When institutions matter: the EU and the identity of social democracy.
| Author | Moschonas, Gerassimos |
| Position | Features |
Parties have historically developed, among other things, in the wake of major institutional changes such as the parliamentarisation of formerly authoritarian states or the advent of universal suffrage. So, today, the unprecedented character of the European Union has a significant impact on party phenomena and party conflict.
How does the European framework, particularly its institutional aspects, influence the role and dynamics of political parties (and partisan families)? What are its consequences for the programmatic development and, more generally, the physiognomy and tradition, of social democracy?
A conservative system with little room for partisan logics
Historically, one of the important activities of political parties was the harmonisation of relations between different institutions within political systems. The partisan character of institutional harmonisation and government/administration was a specific trait of politics in Europe and contributed to the transition from classical parliamentarianism to party democracy (Bartolini, 2005b).
The new governmental set-up in Europe is marked by a basic institutional asymmetry. In the twenty-seven states, the system of party government remains dominant and the national political power of parties, albeit reduced, is still considerable. By contrast, at the EU level, parties are not the principal units of decision-making and their European political power has not really been asserted. If partisan treatment of problems is common in European institutions, notably in the Council and the Parliament, the EU in general lacks coherent party leadership. No partisan family simultaneously controls the European Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament and no political family is likely to do so in the future. There is no unique, cohesive and undisputed partisan policy maker in this polycentric polity. As a consequence, the European system is a system without a party coordinator. In particular, Euro-parties exert neither the function of government (a central aspect of which is institutional and policy harmonisation) nor that of political representation (1). 'In its deepest characteristics, the European community model rejects the classical form of the political party' (Magnette, 2001, 63).
Given this fundamental institutional divergence (party government at national level and its practical absence at a specifically European level), the parties can no longer ensure the cohesion of power centres and are no longer identified, as they used to be, with public authority; or, to be more precise: if they take responsibility for the cohesion of power centres at a national level, they do not ensure this cohesion in the system as a whole (for the 'Brussels complex', which is not governed directly by parties, now represents a crucial component in the network of European executives).
Weakened institutional leaders, though nevertheless still leaders at a national level, but without a clearly defined role at the EU level, political parties have lost a significant part of their erstwhile influence and authority. Actually, in the framework of European multi-level governance, the 'asymmetrical dynamic' of party government, by short-circuiting the unity of the decision-making process, reduces the managerial and governmental efficacy (problem-solving capacity) of political parties. And this is a not insignificant development. As Arthur Schlesinger has written, 'politics in the end is the art of solving substantive problems' (Schlesinger, 1986).
The EU is furthermore a profoundly conservative system, in the sense that it 'protects' the units (the states) that make it up and does not easily revisit institutional and political decisions it has taken. Changes and adaptations in the EU invariably occur on the margins, without a fundamental challenge to initial options and ways of operating. The whole community culture is based on the idea that no institution is ruled by a clear-cut majority logic or a stable coalition (decisions being the result of an ongoing process of compromise, in which partisan logics play a limited role) (Costa, 2004, 282). In this system where the logic of consensus or grand coalition rules (2), it is very difficult to produce a new master narrative and a new 'frame of action'. Political leadership and strategic vision do not easily come out of such a system (Tsoukalis, 2005).
The 'conservative' character of the system is further encouraged by the marked tendency to depoliticise sensitive questions, so as to avoid decision-making blockages. The objective of 'keeping the engine ticking over', in order to maintain a cooperative dynamic, is the key--the real cause of the conservatism. Tendencies to regime preservation have been accentuated by successive enlargements--especially the 'big bang' expansion of 2004.
Of course, political parties remain firmly rooted in European representative systems. Parties remain central actors. However, they are suffering from the fragmentation and conservatism of European governance and their proper (albeit natural) incapacity for effective coordination of their European action. Parties, both as problem-solving structures and as producers of policy-oriented ideas, are seriously affected by the deep reach and scope of European integration. In a sense, national parties are the victims of Europe's success, in particular the major parties of government (precisely those that manage European governance at both national level and Brussels level).
Europe as a problem for social democracy
The segmentation of competences and multiplicity of power centres in the European system of multi-level governance, as well as the structural inability of parties to find a central guiding role in the overall institutional set-up, create a formidable problem of collective action and coordination for all those aspiring to a strategy of change and ruptures.
The institutional reality of the EU is a sizeable obstacle in the path of all actors (national states, left-wing parties, populist right-wing parties, trade unions, pro- or anti-European associations, anti-globalisation or alternative globalisation movements) which aspire to change the EU's economic policy and institutional architecture. There is no Winter Palace to occupy or surround in the European political system; there is no royal road for prompting and coordinating the mobilisation of actors with highly diverse sensibilities, cultures and interests.
This problem of collective action and coordination is common to all political parties and families, but it particularly affects left-wing parties: parties that aim to correct--or change--the dominant economic paradigm are more in need of strong institutional (and societal) resources. This problem affects more specifically the social democratic parties, because it is mainly they which, as essentially governmental parties, are confronted head on with the 'conservative' character of the European institutions. They participate in the European Council and in the Council of Ministers, they contribute to the formation of the majorities in the European Parliament, they appoint some of the commissioners, they direct the national states. By contrast, the smaller parties of the radical left and the Green parties, as parties of the opposition, are the ones that benefit electorally from the conservatism of the system. Conservatism, forcing the social democrats to adopt pragmatist positions and thus to convergence with the centre-right parties, widens the competitive space for outsiders and new parties.
Everything that has been said so far confronts socialists, or at least those who wish--assuming they do wish--to 'change' Europe, with a very delicate problem: How to be radical (in the sense of promoting new policies and new operating frameworks) in a system that, by its very nature (complex and cumbersome decision-making mechanism, twenty-seven players-countries), is easily weakened under the pressure of change? And, consequently, how to change European policies without...
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