Kim Nossal Charlie Foxtrot: Fixing Defence Procurement in Canada Toronto
Date | 01 March 2017 |
Author | J.L. Granatstein |
DOI | 10.1177/0020702017694155 |
Published date | 01 March 2017 |
Subject Matter | Book Reviews |
International Journal
2017, Vol. 72(1) 142–154
!The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0020702017694155
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Book Reviews
Kim Nossal
Charlie Foxtrot: Fixing Defence Procurement in Canada
Toronto: Dundurn, 2016. 199pp., $19.99 (paperback)
ISBN: 978–1–4597–3675–7
Reviewed by: J.L. Granatstein, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, Toronto
jgranatstein@rogers.com
That defence procurement in Canada has been and is a mess is beyond dispute.
From the Ross Rifle at the turn of the century to the CF-105 Arrow, from the
botched Sea King helicopter replacement to the Iltis jeep, the continuing F-35
fighter debacle, and a host of other delayed equipment purchases, Canadian gov-
ernments and the Canadian defence establishment have wasted years and billions
of dollars and left the nation’s defenders exposed to unnecessary risk. The title,
Charlie Foxtrot, is military speak for Cluster F@#k, and that derogatory title lays
out the scope of the mess. Kim Nossal’s clearly written and well-researched book
offers good history and calm judgments that tell us how Ottawa might do better.
The blame for this situation rests on many. First in line is the Canadian people.
With the sole exception of the early Cold War years when Louis St. Laurent’s
Liberal government spent up to 8 percent of GDP on the armed forces,
Canadians have never been willing to pay for defence at a level that would provide
the military with the best weaponry. We have been easy riders, Nossal says rightly
enough, willing to be marginal players militarily and happy to let the Americans
defend us, moaning about protecting Canadian sovereignty notwithstanding. It’s
always defence on the cheap. But it’s not only the people’s fault. The military for
the last 65 years or so has always wanted to be capable of filling all combat roles,
something that the easy riding voters will not pay for, but something that the
generals and admirals call for without cessation lest their service be sharply cut.
That Cabinet ministers have gone along with this while knowing that they would
never provide the funds necessary for state-of-the-art equipment for all three ser-
vices puts them to shame as well. The result, Nossal states bluntly, is that Canada is
not ‘‘a serious country’’ (147).
This situation persists. Today there are three ministers responsible for defence
procurement, a virtual guarantor of delays and turf wars. There is the high and
increasing inflation of defence costs, not least in naval vessels and aircraft. The
ever-increasing US dollar exchange rate runs up costs. There is the ongoing scarcity
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