Introduction: cooperation, conflict, and interaction in the global commons
| Date | 01 September 2021 |
| Author | Akasemi Newsome,Marianne Riddervold |
| Published date | 01 September 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/00471178211036598 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178211036598
International Relations
2021, Vol. 35(3) 365 –383
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/00471178211036598
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Introduction: cooperation,
conflict, and interaction in
the global commons
Marianne Riddervold
Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and University of
California Berkeley
Akasemi Newsome
University of California Berkeley and Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences
Abstract
The global commons – the High Seas, Antarctica, the Atmosphere, and Outer Space – are
resource domains outside the authority of states. Historically, the global commons have been
practically inaccessible and thus rarely subject to sovereignty claims and international regulations.
With technological advances and environmental developments, the global commons have become
a key site for international relations (hereinafter IR). In spite of often competing claims from state
and non-state actors to these areas, the global commons have remained mainly cooperative. This
is not what one would expect from most IR perspectives in a close to anarchical environment
and a volatile geopolitical international environment. This Special Issue sets out to address this
puzzle by asking: To what extent and why is there little conflict in the global commons? For this
purpose, this introduction develops a common framework that distinguishes between three
models and corresponding hypotheses of the factors affecting the level of cooperation and
conflict in these domains. While two are based on realist and liberal IR perspectives, we draw
on constructivism, political theory, and law to develop a third model, called the Human Heritage
model. To conclude, this introduction also sums up the findings and discusses their implications
for the global commons and IR studies.
Keywords
conflict, collective goods, geopolitics, global commons, human heritage, international order
Corresponding author:
Marianne Riddervold, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, Norwegian Institute of International
Affairs and University of California Berkeley, PO Box 400, Elverum, 2418, Norway.
Email: marianne.riddervold@inn.no
1036598IRE0010.1177/00471178211036598International RelationsRiddervold and Newsome
research-article2021
Article
366 International Relations 35(3)
Introduction
The world can be divided into two realms: Areas or resource domains that fall under
some sort of national jurisdictions and those that do not. The global commons – the High
Seas, Antarctica, the Atmosphere, and Outer Space – are areas or resource domains that
lie beyond the political reach of any one state and are in principle resource domains to
which all states and other actors have legal access.1 Not being subject to state sover-
eignty, a wide plethora of state and non-state actors (individuals, subnational authorities,
firms, indigenous groups) have legal access and can potentially exploit them.2 Historically,
however, the global commons have been practically inaccessible, and have therefore
hardly been subject to sovereignty claims.3 Instead, the global commons have ‘been
guided by the principle of the common heritage of humankind – in the case of the High
Seas’.4 With technological advances and environmental developments, this is changing
rapidly. Due to the common access nature of outer space, the US, Russia, China, India,
and most recently Saudi-Arabia, have launched satellites, and are increasing their efforts
to get to the moon and to Mars. In the high seas, areas such as the South China Sea and
the Arctic are increasingly subject to competition over resources and sovereignty claims,
and amongst states, great power rivalry.5 Many have also argued that the virtual realm
has come to constitute its own area of the global commons; as one where there is limited
or no international regulation, and where a number of states and private actors provide
the technical, physical, and regulatory infrastructure.6
Due to the unique non-territoriality of the global commons, not only states, but also
non-state actors are increasingly active in making claims in and to these domains. While
the European Union (EU) is prominent for its environmental policies linked to the atmos-
phere (climate change and global warming), its extensive space program is less known,
and the EU is becoming a maritime power in its own right.7 Other examples of non-state
actors who are active in the global commons include multinational companies deploying
satellites and even space ships, various non-state organizations promoting issues such as
environmental protection, the peaceful exploitation of space, indigenous peoples’ rights
in the Arctic, cities and regions developing their own environmental policies, shipown-
ers’ and international workers’ organizations, just to mention a few. As concerns about
the environmental protection of the atmosphere, the high seas and space mount, the
global commons have moved further into public awareness as well.
Nonetheless, few studies systematically explore the global commons from different
IR perspectives across cases. In light of the increased salience of these issues for under-
standing IR more broadly, this lack of studies is puzzling and something this Special
Issue sets out to address. What is more – the global commons present us with an empiri-
cal and theoretical puzzle: Despite all of these actors and claims, the global commons
have remained relatively peaceful. To mention just a few examples, in space, state and
non-state actors cooperate at the international space station, with Russia, and from 2020,
Musk’s SpaceX, transporting US astronauts.8 Both states and various non-state actors are
active in seeking to reduce the environmental impact in the different commons.
Discussions in the UN on how to regulate weapons in space have been slow, but still
engaged all the great powers.9 Similarly, the large number of competing claims being
made to the Arctic mostly take place within established institutions.10 The same is true
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