Institutions, contexts, and ethnic violence in comparative perspective
| Author | Tse-min Lin,Feng-yu Lee |
| Published date | 01 June 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512119891540 |
| Date | 01 June 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512119891540
International Political Science Review
2021, Vol. 42(3) 400 –415
© The Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0192512119891540
journals.sagepub.com/home/ips
Institutions, contexts, and ethnic
violence in comparative perspective
Feng-yu Lee
National Taiwan University, Taiwan
Tse-min Lin
University of Texas at Austin, USA
Abstract
Which combinations of government structures and electoral systems create better frameworks for
addressing ethnic violence? Is there any one-size-fits-all institutional solution to violent ethnic conflict? Why
or why not? These questions are of substantial importance to scholars and policymakers alike, but the extant
literature does not provide a systematic and thorough exploration. In this article, we argue that the effects
of political institutions on ethnic violence are moderated by parameters of ethnic configurations. Through
a large comparative study, we find that institutions are relevant when ethnic groups are not geographically
dispersed, and whether ethnic minorities face a majority group also matters. For concentrated minorities
facing a majority, semi-presidential-proportional and presidential-proportional systems are more effective
in reducing violence. In cases involving concentrated minorities facing no majority, parliamentary-non-
proportional systems are associated with the most intense violence. We conclude that states seeking to
alleviate ethnic violence by institutional engineering must take contexts seriously.
Keywords
Government structures, electoral systems, ethnic violence, ethnic configuration, multilevel analysis
Which ‘combinations’ of government structures (semi-presidentialism vs. presidentialism vs. par-
liamentarism) and electoral systems (proportional representation vs. non-proportional systems)
create better frameworks for addressing ethnic violence?1 Are they parliamentary-proportional rep-
resentation (PR) systems, as many scholars and politicians worldwide have argued?2 Why or why
not? These questions are of substantial importance because ethnic divisions have been so wide-
spread and have become the world’s most serious source of violence since the 1990s. However,
Corresponding author:
Tse-min Lin, Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin, 158 W 21st St., Stop A1800, Austin, TX
78712-1704, USA.
Email: tml@austin.utexas.edu
891540IPS0010.1177/0192512119891540International Political Science ReviewLee and Lin
research-article2019
Research Article
Lee and Lin 401
there are not many large comparative studies on this subject that provide satisfactory analysis, and
the theories and empirical results of these studies are often incomplete and biased.
Using the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset from 1985 to 2006, we revisit these questions by
analyzing all ethnic groups at risk in democratic states. While extant studies recognized the impor-
tant interactive effects between government structures and electoral systems, none of them tested
these effects in their models. This is probably because multiplicative models suffer from collinear-
ity problems and are difficult to interpret (Braumoeller, 2004; Kam and Franzese, 2007).
Furthermore, past studies did not take seriously whether ethnic minorities are geographically con-
centrated and whether they face a majority group. Through a large comparative study, we found
that combinations of government structures and electoral systems are relevant only when ethnic
groups are geographically concentrated. We also confirmed that whether concentrated minorities
face a majority group affects whether institutional combinations facilitate checks and balances or
the formation of coalition or broad coalition cabinets, which in turn influence ethnic violence.3
Specifically, in cases involving concentrated minorities facing a majority group, semi-presidential-
proportional and presidential-proportional systems are more effective in reducing violence because
these institutional combinations facilitate checks and balances in this ethnic configuration. In cases
involving concentrated minorities facing no majority, parliamentary-non-proportional systems are
associated with the most intense violence because these institutional combinations facilitate nei-
ther the formation of coalition cabinets nor checks and balances.
The ethnic security dilemma
The ethnic security dilemma refers to competition for control of the government among ethnic
groups. Saideman et al. (2002) first applied the concept of ‘security dilemma’ in international rela-
tions to ethnic conflict. They argued that the competition for control of the government between
ethnic groups could cause a security dilemma. Ethnic groups seek to control the government
because they believe that the government is the greatest potential threat to them. Groups fear that
should another group control the government, it will use state resources to act against them and
even endanger their survival. This fear is mutually reinforcing: one group’s attempt to control the
government will evoke others’ fear and counter-actions, and eventually every group is worse off
because of the irrational competition. This ethnic security dilemma thesis thus suggests that ‘ethnic
groups will be more secure if they have access to decision makers, if they can block harmful gov-
ernment policies, and if they can veto potentially damaging decisions’ (Saideman et al., 2002: 107).
By ethnic groups, we mean groups that belong to a certain ascriptive category, such as language,
race, religion, tribe, and so on.
The implication of the ethnic security dilemma is supported by the global evidence of ethno-
political violence, which shows that ethnic conflicts can usually be lessened by some combination
of policies and institutions of power sharing (Cederman et al., 2010; Gurr, 1993). In theory, dis-
criminated or mobilized ethnic groups are those who would challenge and fight against the state if
these groups’ interests were not appropriately protected in their struggle for state power (Cederman
et al., 2010; Elkins and Sides, 2007; Gurr, 1993: 3). Most of these groups at risk are ethnic minori-
ties, whose demographic size is less than 50% of the national population, and only a few of them
are majorities (Gurr, 1993).4 It should be noted that some ethnic minorities are empowered and
advantaged. These groups are likely to lose power, though, thanks to their minority status. When
this change happens, these advantaged minority groups are at risk of being retaliated against and
having restrictions imposed on their rights (Gurr, 1993). Because of this, in addition to discrimi-
nated and mobilized groups, advantaged minorities are also included in our analysis. This article
focuses on investigating how institutions influence the intensity of ethnic violence among all these
To continue reading
Request your trial