Introducing OMOV: The Labour Party–Trade Union Review Group and the 1994 Leadership Contest
| Author | Mark Wickham‐Jones |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.2012.00910.x |
| Date | 01 March 2014 |
| Published date | 01 March 2014 |
Introducing OMOV: The Labour
Party–Trade Union Review Group and
the 1994 Leadership Contest
Mark Wickham-Jones
Abstract
Most scholars conclude that the introduction of one member, one vote
(OMOV) into the electoral college that chooses the Labour leader demon-
strates a new, reduced role for the party’s affiliated trade unions. This article
examines the adoption of OMOV by Labour. It looks at discussions in the
Labour party–trade union review group that moulded the decision to adopt
OMOV during 1992–1993. Drawing on the full breakdown of results, it goes on
to examine the outcome of the 1994 leadership contest. The distribution of
votes, union by union, indicates that, contrary to the conventional view, trade
union leaderships retained the capacity to shape the pattern of voting through
their ability to nominate candidates. The article concludes that the introduction
of OMOV did not reduce the role of trade union leaderships in Labour’s internal
affairs in the manner that many scholars have concluded to be the case.
1. Introduction
Over the last couple of decades, much academic literature on the British
Labour movement has highlighted the apparent loosening of the link
between trade unions and the political party to which many affiliate. The
modernization of Labour — begun well before Tony Blair’s election as the
party’s leader in 1994 — is taken as evidence of a party recasting its institu-
tional structures and governing practices (see, e.g. Hay 1999; Heffernan
2000). The formal link between Labour and its trade union affiliates remains,
of course, but as a direct result of successive reforms, it is often held to be
more distant and weaker than at any time in the party’s history (for a
comprehensive overview, see McIlroy 2009a: 44–55, 2009b,c). In particular,
political commentators and scholars alike heralded the introduction of one
Mark Wickham-Jones is at the University of Bristol.
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British Journal of Industrial Relations doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8543.2012.00910.x
52:1 March 2014 0007–1080 pp. 33–56
© John Wiley & Sons Ltd/London School of Economics 2012. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
member, one vote (OMOV) in 1993 for internal elections within Labour as a
major development and as a decisive break with the past (see, e.g. Fielding
1999: 75–76; Ludlam 1999: 136-7; Webb 1995: 1–14). Proponents of the move
declared it to be an important reform that would alter the role of trade unions
within the party in a fundamental manner. For the most part, political
observers and academics agreed. They concluded that it demonstrated a
fundamentally new arrangement, one in which trade union leaders would
have much less opportunity to shape outcomes in the Labour party, particu-
larly in terms of influencing its leadership elections. The reform had margin-
alized union elites. Ben Pimlott’s judgement was typical: When John Smith,
the instigator of the change, died in May 1994, Pimlott (1994: 146) wrote,
‘His most important success was one member, one vote — an issue that
had dogged, depressed and debilitated the Labour party for fifteen years or
more.’ For A. Watkins (1998: 173), it was ‘a change of revolutionary pro-
portions’. When the restructured mechanism to elect the Labour leader was
first deployed to choose Smith’s successor in 1994, The Guardian journalist K.
Harper (1994: 5) wrote, ‘Union leaders are no longer regarded as kingmakers
and Labour has a new electoral procedure which has swept away the block
voting system.’ Participants and commentators alike were, of course, divided
over the normative implication of the reform. For some, it was an essential
measure if Labour was ever to win power again; for others, it was a betrayal
of the values and causes that had guided the movement for nearly a hundred
years.
The classic text on relations between the Labour and the unions, L.
Minkin’s (1991) volume, The Contentious Alliance, was published just before
the introduction of OMOV. In that volume, Minkin offered a robust and
detailed account of the evolving relationship, one that highlighted many
tensions and indicated its capacity to endure, in one form or another. In a
detailed survey of the 1990s, J. McIlroy (1998, 2009c) depicted a complicated
though strained alliance given the tensions and differences between organized
labour and its parliamentary wing (a similar analysis was provided by
Ludlam and Taylor 2003). For many scholars, however, the introduction of
OMOV to leadership elections in 1993 was straightforward in reducing the
power of organized labour and in excluding trade union leaderships from the
role that they had previously enjoyed. Their ‘patronage’ was reduced (Field-
ing 1999: 75). In an authoritative account of the reform, T. Quinn (2004a:
134) concluded, ‘The reform of the electoral college dramatically reduced the
role of union leaders and officials. Union influence would henceforth be
administered through the agency of individuals and would be mediated by
turnout rates.’ Two other scholars concluded in similar vein that ‘block votes
on a winner-take-all basis were discontinued’ (Alderman and Carter 1994:
325). L. Stark (1996: 115) noted, ‘Union leaders could no longer be counted
upon to deliver large number of votes.’ In her account, Meg Russell qualified
just how dramatic the reduction in the role of the unions was: it was not, she
argued, matched by a shift to the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP).
Instead, she placed emphasis on the role that would be played by the media
34 British Journal of Industrial Relations
© John Wiley & Sons Ltd/London School of Economics 2012.
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