governance in
all sectors and at all levels, key to regulatory effective-
ness and eff‌iciency, governmental accountability and the
curbing of corruption. So much of governance reform
consists of efforts to increase those f‌lows that one
author has referred to transparency as ‘the Swiss Army
knife of policy tools’, called for in everything from f‌inan-
cial regulation to conf‌lict resolution (Hauf‌ler, 2010,
p. 55). Given the considerable problems with national
and global-level energy governance explored throughout
this special issue, it is not surprising that we f‌ind infor-
mation disclosure initiatives emerging throughout the
energy sector to address various governance challenges.
Notably, these initiatives are not just intended to
improve existing governance systems such as regula-
tions, but to serve as governance tools in and of them-
selves.
The emergence of such information disclosure initia-
tives results directly from the lack of global consensus
on how to deal with complex energy governance chal-
lenges, particularly with regards to regulations on cli-
mate change and energy markets. The continued
absence of clear international regulation on climate
change despite the many years of negotiations, for
Global Policy Volume 2 . Special Issue . September 2011
ª2011 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2011) 2:SI doi: 10.1111/j.1758-5899.2011.00135.x
Research Article
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