A JOB FOR JURISPRUDENCE
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1945.tb02897.x |
| Author | C. P. Harvey |
| Published date | 01 November 1945 |
| Date | 01 November 1945 |
MODERN
LAW
REVIEW
Nov.,
1945
his
conclusions on what he had learned during his practical experience in
India
rather than on the study of law in the
books.
In more recent days
Dicey, Bryce, Markby, Salmond, Maitland, Pollock, and Holdsworthw
have played their
part
in developing a living jurisprudence which, although
differing both
in
method and substance from that of the Continent,
is
of
peculiar importance as expressing the genius of the English people.*6
Perhaps this can be best summed up in Maitland’s conception of law as a
seamless web, that gradual evolution which is true of English life as
a
whole.
The ordinary student will find this book too difficult and abstruse
for
his
purposes, but
it
will prove stimulating and of value to the scholar.
Not every legal theory has been “reduced to
its
essential foundations,”
but, on the whole, Dr. Friedmann has succeeded in presenting an accurate
picture of the varying, and frequently conflicting, ideas on which the
more importaat legal philosophies have been based. This
is
particularly
welcome
at
the present time when the foundations of law, both international
and national, must be strengthened
if
the world is to enter on the era of
peace and justice which we all
so
eagerly desire.
A.
L.
GOODHART.
A
JOB
FOR JURISPRUDENCE
To
the Editorial Committee, MODERN
LAW
REVIEW.
DEAR
SIRS,
In
“
Another Job for Jurisprudence,” published in your March number,
Professor Walter. B. Kennedy of New York has done me the honour of
a
full-length critique of my article, “A Job for Jurisprudence,” which
appeared in your issue of April,
1944.
I
trust that
I
may be permitted
a
reply, since the subject of law reform is of great importance and since
Professor Kennedy
has
missed my point more widely and
at
greater
length than
I
should have supposed possible. His desire to prove that
I
am
as
mad
as
a
hatter
is
quite understandable, but he has allowed himself
to
be
led astray by over-keenness. Thus on p.
20
he quotes me, in in-
verted commas,
as
saying that the gulf between established legal
principles and the social conditions of to-day
is
“a chasm to be bridged
in
defiance of logic and legal theory and solved by ‘realistic improvisa-
tions.’’’
I
should never
be
one for
“
solving chasms” and
I
rather resent
this
aspersion on my command of language
;
but my complaint goes deeper
than this, since what
I
actually wrote was: “a gulf which is sometimes
to
be bridged, in defiance of logic and legal theory, by realistic improvisa-
tions, and
at
other times is not bridged at all.” My point-in case there
should be any doubt in the minds of Professor Kennedy’s readers-was
not that the gulf mentioned could always be bridged by
a
process of
Although Holdsworth was primarily an historian, many
of
his eassys deal
with subjects usually regarded as part
of
legal philosophy.
In
reviewing Dr. Friedmann’s
book
in
the
,?wadian
Bar
Review
1945)
23
C.B.R.
267,
Dr.
C.
A.
Wright,
K.C.,
says that it maAks the rebirth
o!
jurisl
prudential thought in England after many barren years. This seems a strange
view for
so
distinguished a scholar as Dr. Wright to hold. Without in any way
denying the value of Dr. Friedmann’s interesting work
I
doubt whether its
contribution to original jurisprudential thought is equal
to
that
of
the
scholars
I
have mentioned.
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