Isaacs v Robertson
Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
Judge | Lord Diplock |
Judgment Date | 13 June 1984 |
Docket Number | Privy Council Appeal No. 2 of 1983 |
Court | Privy Council |
Date | 13 June 1984 |
Lord Diplock; Lord Keith of Kinkel; Lord Roskill; Lord Brightman; Lord Templeman
Privy Council Appeal No. 2 of 1983
Privy Council
Practice and Procedure - Judgment — Duty to obey judgments until set aside — Inapplicability of the concepts of void and voidable to judgments — Trespass action begun in 1977 and adjourned to a date to be fixed — No further steps taken until 1979 — Interlocutory injunction granted to the respondent restraining the appellant from trespassing on property — Failure by appellant to comply with the injunction — Application by the respondent for appellant's committal for contempt of court — Appellant contending that his disobedience could not constitute contempt as the order granting the interlocutory injunctions was a nullity — Order 34 Rule 11(1)(a), Rules of the Supreme Court.
[ Delivered byLord Diplock]: In an action started by the respondent (“Robertson”) against the appellant (“Isaacs”) and two other defendants in the High Court of Saint Vincent by writ dated 23rd and served on 25th July, 1977, Robertson claimed, among other relief, an injunction to restrain Isaacs from trespassing upon a parcel of land at Villa in Saint Vincent, some 14 acres in extent (“the disputed land”) which had become the subject of a family quarrel with the merits of which the instant appeal is not in any way concerned. Immediately upon the issue of this writ Robertson applied to the court for an interlocutory injunction restraining Isaacs and the other two defendants:-
“… by themselves, or by their servants or agents or otherwise howsoever from entering or crossing [the disputed land] and from interfering and/or molesting the plaintiff whether by his servants agents or otherwise howsoever in the occupation and use of [the disputed land].”
This application came before the judge in chambers on 13th September, 1977, and was then adjourned to a date to be fixed. Thereafter no further steps were taken in the action until, on 31st May, 1979, the application for the interlocutory injunction was brought on for hearing in the High Court before Glasgow, J. who granted it, subject to the usual undertaking as to damages, which, in their Lordships' opinion, plainly identifies it as intended to be interlocutory not final although it omits to state expressly that it is to remain in force only until judgment or further order.
The other two defendants were represented at the hearing of this application on 31st May, 1979. Isaacs, by his own choice, did not appear and was not represented at the hearing although he had notice of it. The terms of the judge's order were communicated to Isaacs' solicitor and a copy of the court's order was served upon Isaacs personally on 11th July, 1979.
On 31st July, 1979, Robertson issued a notice of motion for the committal of Isaacs for contempt of court in refusing to obey the interlocutory injunction of 31st May, 1979. The application was supported by uncontradicted affidavit evidence which disclosed flagrant breaches by Isaacs of the High Court's order, and was heard by Glasgow, J. on 21st and 22nd August, 1979. He delivered judgment on 22nd November, 1979, dismissing Robertson's motion with costs; but their Lordships have not been provided with a copy of his formal order against which Robertson appealed to the Court of Appeal by notice dated 26th November, 1979.
The appeal came on for hearing in April, 1981. The reasons for judgment of the court (Peterkin, C.J., Berridge, J.A. and Robotham, J.A. (Acting)) were delivered by Robotham, J.A. (Acting) on 20th July, 1981. The appeal was allowed; Isaacs was found to be in contempt of court for disobeying the interlocutory injunction of 31st May, 1979; no penalty by way of fine or imprisonment was inflicted because the Court of Appeal held that he would have been entitled to succeed in an application to have the injunction set aside if he had made such application; but he was ordered to pay Robertson his costs of the appeal and those incurred by Robertson on the application for the interlocutory injunction and in the committal proceedings in the High Court.
It is symptomatic of the slip-shod way in which his litigation has been conducted since it was started nearly seven...
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