Intent In Forgery―II
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1965.tb01069.x |
| Published date | 01 May 1965 |
| Author | Tom Hadden |
| Date | 01 May 1965 |
INTENT IN FORGERY-I1
11.
INTENT
TO
DEFRAUD
AND
ECONOMIC
Lose
IT
has already been shown in a previous section of this article
that despite the words of the
1918
Forgery Act an intent to defraud
was always necessary at common law to establish the forgery of all
classes of document, both public and private.
It
is the object of this
section to show how the misinterpretation of the
common
law cases
implicit in the words of the Act has led to a considerable amount of
confusion in the post-1918 cases.
The confusion has perhaps been most apparent in the dispute
about the extent of the meaning of the words “with intent to
defraud.” The judicial approach in a series of cases since 1918,
R.
v.
Bassey,2
R.
v.
Potter,8
R.
v.
Garland
and culminating in
Welham
v.
D.P.P.,s
has been that in order to establish an intent
to
defraud it is sufllcient that. the accused should have intended to
induce the party deceived to do something to his prejudice which he
would not have done,
or
to refrain from doing something which he
would have done, had he realised that the document was false. The
opposing view, that some economic loss must be intended, has been
forcibly argued by
Dr.
Turner
It
will
be argued
here that the judicial view is legally correct, and hence that the
claims of the academic writers, though perhaps arguable
as
a matter
of policy, are not supported by the authorities cited, and that their
criticisms of the judges are unfounded.
There are two main lines of support for the judges’ view:
fist,
Buckley
J.’s
account of the difference between deceit and fraud, and
secondly
a
series of pre-1918 cases. Buckley
J.’s
definition
will
be
dealt with first since recourse to the earlier cases was not seriously
attempted until
Welham’s
case.
Buckley
J.
in 1908 had to consider whether
to
order a prosecu-
tion to be instituted under Acts of 1861 and 1862 against a company
director in the face of the refusal of the Law Ofilcers of the
Crown
to do
so.
The question was whether there was a prima facie case of
the commission of the offence of making
or
publishing
a
false
statement
or
account
or
a false
or
fraudulent entry in the company’s
accounts with intent to deceive
or
defraud, and in holding that
and Fridman.’
1
(1965)
28
M.L.R.
154.
2
(1931)
22
Cr.App.R.
160.
8
1958
2
All
E.R.
61.
4
1960
Crim.L.R.
129.
5
1961
A.C.
103; [1960]
1
All
E.R.
805.
8
1963
Crim.L.R.
465,
end
in
Kemy,
Outlines
of
Criminal
Law,
18th
ed.,
pp.
1
19581
Crim.L.R.
503;
119601
Crim.L.R.
630.
8
Ae
London
and
Globe Fmance Corporation Ltd.
119031 1
Ch.
728.
169-3!’0.
286
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