Integrating Social and Political Strategies as Forms of Reciprocal Exchange into the Analysis of Corporate Governance Modes
| Author | Peter J. Buckley,Jean J. Boddewyn |
| Date | 01 October 2017 |
| Published date | 01 October 2017 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12243 |
British Journal of Management, Vol. 28, 575–588 (2017)
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8551.12243
Integrating Social and Political Strategies
as Forms of Reciprocal Exchange into the
Analysis of Corporate Governance Modes
Jean J. Boddewyn and Peter J. Buckley1
Baruch College, City University of New York, USA, and 1Centre for International Business, Leeds University
Business School, UK
Email: Jean.Boddewyn@baruch.cuny.edu; pjb@lubs.leeds.ac.uk
The concept and theory of reciprocityprovide fruitful ways of integrating social and politi-
cal strategies because both involvedonating valuable resources to non-market recipients –
mainly non-governmental organizations, politicians and regulators– who are not contrac-
tually bound to reciprocate although a return is normally expected. Besides, we interpret
the use of non-contractual reciprocity through relational-modelstheory and transaction-
cost economics. The former oers a model of ‘equality-matching’ that corresponds to
reciprocity while transaction-cost economics’ criteria of uncertainty, frequency and asset
specificity can be applied to non-contractual relationships in order to determine their ef-
ficiency. We also dierentiate reciprocity from bribery and oer researchimplications of
the fact that goods can be obtained from others without using transactions.
Introduction
Social and political strategies often interact as
when helping a local community brings a firm
in fruitful contact with local ‘political’ actors or
when getting a favourable lawpassed requires vari-
ous ‘social’ initiatives (Hillman, Keimand Schuler,
2004). Such an eective combination of these two
distinct non-market strategies was evident when
several US casino companies mixed philanthropy
and lobbying in the process of obtaining Mas-
sachusetts’ first gambling licence. These applicants
gave money to a fire-damaged day-care centre,
funded Independence Day fireworks, oered perks
and totes to local residents, sponsored a Hockey
League team, made a company’s CEO the hon-
orary chair of a pancake breakfast for 14,000 peo-
ple, prepared elaborate proposals showing their
potential contributions to local urban develop-
ment and poverty alleviation, and promised an
$800 million resort as well as a $15 million upfront
payment to the winning city which would also col-
lect $25 million a year. All of these philanthropic
and lobbying eorts were made in order to obtain
the political approval of local ocials and voters
in forthcoming ballotings about licensing the first
casino to be built and operated in this US state
(Business Week, 2013, pp. 30−32).
In this story,we witness the practical integration
of (1) corporate social responsibility (CSR), which
captures a firm’s intention to convince relevant
stakeholders that it contributes to social welfare,
and (2) corporate political action (CPA) which
addresses its eorts to influence political decision-
makers (den Hond et al., 2014, p. 804) – two
strategies thatcan be used interchangeably or com-
plementarily in the pursuit of business objectives
(Frynas and Stephens,2015, p. 484; Richter, 2011).
However, the conceptual anity between social
and political activities has not received adequate
attention in terms of identifying what makes the
two strategies shoots of the same stem (Liedong
et al., 2015, p. 408; Mellahi et al., 2016). Indeed,
many scholars point to the conceptual incompat-
ibility of firms’ socially responsible activities and
their instrumental political activities (e.g. Jamali
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