Lake v Bennett

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeTHE MASTER OF THE ROLLS,LORD JUSTICE SALMON,LORD JUSTICE CROSS
Judgment Date02 December 1969
Judgment citation (vLex)[1969] EWCA Civ J1202-4
CourtCourt of Appeal (Civil Division)
Date02 December 1969

[1969] EWCA Civ J1202-4

In The Supreme Court of Judicature

Court of Appeal.

Appeal by applicant, Mrs. Lake, from order of His Honour judge G.F. Leslie at Bloombsbury and Marylebone county court on 14th March 1969.

Before

The Master of The Rolls (Lord Denning)

Lord Justice Salmon and

Lord Justice Cross.

In the Matter of The Leasehold Reform Act 1967

and

In the Matter of No. 61, Gayton Road, Hamptead, London, N. W. 3.

Between
Joan Margaret Lake (Married Woman)
Applicant
and
(1)Mr. Bennett (Male)
(2)Stan Gilbert (West End)
Respondents.

Mr. NIGEL HAGUE (instructed by Messrs. Ewart Price & Co., Hampstead) appeared on behalf of the Appellant Applicant, Mrs. Lake.

Mr. ASHLEY BRAMALL (instructed by Messrs. Parker Thomas & Co.) appeared on behalf of the Defendants.

THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS
1

We need not trouble you, Mr. Hague.

2

About one hundred years ago a house - No. 61, Gayton Road, Hampstead - was let for a period of 99 years, from the 24th December, 1869, at a rent of £2 a year. It was clearly a long lease at a ground rent. The lease was due to expire on the 24th December, 1968. The freehold was vested in Mr. Bennett, and the leasehold in Mrs. Lake. Mrs. Lake's father was tenant before her. He became the leaseholder in 1934. She was there with him till he died in 1962. She has been there herself ever since as the tenant. Mrs. Lake claims to be entitled to purchase the freehold under the Leasehold Reform Act, 1967. She has resided there much more than five years. The rateable value is less than £400. So she comes within the statutory provisions. She gave due notice to Mr. Bennett on the 29th March, 1968, claiming to buy the freehold. His advisers rejeoted her claim, saying: "The house and premises described in your notice are not a house' for the purposes of the Act.

3

The building has a basement, a ground floor, and two floors above. Mrs. Lake herself occupies the top two floors, and also the basement, for ordinary living purposes - bedrooms, kitchen, bathroom and the like. But she has sublet the ground floor. She has let it to a bookmaker. It is now a licensed betting office. In her father's time, up to 1952, her father had occupied the whole house. He used the ground floor for his business as a shoe repairer. After his death Mrs. Lake continued to occupy the dwelling roods, but she let off the ground floor no doubt for a considerable sum, to Mr. Gilbert, who now runs there a licensed betting office.

4

If the building is a 'house' within the meaning of the statute, Mrs. Lake is entitled to buy the freehold at a price to be fixed in accordance with the Act, which would be a very modest sum. But, if it is not a 'house' within the meaning of the Act, she is not entitled to buy it at all. The freeholder, on the assumption that she has no right, has already arranged to let it to the bookmaker after the expiry of the lease.

5

The material definition is section 2. It says: "2(1) For purposes of this Part of this Act, 'house' includes any building designed or adapted for living in and reasonably so called, notwithstanding that the building is not structurally detached, or was or is not solely designed or adopted for living in, or Is divided horizontally into flats or marionettes.

6

Some things are clear. First, the sab-letting of the ground floor does not take the case out of the Act, see Harris v. Swlck Securities Ltd.. ( 1969 1 W.L.R. 1604). Second, the use of the ground floor for business purposes does not take it out of the Act. Several sections contemplate that part of a house may be used for business purposes. The only question is whether this is a 'house' within the definition of a "building designed or adapted for living in and reasonably so called"?

7

I believe this is the first statute in which Parliament has endeavoured to give a definition of a "house". There have been many statutes which have used the word "house without defining it. And the Courts have given it a wide interpretation. The first case was the most extreme: ( Richards v. Swansea Improvement and Tramways Co. 1878 9 Ch. D. 425). It was under the Lands Clauses Act. It was held that a mass of buildings was a "house", though part of it was residence, part cottages, and part manufactory. It was all held to be a "house". That is going a long way. It wo. Id not apply, I should think, to the present Act, because of the words "reasonably so called".

8

In the Rent Acts too there was no definition of a "house"; but under them a hotel was held to be a "house", see ( Epsom Grand Stand Association (Limited) v. E.J. Clarke 1919 35 Law Times Reports 525); and also a building which was part dwelling and part business premises, see ( Ellen v. Goldstein 1920 123 Law Times). Quite recently in ( Luqanda v, Service Hotels Ltd. 1969 2 W.L.R. 1056) this Court held that a building (four houses knocked into one) with 88 rooms which were let off in furnished rooms, was a "house". I doubt whether the whole would be a"house" within this Leasehold Reform Act, because of the limitation "reasonably so called", though each one of the four month be.

9

In the Housing Acts there was no definition of a "house", but we considered it in ( Ashbridge Investments Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government 1965 1 W.L.R. 1320). I ventured to suggest that a 'house' In the Act" - that is, the Housing Act - "means a building which is constructed or adapted for use as, or for the purposes of, a dwelling". It would appear that in the Leasehold Reform Act, 1967, Parliament adopted these words, but added the limitation "reasonably so called".

10

It is quite plain that this building was a "house" within all these earlier statutes. The point is What is the limitation conveyed by the words "reasonably so called"? I would not pretend on this occasion to attempt to define the limitation. But it may be useful to give an illustration. I do not think that a tower block of flats would reasonably be called a "house". But I think a four-storied building like the present one is reasonably called a "house". Take it in stages. First, if the tenant occupied the building entirely by himself, using the ground floor for his shop premises, that would plainly be a "house" reasonably so called. Second, if the tenant, instead of using the ground floor himself for business purposes, sublets it that does not alter the character of the building. It is still a "house" reasonably so called. And that is this case.

11

"It depends on the nature of the business. If you have a business which is a bookmaker's office, financially very profitable, that gives a colour to the whole building. It is not a house but a bookmaker's office." I am afraid I do not agree. It seems to me that, even though the subletting is financially profitable for the tenant, the character of the building remains the same. It is a "house" within the meaning of the Act,

12

Then Mr, Ashley...

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19 cases
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    ...these are premises which started as a shop with living accommodation. 8 The learned judge was referred to the decision of this court in Lake v. Bennett reported in (1970) 1 QB page 663. He concluded that that decision applied to the facts in this case and concluded it in favour of the tenan......
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    ...to do so.” 23 The first decision on the issue of “'house' … reasonably so called” is the unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal in Lake v Bennett [1970] 1 QB 663, where, at 670C-D, Lord Denning MR, said that “[t]here have been many statutes which have used the word 'house' without defini......
  • Wolf v Crutchley
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    ...No. 5 and is entitled to buy the freehold of it. 8 I may perhaps add that the present case was envisaged by myself in ( Lake v. Bennett 1970 1 Q.B. 663) at page 670. I instanced a case where four houses had been knocked into one with 88 rooms let off as furnished rooms. I said that the four......
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2 books & journal articles
  • Table of Cases
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    • Wildy Simmonds & Hill Leasehold Enfranchisement Law & Practice Contents
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    ...08 EG 176, Land Reg 88 Kutchukian v The Trustee of John Lyon’s Charity [2012] UKUT 53 (LC), (2012) March 1, UT(LC) 143 Lake v Bennett [1970] QB 663, [1970] 2 WLR 355, [1970] 1 All ER 457, [1970] 21 P&CR 93, CA 5, 6 Lemon v Landeur [1946] KB 613, [1946] 2 All ER 329, [1946] 115 LJKB 492, CA ......
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