Last Word: The Elections Bill – Creating More Problems than it Solves?
| Published date | 01 December 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/20419058211066523 |
| Author | Justin Fisher |
| Date | 01 December 2021 |
40 POLITICAL INSIGHT • DECEMBER 2021
Last Word
The Elections Bill – Creating
More Problems than it Solves?
In July 2021, the government
introduced the Elections Bill. It covered
a range of issues, most of which were
relatively uncontroversial responses
to existing issues. Other provisions were
more controversial – voter identication,
increased political control of the Electoral
Commission and new restrictions on ‘third
party’ organisations that campaign, but do
not stand for election. The proposals for voter
identication have caused the most debate.
But proposals on the Electoral Commission,
and new restrictions on third parties are also
worthy of examination.
The Electoral Commission
It’s fair to say that politicians have expressed
concerns about the Electoral Commission ever
since it was established by the Political Parties,
Elections & Referendums Act 2000, despite
always having been overseen by Parliament
through a Speaker’s Committee. MPs’ concerns
were initially that the Commission lacked
political experience; a by-product of the very
stringent rules designed to deliver impartiality,
which placed signicant restrictions on
who could work for the Commission. These
concerns were partly dealt with by the Political
Parties and Elections Act in 2009, where party-
nominated commissioners were introduced.
However, new concerns emerged following
the 2015 General Election, when a number of
candidates’ spending returns were investigated.
Most cases were dropped, but one MP, his
agent and a Conservative Party ocial did end
up in court, with the ocial prosecuted.
The new Elections Bill proposes greater
parliamentary accountability for the
Commission, by the introduction of a Strategy
and Policy Statement, to be approved by
Parliament. This is intended to provide the
Commission with guidance on the discharge
of its functions. The Bill also proposes
an extension of the role of the Speaker's
Committee to give it the power to examine the
Commission's compliance with the statement.
Such proposals are challenging, not least
because political oversight already exists.
For the Commission to function eectively
and independently, it should – as far as is
possible – be free from interference from those
whom it seeks to regulate. These provisions
would signicantly diminish the necessary
independence of the Commission, both
literally and in the eyes of the electorate; a risk
amplied by the fact that a majority of the
members of the Speaker’s Committee on the
Electoral Commission are currently from the
governing party.
And, far from requiring additional oversight,
the Commission already delivers excellent work
in ensuring the high levels of satisfaction in
the integrity of the electoral process amongst
those who are most knowledgeable and
closely involved. A survey of electoral agents at
the 2019 General Election showed that 78 per
cent agreed that the rules in respect of election
spending and donations, were clear; 72 per
cent viewed the Electoral Commission as a
useful source of advice; 75 per cent thought
Electoral Commission guidance for candidates
and agents was clear and easy to use; and 75
per cent thought Electoral Commission written
information on the verication and count was
clear and easy to use.
So, the Bill’s proposals represent both
disproportionate and unnecessary measures.
They threaten the independence and therefore
the eectiveness of the Electoral Commission,
and there is little evidence to support the need
for further parliamentary accountability.
Third parties
The issue of third-party campaign expenditure
is notoriously dicult to regulate, but one of
the key proposals in the Bill would arguably
cause more diculties than it would solve.
It concerns restrictions on coordinated
campaign spending between parties and third
parties. The logic of this proposal is sound and
The UK government’s Elections Bill needs to be re-examine d, argues Justin Fisher.
seeks to guard against the articial ination
of spending limits. However, the existing
comparable legislation on coordination – the
so-called ‘Working Together’ rules as they
apply in referendums – is not t for purpose.
This was tested at the 2016 European Union
referendum and caused considerable
diculties to both designated campaigns
(analogous to political parties) and registered
campaigners (analogous to third-parties).
A study of perceptions of the regulations
amongst permitted participants in the
referendum found that the rules on ‘Working
Together’ was very poorly understood – some
56 per cent of campaign participants found
the rules dicult to understand, compared
with only 12 per cent who found the process
of recording and reporting donations dicult.
The rules were so complex that campaigners
eectively divorced themselves articially
from like-minded groups to avoid any charge
of potential coordination. Forty-two per cent
decided not to work together after initially
considering the option.
So, while the provision in the Bill is well-
intentioned, a fuller examination is needed
to ensure the problems demonstrated in
2016 are not replicated in elections, where
the diculties observed during the Brexit
referendum would be likely to be amplied.
Condence in elections – which the Bill
seeks to enhance – would not be increased if
campaigners inadvertently found themselves
subject to investigation through genuine
misunderstandings rather than any intent
to deceive. It would be better to withdraw
this provision from the Bill and undertake a
thorough re-examination of coordination rules
for both elections and referendums before
bringing any proposals back to Parliament.
Justin Fisher is Professor of Political Science
and Director of Brunel Public Policy at Brunel
University London.
Political Insight December 2021 BU.indd 40Political Insight December 2021 BU.indd 40 18/11/2021 14:2118/11/2021 14:21
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