Integrated Ombudsmanry: Joined‐up to a Point

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.00330
Published date01 May 2001
Date01 May 2001
Integrated Ombudsmanry: Joined-up to a Point
Brian Thompson*
Following an approach in October 1998 by the Parliamentary Commissioner for
Administration (PCA), the Health Service Commissioner (HSC) and the
Commissioners for Local Administration in England (CLA), the Cabinet Office
conducted a review of the public sector ombudsmen in England which reported in
April 20001and a consultation paper based on the review was issued in June 2000.2
The key conclusions of the Review were:
the current legislative provision for the ombudsmen is restrictive and is
distorting the service and therefore requires a radical overhaul;
proliferation of methods of public service delivery will continue, which will
mean finding new ways to help complainants and enabling the ombudsmen to
work with others to provide an integrated service;
reshaping of the ombudsmen is needed to respond to reshaped government3and
the MP filter can no longer be sustained in an era of joined up government and it
is strongly recommended that it is abolished.4
This analysis led to the fundamental recommendation that, instead of three separate
ombudsmen systems focused on central and local government and the National
Health Service (NHS), these should be combined in one single commission for
England; and access for complaints on central government matters (to the PCA)
should no longer be through a MP (the MP filter) but direct as is the case with the
CLA and HSC. The consultation paper focuses in particular upon those recom-
mendations and others on powers, jurisdiction, appointment and accountability. In
addition, consultees were invited to comment on any of the review’s
recommendations or any aspect of the organisation and operation of the public
sector ombudsmen in England.
The approach which the Review takes is one of concentrating on the resolution
of complaints. Its analysis of the legislation and the working practices of the
ombudsmen lists various barriers. The PCA has frequently been criticised for the
length of time taken to complete an investigation and action has been taken to
reduce the backlog of cases.5The PCA was the first ombudsman in the United
Kingdom (UK) and served as a template for its counterparts, first in Northern
Ireland, then the NHS, local government and most recently in the devolved
ßThe Modern Law Review Limited 2001 (MLR 64:3, May). Published by Blackwell Publishers,
108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 459
* Liverpool Law School.
1 P. Collcutt and M. Hourihan, Review of the Public Sector Ombudsmen in England (London: Cabinet
Office, 2000). It is also available on the Cabinet Office Website at
central/2000/ombudsmenreview.pdf>. The review was announced in the White Paper Modernising
Government, Cm 4310 (1999).
2Review of the Public Sector Ombudsmen in England: A Consultation Paper (London: Cabinet Office,
2000).
3 n 1 above, para 2.43.
4ibid para 3.52.
5 In the Annual Report for 1999–2000 the PCA stated that the backlog had been eliminated, HC 593
(2000) para 1.
arrangements for Scotland and Wales. The analysis of the working practices of the
PCA characterised them as an audit type investigation. The conception of the PCA
was that of an assistant to MPs in their historic role of holding the executive to
account and seeking the redress of citizens’ grievances. The investigation would
end in a report to the MP. The complainant was not a direct customer of the PCA.
The focus of the investigation was maladministration, and maladministration
which had produced injustice. Fairness and thoroughness had to be built into the
investigation process given the possibility of a report which concluded that the
investigated body had caused injustice through maladministration. A combination
of the legislation and its implementation by the first PCA, Sir Edmund Compton a
former Comptroller and Auditor General, led to an investigation process which, in
effect, required three separate inquiry stages. First, the PCA could only accept
complaints for investigation which were within jurisdiction and so they had to be
screened;6secondly, the principal officer of the body complained against was
given an opportunity to respond to the complaint7and then the PCA investigation
would take place.8The Review does not pick up on a factor which can delay the
issue of the report in this third investigation stage, which is the practice of showing
a draft report to the principal officer.9This allows facts to be checked and a
reaction to a draft recommendation on a remedy where maladministration has been
found to cause injustice. The reaction can, on occasion, turn into a protracted
negotiation.
These stages contribute to a longer timescale than would be the case if the focus
was simply to resolve a complaint. The CLA took the initiative in seeking to
resolve some complaints informally, that is without beginning or completing an
investigation, and this is now something which the PCA does.10 As the legislative
basis for such informal resolution is unclear, the Review recommends that it be
authorised in the statute11 which will create the new commission for the public
sector ombudsmen in England.
The Review recommends that the ombudsmen adopt a new approach as follows:
a focus on outcomes and in particular on complaints resolutions;
a clear recognition of when intervention is required;
initially an informal approach aiming to achieve co-operation and perhaps using
a conciliatory approach;
investigation in the old sense to be used if informal methods do not work.12
Within this framework instead of the segmented process described above, the
process would be continuous, moving away from ‘acceptance or rejection’ of a
complaint to the action or resolution proposed (in some cases, ‘no action’ by the
ombudsman). Thus a complaint would be pursued until it is clear that the
6 Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration Act 1967, ss 4–6, Scheds 2 & 3.
7ibid s 7(1).
8ibid s 1(1).
9 The practice of showing a draft only to the investigated body was found not to be in breach of natural
justice in RvParliamentary Commissioner for Administration, ex parte Dyer [1994] 1 WLR 621.
However, the Review recommends, at para 6.20, that a copy of the draft also be shown to the
complainant, which has been the practice of the CLA.
10 In the Annual Reports for 1998–99 HC 572 (1999) and 1999–2000, HC 593 (2000) the PCA records
that 90 and 121 complaints respectively were resolved without an investigation. The figures in the
CLA Annual Reports for local settlements were 2,414 with no report issued, 24 with an issued report
in 1997–98; and 2,251 without a report, 42 with a report in 1998–99.
11 n 1 above, para 6.6.3.
12 ibid para 6.61.
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complaint is out of jurisdiction and not investigable, a settlement to the
ombudsman’s satisfaction has been achieved, or investigation has been
completed and a report has been produced.
13
In the 1999–2000 Annual Report,
issued after the publication of the Review, the PCA talks about extending the
‘product range’ so as to encompass informal resolution, investigations of varying
intensity and of the amalgamation of the screening and investigation directorates
from April 2000.
14
The Review devotes some space to the recommendation to abolish the MP
filter
15
mainly, one assumes, because a majority of MPs wish to retain it, whilst
most commentators favour abolition. A survey was conducted for the Review in
which support for retention, at 52 per cent, had declined from the 1993 level of 58
per cent.
16
The Review’s survey indicated that Labour MPs were generally in
favour of abolition whilst Conservatives were not and that MPs first elected in
1997 were more in favour of abolition than those with a greater length of service.
The survey responses also had MPs who admitted uncertainty about jurisdiction
and general access arrangements. As complaints must be referred by MPs then the
fact that around 70 per cent of complaints submitted do not end in informal
resolution or an investigation report shows that MPs are not absolutely clear about
the criteria. To be fair some MPs may knowingly refer complaints outwith the
statutory criteria but this is suspected to be a small number. In arguing for the
removal of MPs as gatekeepers to the PCA, it is pointed out that this does not
mean removal of MPs entirely from the field of complaints about constituents’
grievances with central government. Some will begin the complaint with MPs or
move on to them if unhappy with the reaction of the respondent body. Since the
days of the Whyatt report
17
which initially proposed the creation of an
ombudsman in the UK, the number of grievance-handling agencies has increased
and now ranges from bodies’ own complaints machinery whether internal or
independent such as the Independent Cases Examiner for the Child Support
Agency, to the ombudsmen and various regulatory regimes for the privatised
utilities. Given this complexity, for citizens and MPs, it is best if there is a single
gateway to the public sector ombudsmen which can exercise a more consistent
policy on access to the ombudsmen. This first contact is rightly regarded as very
important because some complainants, having been told that they should take their
complaint to another body, decide to drop it. The Review recommends that there
should be monitoring of complaints which do return after having been directed to
another grievance-handler and that steps should be taken to find out what happens
to those which do not return.
18
Where a complainant is directed to another body, it
should be subject to the condition that if it has not been resolved within a specified
time-limit, then it will be automatically referred to the commission.
19
There is
concern that the gateway should not go beyond signposting and being an impartial
investigator. Accordingly the recommendation is made that by entering into
partnerships with the Community Legal Service and the Community Health
13 ibid para 6.54.
14 HC 593 (2000) paras 1.15–1.20.
15 n 1 above, paras 3.33–3.56.
16 Survey carried out for the Select Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration
and reported in Powers, Work and Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, HC 33 (1993).
17 Justice, The Citizen and the Administration: The Redress of Grievances (chaired by Sir J. Whyatt)
(London: Stevens, 1961).
18 n 1 above, para 6.43.
19 ibid para 6.35.
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Councils, those bodies will gain access to information which can help them
support complainants.
20
The proposed organisational structure
21
does not do much more than
amalgamate the three ombudsmen. All of the ombudsmen would continue to be
appointed by the Queen, they would report to Parliament and be subject to
scrutiny by the National Audit Office. The new commission would be chaired by
one of the ombudsmen for the purposes of representing it externally, for
management purposes and when there was a requirement to answer to Parliament.
It is proposed that this ombudsman would be responsible for matters relating to
the UK as a whole and for reserved matters in Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland. The internal organisation would operate as a single entity for the
management of work and generally for accountability, policy-making, funding
and resource management. The individual ombudsmen would be appointed as
office-holders with a personal jurisdiction across the entire work of the new
commission. They should not be appointed to have particular functional or
geographical responsibilities. However by agreement within the new commission
they would each be identified with a particular group of the bodies under its
jurisdiction. Thus, for example, local authorities would know which member of
the new commission would deal with them individually or corporately on
questions of policy and practice. It was recommended that the staff of the new
commission should specialise in aspects of the functions of bodies under
jurisdiction and as necessary form teams to deal with partnership working by
those bodies. Such partnerships may involve bodies not under jurisdiction, or
under the jurisdiction of another complaints investigation scheme, and innovative
collaborative arrangements would be needed. Each ombudsman would be
responsible for his or her own cases and not subordinate to any other ombudsman.
No ombudsman would be superior to another in making decisions and
recommendations about matters under jurisdiction nor would any ombudsman
act in any appellate capacity if a complainant disagreed with another
ombudsman’s decision.
It is also proposed that the commission have (a) non-executive board members
who could be drawn from ‘external bodies or the general public’ and whose role
would be to assist in the monitoring of the impact of the new commission and to
offer operational and policy advice;22 and (b) associates, including the public
sector ombudsmen in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and the Data
Protection/Information Commissioner.23 Currently the PCA is an ex officio
member of the Commission for Local Administration in Wales which can
exchange cases for investigation with its English counterpart, usually on the basis
of convenience or propriety.
The reasons for proposing the unified commission are first that the delivery of
public services crosses the boundaries of the separate public sector ombudsmen
remits and this is likely to increase,24 and second to try to increase awareness of
and access to the ombudsmen and indeed, other grievance-handlers. As the Review
20 ibid para 6.31. The Legal Services Commission’s Funding Code criterion 5.4.7 states that requests for
legal representation and support funding may be refused if there are alternatives to litigation,
including ombudsman schemes, which should be tried first: http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/stat/
fc_criteria.htm>.
21 n 1 above para 5.3.
22 ibid.
23 n 1 above, paras. 7.3–74.
24 This is ‘joined-up’ government, a prominent feature of the White Paper, n 1 above.
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does not make any recommendations on changes of jurisdiction25 we have the
situation that whilst it is proposed to remove the MP filter for PCA cases, where
bodies are subject to the PCA and have their own internal and possibly independent
complaints examiners, then these must usually be resorted to before the PCA can
be involved. In the NHS recourse to its two-stage complaints scheme is also
normally expected before the HSC can become involved. CLA normally expects a
complainant to have raised the matter with the local authority, if not to have
exhausted its complaints system, otherwise the complaint will be regarded as
premature and will not be accepted.
Continued role confusion?
The response which the House of Commons Public Administration Select
Committee (PAC) made to the consultation paper on the Review was both positive
and critical.26 It agreed with the idea of a single commission,27 and the removal of
the MP filter28 but preferred that legislation should specify those bodies which
were not within the ombudsmen’s jurisdiction rather than those who were.29 The
committee did raise concerns about the composition and jurisdiction of the
proposed commission. It suggested that a review of the ombudsmen should be
accompanied by a review of their jurisdiction and referred to the evidence of
academic witnesses who argued first for the inclusion of contractual issues and
personnel matters and second for the consideration of the merits of issues where
there was no maladministration.30 The committee also thought that some areas of
the public sector were not included and suggested that they should be, giving
education as an example.31 They were concerned about the number of associate
ombudsmen and the non-executive members.32 The Select Committee noted that
the Prison Ombudsmen was not included in the new commission.33 In the Review,
the reason given was that this was a ‘niche’ role, not established by statute and
properly part of the executive.34 The Prison Ombudsman, like the Independent
Cases Examiner at the Child Support Agency, is above the departmental
complaints system but under the PCA. Both are meant to be independent whilst
funded by the departments they oversee.
One of the problems with the Review is that it seems prepared to put up with the
complicated position on access conditions and would seek to improve it by requiring
the new commission to agree protocols with other ‘intermediary’ complaint
handlers, on arrangements to deal with cases, which should be publicised,
35
thus
25 It is suggested that the new legislation might adopt a variety of methods on specifying which bodies
are within jurisdiction. Listing generic types such as local authorities and NHS Trusts would be
sufficient to cover many bodies within jurisdiction; it might, however, be necessary to list at least
some organisations to banish all doubt, n 1 above, para 5.8.
26 HC 612 (2000).
27 ibid para 7.
28 ibid para 12. The Select Committee noted that originally the MP filter was meant to assuage MPs’
feelings but felt that it was now inconsistent in a world of public service charters not to have direct
access to the public sector ombudsmen.
29 The consultation paper, n 2 above, asked if the legislation should specify those outside jurisdiction.
30 Respectively raised by Dr. P. Giddings and Professor P. Birkinshaw, n 26 above, paras 13, 16.
31 ibid para 14.
32 ibid para 8.
33 ibid raised specifically by Professor M. Seneviratne.
34 n 1 above, para 4.7.
35 ibid para 7.6.
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helping complainants and respondent bodies. This could be regarded as a pragmatic
approach but it could also be seen to reflect continued confusion over the real role of
the ombudsmen. For some academic commentators there has long been a view that
ombudsmen would do better to concentrate on audit and the improvement of
performance rather than resolving complaints or as Harlow and Rawlings have put it
on fire-watching rather than fire-fighting.
36
The PCA was conceived as a last resort
so that complaints which had alternative remedies available would be outside
jurisdiction unless the PCA determined that it would be unreasonable for the
complainant to seek that other remedy.
37
The trend of thinking and practice on
complaints handling reflected in the Citizen’s Charter and its successor Service
First
38
and the NHS complaints scheme,
39
is that complaints should be dealt with
speedily and at, or close to the point of contact with the complainant. There is a
pyramid structure so that complaints not resolved at that lower level are dealt with
by independent review and at the top of the structure is the ombudsman. The Service
First and NHS guidance stresses the importance of learning from mistakes so as to
enhance performance.
The Review’s recommendations stress resolution and speed and urge that
meetings and phone calls be used in preference to paper-intensive methods. The
call to produce searchable electronic databases of decisions which can be used by
complainants and their advisers as well as by respondent bodies40 seeks to balance
fire-fighting with fire-watching as does the proposal that informal resolution
should not foreclose the possibility of a full investigation which could bring to light
systemic problems.41 Concern for resolution prompts the recommendations that
where the unified gateway to the commission has to refer the complainant to
another grievance-handler, the situation should be monitored to see if the
complainant returns, and also to set conditions so that the complaint would be
automatically transferred. One aspect which could assist the audit role is the
ombudsmen’s ability to conduct investigations on their own initiative without the
trigger of a complaint. Noting that ombudsmen in other countries have this power,
it is said that it is not used much and that it could imperil the ombudsmen’s
impartiality and so it is specifically rejected.42 It would be unfortunate if bodies
subjected to an own initiative investigation doubted the impartiality of the
ombudsmen given that random audit is not uncommon. This is a useful tool and
has been conditionally advocated by select committees.43
36 C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (London: Butterworths, 2nd ed 1997) 427–432.
37 Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration Act 1967, s 5(2). A similar provision applies to the
CLA , Local Government Act 1974, s 26(6).
38 Citizen’s Charter Complaints Task-Force, Effective Complaints Systems Principles and Checklist
(London: Cabinet Office, 1993); Putting Things Right (London: Cabinet Office, 1995); Good Practice
Guide (London: Cabinet Office, 1995), Service First, How To Deal With Complaints (London:
Cabinet Office, 1998).
39 Department of Health, Being Heard: Report of a Review Committee on NHS Complaints Procedures
(chaired by Professor A. Wilson) (London: Department of Health, 1994); NHS Executive,
Complaints: Listening . . . Acting . . . Improving . . . Guidance on Implementation of the NHS
Complaints Procedure (NHS Executive, 1996).
40 n 1 above, para 6.40.
41 ibid paras 6.4, 6.9.
42 ibid para 6.15.
43 Successive Select Committees on the PCA have suggested initiation of investigations but on different
conditions: it would serve as a follow-up to reports where maladministration and injustice had been
found, HC 615 (1978), para. 31); again where there had been a report finding maladministration and
injustice and the PCA suspected that a citizen had suffered but not made a complaint, the PCA could
ask the constituency MP to make a reference, HC 129 (1990), para 22, and where a select committee
made a reference to the PCA, HC 33, (1994) para 44. The Public Administration Committee in its
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The bigger partiality problem in complaints systems is the perception of
complainants that only independent grievance-handlers are appropriate. They fear
that where a member of the organisation complained against is conducting the
investigation, then the loyalty felt amongst colleagues means that the complaint
will not be dealt impartially. This has bedevilled the system for police complaints
and the new NHS complaints procedure,44 and led to the rejection of proposals
which would have left complaints against local government to their own internal
complaints systems with no investigatory role for the CLA.45
The Review rejects calls made for a Public Administration Commission with a
wider oversight and standard setting remit, emphasising that the ombudsmen’s
focus must be on complaints resolution.46 There is awareness of the total
complaints picture and a recommendation that the current focal point in the
Cabinet Office be slightly expanded to serve as the body to monitor and co-
ordinate public sector complaints processes.47 Welcome as the integrationist
approach of the Review is, it does not go far enough. There is a need for a body
which not only has an overview of the whole field of complaints handling but can
use the complaints it processes to inform suggestions for improvement. The
cultural change represented by Citizen’s Charter/Service First in which complaints
are accepted and learnt from, rather than evaded and denied, still has some way to
go. Aspects of the New Public Management in which quantitative measures are
meant to be driving toward improvement can have unintended consequences so
that, for example, complaints may not be recorded if there are league tables which
display complaints received. If complete complaints recording does not happen
then it prejudices monitoring and learning from complaints.
The concern in the Review that nothing should detract from a concentration upon
resolution does not rule out a commission containing all aspects of complaints
handling: resolution, learning from mistakes, research and dissemination of good
practice. Logic might suggest that not only should one learn from the example of
the Audit Commission with its financial irregularity and value for money audits
and the promotion of best practice, but that a combined Public Administration and
Accounts Commission would be the route to follow. This might be too much but it
should be noted that there is a recommendation that whilst care should taken in
determining whether the investigation focus might widen to take systemic points
into account in case the original complaint is lost sight of, there should be good
liaison with the Audit Commission and the National Audit Office in order to take
forward matters of concern.48
response to the consultation upon the Review also thought that there was a role for own initiative
investigations, in certain circumstances, which were not specified, and also at the suggestion of the
committee itself, HC 612 (2000) para 11.
44 See the Home Office, Complaints Against the Police : A Consultation Paper (London: Home Office,
2000) and the critique of, and reform proposals for, the independent review stage in NHS complaints,
H. Wallace and L. Mulcahy, Cause for Complaint? An Evaluation of the NHS Complaints Procedure
(London: Public Law Project, 1999).
45 The reaction to the proposal to lose independent investigation of complaints against local authorities
in Sir G. Chipperfield, Report of the Financial Management and Policy Review ofthe Commission for
Local Administration in England Stage I ( London: Department of the Environment, 1996) led to its
abandonment and the confirmation of the investigatory role of the CLA in A. Whetnall, Report of the
Financial Management and Policy Review of the Commission for Local Administration in England
Stage II ( London: Department of the Environment, 1996).
46 n 1 above, para 6.86.
47 ibid para 5.19.
48 ibid para. 6.89.
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Academics have advocated the need for research and it is a function and capacity
that an overarching body in the field of administrative justice ought to have.49 One
important topic is the appropriate number of levels in the complaints pyramid. The
factors which have to be balanced are speed, cost, and fairness which involves
impartiality and independence. Is there a need for three levels given the time the
entire process takes, or do the different tiers deal with appropriate cases, and are
there variations in the different areas of the public sector? The proposed
commission would be in an ideal position to undertake such research and given the
recommendation to have non-executive members on its board, this suggestion does
not push very far beyond the Review’s boundaries. Indeed this would seem to be
the only sensible role which the proposed non-executive members could play. As
the PAC commented, their role is ‘undeveloped’ in the Review.50
The Review does take into account the relationship with the courts. Referring to
Lord Woolf’s 1996 Access To Justice Final Report they declined to follow two of
three particular recommendations on this relationship. Ombudsmen’s reports
should continue not to be binding and not to be enforced by the courts, nor was
there support for the idea of the courts being able to refer a case before them to
ombudsmen, but it could be useful for ombudsmen to be able to refer an issue of
law arising in an investigation to the courts for determination.51
Conclusion
The Review has one big idea, amalgamation, but this is not followed through
comprehensively. There are many good recommendations which could improve
awareness of, and access to, the ombudsmen and the lower tiers in the public sector
complaints system. The proposals on working methods are unlikely to offset the
rise in complaints which abolition of the MP filter would bring about.52 While
outside the Review’s remit,53 the logic of a merged commission also applies to
Scotland and Wales, and in Northern Ireland where it could formalise the ‘virtual’
situation in which there are two ombudsmen systems, both offices always held by
one person working in shared accommodation. This would, however, tip the
49 See, for example, B. Thompson, ‘Administrative Justice: Towards the Millennium, Towards
Integration?’, D. Lewis, ‘Filling in the Gaps: A Standing Administrative Conference for the United
Kingdom’, and M. Partington, ‘Future Development’ in M. Harris and M. Partington (eds),
Administrative Justice in the 21st Century (Oxford: Hart, 1999) 463–481, 519–531 and 532–548
respectively.
50 n 26 above, para 8. The committee agreed with the views of the current PCA, Mr M. Buckley, that
these non-executive members should not be involved in the handling of individual cases, para 21.
51 n 1 above, paras 7.25–7.27.
52 The Public Administration Committee agreed with Dr P. Giddings that it ‘was optimistic, not to say
naı¨ve’ to think no additional resources would be required after abolishing the MP filter, n 26 above,
para 12.
53 The Public Administration Committee noted that there was very little discussion of the expected
impact of devolution and relations with ombudsmen for Wales and Scotland. As they point out the
current PCA holds the offices of Scottish Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration and Welsh
Administration Ombudsmen, which eases liaison but this may not always be so, n 26 above, para 24.
From October 2000 until January 2001, the Scottish Executive invited comments on Modernising the
Complaints System: Consultation on Public Sector Ombudsmen in Scotland, SE/2000/84 (2000),
which is also available on the consultations website at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/consultations/
misc/mtcs-00.asp>. This proposed a one-stop shop which would deal with complaints about the
Scottish Executive, local government and the NHS in Scotland. It also expressed the preference to
remove the ‘MSP filter’ in respect of complaints against the Scottish Executive, SI 1999 No 1351, art
103(3)(a).
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balance between fire-fighting and fire-watching in favour of the former. A
Commission for Public Administration with a research capacity could resolve
complaints and make suggestions for improving service which a Cabinet Office
unit could implement across the public sector.
In the 1970s Australia produced its ‘New Administrative Law’ following a trinity
of reports,54 which in turn owed something to the Franks Report. In 2000–2001
there are in addition to this study of ombudsmen, others on the arrangements for
judicial review55 and tribunals.56 This provides an opportunity to attempt a more
holistic view of complaints against government and the various redress
mechanisms. If it is ensured that judicial review, tribunals, ombudsmen and
complaints systems can pay particular attention to the citizen’s perspective then
this trinity of reviews might produce the ‘New Administrative Justice’.
54 Report of the Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee , chaired by Sir John Kerr, (Canberra:
Commonwealth Government Printer, 1971); Interim and Final Reports of the Committee on
Administrative Discretions chaired by Sir Henry Bland (Canberra: AGPS, 1973), and Report of the
Committee on Prerogative Writ Procedures chaired by R. J. Elliott QC (Canberra: AGPS, 1973), see
M. Partington, ‘The Reform of Public Law in Britain: Theoretical Problems and Practical
Considerations’ in P. McAuslan and J. McEldowney (eds), Law, Legitimacy and the Constitution
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1985) 191 which acknowledged a debt to J. Goldring, ‘The Foundations
of the ‘‘New Administrative Law’’ in Australia’ (1981) XL Australian Journal of Public
Administration 79.
55 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Review of the Crown Office List, chaired by Sir Jeffrey Bowman,
(London: Lord Chancellor’s Department, 2000). The recommendation to rename the Crown Office
List the Administrative Court has been accepted, see Practice Direction 20 July 2000.
56 Announced by the Lord Chancellor on 17 May 2000 and to be chaired by Sir Andrew Leggatt. Details
and the Review of Tribunals: Consultation Paper are available at
review.org.uk>.
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