Kattos v Prettys (A Firm)
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE RIX,MR JUSTICE HOLMAN |
| Judgment Date | 22 January 2001 |
| Neutral Citation | [2001] EWCA Civ 53 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Date | 22 January 2001 |
| Docket Number | A2/2000/6516 |
[2001] EWCA Civ 53
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION (His Honour Judge Langan QC,
sitting as a Judge of the High Court)
The Royal Courts of Justice
The Strand
London WC2A
Lord Justice Rix
Mr Justice Holman
A2/2000/6516
MR R SPON-SMITH (instructed by Cunningham John, Fairstead House, Bury Road, Thetford, Norfolk) appeared on behalf of the Applicant
MR A POST (instructed by Prettys, Elm House, 25 Elm Street, Ipswich, Suffolk) appeared on behalf of the Respondent
Monday 22 January 2001
Mrs Kattos had a claim against her solicitors, Prettys, in negligence. An issue of limitation arose as to, at any rate, parts of her claim. That issue was resolved in the first instance in her favour by the order of Deputy District Judge Watkins on 29 July 1999. In the ordinary course, she obtained the costs of that hearing.
On appeal, His Honour Judge Langan QC on 4 October 1999 decided that issue in favour of the defendants and overturned the decision of the deputy district judge. And in the ordinary way, the defendants obtained the costs in respect of both hearings.
There was then an appeal to this court. On the eve of the hearing, that appeal and, indeed, the whole action were settled by a compromise, under which the claimant was to receive £35,000 and her costs. A minute of the compromise, dated 17 April 2000, was drawn up and signed by solicitors for both parties. The minute read as follows:
"The parties having agreed that the Defendants will pay to the Claimant in settlement of her claim against the Defendants the sum of £35,000.00 and her costs on the standard basis to be the subject of a detailed assessment if not agreed
We the solicitors for the Claimant (who is sui juris) and for the Defendants hereby request that an order be made that:
This appeal be dismissed by consent;
The Defendants do pay the Claimant's costs of the action and of this appeal on the standard basis to be the subject of a detailed assessment if not agreed;
The Claimant's costs be the subject of a detailed assessment under the Civil Legal Aid (General) Regulations 1989."
An order was subsequently made in those terms on 10 May 2000, save that in error the first paragraph of the order included the words "for permission to appeal" after the words "the appellants appeal". That error was amended under the slip rule on 16 May 2000. 5. Immediately after the making of the compromise and the drawing up of the minute of order of 17 April 2000 the very next day, or perhaps the day after a dispute broke out in correspondence between solicitors as to the effect of the compromise upon the order below of His Honour Judge Langan, which gave to the defendants the costs of the hearings on the limitation issue up to that point. Despite that dispute, the order was subsequently drawn up on 10 May 2000, subject to the slip which I have mentioned, in the words of the minuted agreement.
There the matter rested for some time, until in due course the question of the detailed assessment of the claimant's costs came up for hearing. By an order made on 8 November 2000 and drawn on 20 November 2000, District Judge Temple, sitting at Cambridge County Court, declared that the order of this court, the Court of Appeal, sealed on 10 May 2000:
"… does not entitle the Claimant to recover the costs of the hearing before Deputy District Judge Watkins on the 29th May 1999 or the hearing before His Honour Judge Langan QC on the 4th October 1999."
That order gave rise to Mrs Kattos'...
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