International trade protectionist policies and in-state preferences: A link

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/JOPP-17-01-2017-B002
Date01 March 2017
Published date01 March 2017
Pages31-52
AuthorSawsan Abutabenjeh,Stephen B. Gordon,Berhanu Mengistu
Subject MatterPublic policy & environmental management,Politics,Public adminstration & management,Government,Economics,Public Finance/economics,Texation/public revenue
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, VOLUME 17, ISSUE 1, 31-52 SPRING 2017
INTERNATIONAL TRADE PROTECTIONIST POLICIES AND IN-STATE
PREFERENCES: A LINK
Sawsan Abutabenjeh, Stephen B. Gordon and Berhanu Mengistu*
ABSTRACT. By implementing various forms of preference policies, countries
around the world intervene in their economies for their own political and
economic purposes. Likewise, twenty-five states in the U.S. have
implemented in-state prefe rence policies (NASPO, 2012) to protect and
support their own vendors from out-of-state competition to achieve similar
purposes. The purpose of this paper is to show the connection between
protectionist public policy instruments noted in the international trade
literature and the in-state preference policies within the United States. This
paper argues t hat the reasons and the rationales for adopting these
preference policies in international trade and the state s’ contexts are
similar. Given the similarity in policy outcomes, the paper further argues that
the international trade literature provides an overarching explanation to help
understand what states could expect in applying in-state preference policies.
INTRODUCTION
Public procurement plays an important role in supporting the
operation of governmental organizations, the delivery of services by
such entities, and the achievement of a variety of social, economic,
and environmental objectives that may or may not be related to what
is being acquired. As “the designated legal authority to advise, plan,
-------------------------------------
* Sawsan Abutabenjeh, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor, Department of
Political Science a nd Public Administration, Mississippi State University. Her
current research focus is on public management, public procurement, public
finance, and gende r in public affairs and leadership. Stephen B. Gordon,
PhD, FNIGP, CPPO, is Program Director, Procurement & Contracts
Management, School of Continuing & Professional Studies, Uni versity of
Virginia. His research interest is in public procurement. Berhanu Mengistu,
Ph.D., is a professor, School of Public Service, Strome College of Business,
Old Dominion University. His rese arch interests include public policy and
finance, privatization, public corruption and conflict analysis and resolution.
Copyright © 2017 by PrAcademics Press
32 ABUTABENJEH, GORDON & MENGISTU
obtain, deliver, and evaluate a government’s expenditures on goods
and services” (Prier & McCue, 2009, p. 329) public procurement
officials must acquire needed materiel, services, solutions, and
infrastructure through sourcing methods and procedures that are
required to comply with a framework of policies that prescribe what
public procurement officials can, must, and cannot do. Included in
this framework of policies are preferential procurement policies which
international governments use to intervene in trade to protect their
economies and citizens (Green, 1994; Pregelj, 2001; Ward, 2000).
Like their international counterparts, some state governments have
also implemented preferential procurement policies in the form of in-
state preferences to grant an advantage to vendors located within
their borders or to products or services grown, made, or provided
within their borders when source selection decisions are made
(Hefner, 1996; Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2011; McCrudden, 2007;
Moreland, 2012; Qiao, Thai, & Cummings, 2009).
This paper argues that in-state preference policies can be linked
to the protectionist policies cited in the context of international trade ,
which are also referred to as discriminatory procurement policies or
preferential procurement policies. The link is shown by examining the
similarities between the rationales and arguments for or against
protectionist policies in international trade and the preference
policies implemented by state governments. The paper further
contends that arguments for or against a variety of formal
discriminatory policies and other strategies in international trade
could help inform what the impacts of in-state procurement
preference policies would be in the context of the domestic economy.
Although considerable research related to preference policies has
been done on the international level, very little has been done on the
domestic level. Because of the lack of research at the domestic level
and because “a longitudinal review of [the policies’] results is never
conducted” (Qiao, Thai, & Cummings, 2009, p.397), establishing a
link between the international and the domestic contexts would
constitute a valuable contribution to the area of public policy. With
this link, researchers could borrow from international trade research
to investigate the impact of in-state preference policies on a state’s
economy by focusing on protectionist arguments within the
international trade context.

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