James White v Express Newspapers
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | The Honourable Mr Justice Tugendhat,Mr Justice Tugendhat |
| Judgment Date | 25 March 2014 |
| Neutral Citation | [2014] EWHC 814 (QB) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
| Date | 25 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No: HQ14D00139 |
[2014] EWHC 814 (QB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
The Honourable Mr Justice Tugendhat
Case No: HQ14D00139
Robert Sterling (instructed by Carutthers Law) for the Claimants
Christina Michalos (instructed by Express Newspapers) for the Defendant
Hearing date: 18 March 2014
Approved Judgment
I direct that pursuant to CPR PD 39A para 6.1 no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.
On 18 March 2014 I handed down my judgment in this libel action [2014] EWHC 657 (QB) ("the Judgment"). Following that there was a hearing in relation to costs. The Defendant asks for an order that the claimants pay two thirds of the Defendant's costs of the proceedings arising from its application notices dated 19 November 2013. In the alternative it asks that there be no order as to cost. The Claimants each submit that the costs of the application should be in the case.
As recorded in the Judgment, the application notices dated 19 November 2013 were in each case made pursuant to Part 53 Practice Direction 4.1(1). The ruling sought was that, in the case of each Claimant, the words complained of were not capable of bearing the meaning attributed to the words complained of by the Claimant. However, as explained in paragraph 5 of the Judgment, I did not make a ruling on those applications. Instead I invited the parties to consider whether they wished to agree, and in due course they did agree, that the hearing should be treated as the trial of a preliminary issue in the action. The difference is that on the trial of a preliminary issue the court decides what the words complained of actually mean, and does not simply delimit the range of possible meanings.
The first point relied on by Ms Michalos in support of her contention is that the Defendant's applications were successful because it was held that the words complained of do not bear the meaning pleaded namely that each of the Claimants was guilty. She referred to paragraph 16 of the Judgment in which I held that the words complained of "clearly fell short of alleging actual dishonesty or other wrongdoing". She submits that amounts to a finding that the words complained of were not capable of bearing those meanings.
Next Ms Michalos submitted that an order for costs in the case would be very harsh on the Defendant. She submits that there is the risk that the result would be that the Defendant pay the full costs of the Claimants as well as its own costs. That would be unjust because the Claimants each exaggerated their claims by attributing to the words complained of a meaning more serious than that which I have found the words complained of to bear. She referred to the White Book (2014 edition) para 44.3.1.2, p1313. Further, submits Ms Michalos, to plead a libel case too high is an interference with the right of the Defendant to freedom of expression for reasons explained in the judgment I gave in John v. Guardian [2008] EWHC 3066 (QB) at paras 16 to 17.
Ms Michalos further submitted that an order of costs in the case would discourage the Defendant from co-operating with claimants in the future in the event that a trial of a preliminary issue on meaning may be proposed either by the parties or by the court.
Mr Sterling notes that on an application under the Practice Direction the court is required by sub paragraph (3) to decide whether the statement is capable of bearing any other meaning defamatory of the claimant, that is to say other than a meaning attributed to it by a claimant. Accordingly, in her argument on 19 February 2013, Ms Michalos had submitted in relation to Mr Callaghan:
"… that this case really calls for a new Chase level 4 – in other words a level below a clear case of 'grounds to investigate'. Insofar as the meaning in respect of Callaghan is thought to be classified with conventional Chase levels, it is submitted that this is Chase level 3 at the very lower end…".
And in respect of Mr White Ms Michalos submitted that:
"It is possible that an unreasonable reader may infer something to the discredit of Mr White; but a reasonable reader would...
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