Kevin Mark Brown v DPP

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeLORD JUSTICE MANN,MR JUSTICE HOLLAND
Judgment Date26 October 1993
Judgment citation (vLex)[1993] EWHC J1026-4
CourtQueen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)
Date26 October 1993
Docket NumberCO 583/93

[1993] EWHC J1026-4

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

(DIVISIONAL COURT)

Before: Lord Justice Mann and Mr Justice Holland

CO 583/93

Kevin Mark Brown
and
The Director of Public Prosecutions

MR S CHIPPECK (instructed by Tunbridge Wells, Kent TN1 1JA) appeared on behalf of the Appellant.

MR S RUSSELL FLINT (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service, Maidstone, Kent ME14 1PT) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.

1

Tuesday, 26th October 1993.

LORD JUSTICE MANN
2

I will ask Holland J to give the first judgment.

MR JUSTICE HOLLAND
3

MR JUSTICE HOLLANDKevin Mark Brown appeals by way of case stated against his conviction by the Justices for the County of Kent acting in and for the Petty Sessional Division of Tunbridge Wells and Cranbrook. That Court was sitting at Tunbridge Wells on 21st September 1992 when it had before it an information in the following terms: "the Appellant on 18th May 1992, at Civic Road, Tunbridge Wells, did drive a motor vehicle on a road after consuming so much alcohol that the proportion of his breath was 43 microgrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of breath, which exceeded the prescribed limit, contrary to section 5(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988."

4

The evidence that was relied upon by the prosecution, and which was indeed crucial to the conviction, was evidence provided by an unknown policewoman. As the evidence is set out in the case stated, it reads as follows:

5

"That evidence was by a policewoman of a conversation between her and the Appellant when the latter attended the police station in connection with a matter unrelated to the alleged offence. The conversation was that the relevant Police Officer asked the Appellant how he had returned to the Police Station so quickly and he replied that he had driven there. The officer said she could smell intoxicating liquor on the Appellant's breath. The Appellant then said he had not said that he had driven to the police station, but he walked there. Further, he placed "a bunch of keys on the counter and said he was then going to walk home and that the Officer had better keep the car keys."

6

That was the crucial passage of the evidence. For their part, dealing with the matter first as a question of fact, the Justices accepted the policewoman's account, and inferred from that that the Appellant had driven the vehicle at the material time.

7

Turning from fact to law, the Justices received submissions on behalf of the Appellant which were based upon the Code of Practice C, in its terms issued pursuant to section 66 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. It was submitted to the Justices that they should find that there were breaches of the procedure prescribed by that Code of Practice, inherent in the evidence that I have recited, which should have been taken into account by them pursuant to section 67(11) of the Act when considering whether to exclude the evidence of the policewoman pursuant to section 78(1) of the Act; the central submission being that that exclusion should follow because the admission of such evidence would have such an adverse effect on the proceedings.

8

It is necessary to turn to the breaches of the Act that were contended before the Justices, and upon which they had to rule in order to arrive at the conviction. The first submission was based upon the Code of Practice C:10.1 under the heading "Cautions". It reads:

9

"A person whom there are grounds to suspect of an offence must be cautioned before any questions "about it (or further questions if it is his answers to previous questions that provide grounds for suspicion) are put to him for the purpose of obtaining evidence which may be given to a court in a prosecution."

10

It was submitted to the Justices, as it was submitted to us, that they should properly infer from the nature of the evidence given that the policewoman had grounds to suspect an offence, so that...

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