Juries: Evidence of Deliberations
| DOI | 10.1350/jcla.68.4.290.36519 |
| Published date | 01 August 2004 |
| Date | 01 August 2004 |
| Subject Matter | House of Lords |
House of Lords
Juries: Evidence of Deliberations
Rv Connor and Another; R v Mirza [2004] UKHL 2; [2004] All ER
(D) 189 (Jan)
In each of two conjoined cases, a letter had been written to the court by
a juror after majority verdicts of guilty had been delivered. In one case
the juror alleged that the majority of the jury had been racially preju-
diced against the defendant, and in the other case the juror alleged that
most of the jurors wanted to reach a verdict quickly and had not
considered the case properly.
In each case, the Court of Appeal dismissed appeals against conviction
based on the alleged irregularity in the jury’s deliberations. It did,
however, certify in each case that the following questions of law of
general importance were involved, namely:
1. whether the common law prohibition on the admission of evi-
dence of a jury’s deliberations prevailed even if the Court of
Appeal were presented with a statement from a juror which, if
admitted, would provide prima facie evidence of jury partiality in
breach of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights;
and
2. whether s. 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, when interpreted
in the light of s. 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and Article 6 of
the Convention, prohibited the admission into evidence of a state-
ment from a juror which, if admitted, would provide prima facie
evidence of partiality in breach of Article 6, and, if so, whether s. 8
was incompatible with Article 6 to the extent that it prohibited the
admission into evidence of such a statement.
H
ELD
,
DISMISSING THE APPEALS
(
LORD STEYN DISSENTING IN PART
),
s. 8(1) of the 1981 Act was addressed to third parties who could be
punished for contempt, and not to the court, which had the responsibil-
ity of ensuring that the defendant had a fair trial. It was obvious that the
court could not release jurors, journalists or anyone else from the con-
straints of s. 8(1). It was, however, going too far to suggest that the trial
court would be in contempt of itself if during a trial, having received
allegations similar to those made by the jurors in the instant cases, it
investigated them and disclosed the result of those investigations to
counsel so that they might have an opportunity of making submissions
about them to the court; or that the Court of Appeal in its turn, or
persons acting under its direction, would be in contempt if the Court of
Appeal decided that in the interests of justice the allegations had to be
investigated. The court had to look at the common law for guidance as
to the extent to which any such investigation was permissible.
The common law rule that after the verdict had been delivered,
evidence directed to matters intrinsic to the deliberations of jurors was
290
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