Kai Möller, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 219 pp, hb £ 50.00.

Published date01 November 2013
Date01 November 2013
AuthorPritam Baruah
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12052_2
reasoning (eg the degree of popular authority assigned to legal as opposed to
political conceptions of rights), and how the bureaucracy is organised (eg back-
ground and training of policy makers) are all likely to influence patterns of
institutional interaction in a three-stage system of rights review.
Why does the new model’s normative promise remain unfulfilled? Why do
significant gaps exist between theory and practice? The investigations needed to
answer this line of inquiry arguably stand outside the bounds of Gardbaum’s
present project – to offer the new model as an alternative constitutional paradigm
of rights protection. However, they are fundamental to the success of his theory
of the new model. An accurate assessment of its potential contribution to
constitutional theory requires further investigation into the character, circum-
stances and quality of institutional interaction on rights and the constitutional
conditions that improve and impede the appropriate forms of institutional
interaction. Only after analysing these issues can we provide an assessment of the
feasibility of the new model’s commendable ambitions.
Scott Stephenson*
Kai Möller,The Global Model of Constitutional Rights, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012, 219 pp, hb £ 50.00.
Kai Möller offers us a bold and controversial thesis in this monograph: that there
is an emerging global model of constitutional rights, best understood as con-
trolled by a right to autonomy, along with the values of equality and democracy.
The book abounds with nuanced theoretical insights on autonomy, democracy
and judicial review, and controversially paints an anti-perfectionist picture of
constitutional rights that prima facie protects all individual interests, including
unethical ones. Advanced with ample evidence from practice and unhesitating
philosophical engagement, the book holds great attraction for legal and consti-
tutional theorists. Moral and political philosophers would be interested espe-
cially, in how the practice of constitutional law shapes the understanding of
moral concepts and human rights. Expansive in content, the work is a welcome
attempt to make sense of, and justify, the evolving constitutional law jurispru-
dence involving contested moral and political issues. Given its breadth, I will
restrict my comments to Möller’s methodology and selected issues related to
anti-perfectionism, value pluralism, and judicial review.
The book begins by introducing the global model and clarifying the nature of
its project. The arguments are then presented in two parts. Part I, ‘The Scope of
Rights’, presents a theory of rights rooted in a conception of personal autonomy
that aims to capture the general moral structure shared by many or all constitu-
tional rights. Part II, ‘The Structure of Justification’, explains how the subject
matter of constitutional rights and policy-making is ‘the specification of spheres
*Yale Law School.
bs_bs_banner
Reviews
© 2013 The Authors. The Modern Law Review © 2013 The Modern Law Review Limited.
1162 (2013) 76(6) MLR 1156–1169

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT