Ledger-Beadell and another v Peach and another
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 17 November 2006 |
| Neutral Citation | [2006] EWHC 2940 (Ch) |
| Court | Chancery Division |
| Docket Number | Claim No. HC 04 CO 1212 |
| Date | 17 November 2006 |
[2006] EWHC 2940 (Ch)
In the High Court of Justice
Chancery Division
Claim No. HC 04 CO 1212
Mr. Sebastian Prentis, instructed by Messrs. Sanders Witherspoon, appeared for the claimant. Mr. David Schmitz, instructed by Messrs. Rippon Patel and French, appeared for the 1st Defendant. The 2nd Defendant/Party 20 Defendant appeared in person.
Approved judgment
Hearing dates: 6th-7th July, 28th October (application), 14th-18th November 2005, 23rd-25th January, 6th-7th March and 23rd August 2006
Introduction
In this case, the claimants ("Mr. and Mrs. Ledger-Beadell") seek to recover £200,000 advanced by them towards the purchase price of a property called Waterside Oast House, Headcorn, Kent, which the 1 st Defendant ("Miss Peach") purchased in July 2003. At the time, Miss Peach and the claimants' son, the 2 nd defendant and Part 20 defendant ("Mark Ledger-Beadell"), were living together and (as I find) had agreed to get married when he was free to do so. Nevertheless the property had to be purchased by Miss Peach, because Mark Ledger-Beadell was in the middle of divorce proceedings, in which he was seeking to obtain an order for the sale of the matrimonial home or a lump sum in return for giving up his interest in it. To be seen to be acquiring an interest in another property would damage his case. As Mrs. Ledger-Beadell says in her witness statement, she was told by her son and by Miss Peach that "it was to go in her name because it could not show in Mark's divorce so Philly (his wife Philippa) could not try to get her hands on it". The purchase price of Waterside Oast was £650,000. Contracts were exchanged on 6th June 2003 and the purchase was completed on 11th July 2003. GMAC-RFC Ltd. advanced £487,430 to Miss Peach, secured by a mortgage over the property.
The relationship between Miss Peach and Mark Ledger-Beadell was a stormy one. It deteriorated seriously over Christmas and New Year 2003, and by early February 2004 it was over. Miss Peach remained in the property, but took steps to sell it. It was eventually sold for £640,000, and the sale was completed on 1st April 2005. After deduction of the mortgage indebtedness of £520,916 and various costs, the net proceeds of sale were £99,758.98. Miss Peach's solicitor and former employer, Mr. David Goodman, claims to be entitled to a lien for unpaid costs relating to this action of £24,745.
Mr. and Mrs. Ledger-Beadell claim that the provision of £200,000 towards the purchase price represented a straightforward loan for which Miss Peach alone was responsible, and that she is liable to repay it in full. Further or in the alternative, they claim that Miss Peach holds the net proceeds of sale on resulting trust for them. It is common ground that, if this is so, she is obliged to account for £99,758.98 i.e. to make good the deficiency if Mr. Goodman's claimed lien is valid.
Miss Peach denies that she is liable to pay anything. Her case is that the £200,000 advanced by Mr. and Mrs. Ledger-Beadell belonged to their son and was advanced at his request and as agent or trustee for him, that it was expressly agreed that it was a gift to her in contemplation of marriage, and that in any event this is to be presumed by virtue of section 37 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1976. Alternatively, she claims, if the money did belong to Mr. and Mrs. Ledger-Beadell, they gave it to their son and he gave it to her. In the further alternative, she submits that if the money was not a gift there was no agreement as to the basis on which it was advanced, and that there is a constructive trust over the proceeds of sale which should be divided in accordance with the principles explained by the Court of Appeal in Oxley v. Hiscock [2005] Fam. 211.
Miss Peach also claims that Mark Ledger-Beadell agreed to indemnify her in respect of any expense incurred by her in relation to Waterside Oast, and therefore that, if and to the extent that she is liable to his parents, he is obliged to indemnify her. This is strongly denied by Mark Ledger-Beadell, as is Miss Peach's allegation that they had agreed to get married.
After Mark Ledger-Beadell and Miss Peach parted, there were disputes about personal property which Miss Peach claimed Mark Ledger-Beadell had taken from her, including correspondence said to be relevant in this action, and property which he claimed Miss Peach had refused to give back to him including his computer. These disputes resulted in proceedings in the Ashford County Court, in which each had limited success. Miss Peach also claimed an indemnity for any money she had spent on Waterside Oast. Without going into procedural complexities which are now irrelevant, that claim has been transferred to this action, with slightly altered wording. Mark Ledger-Beadell had had very little time to prepare for the hearing on 6th July 2005, but declined to apply for an adjournment because he hoped that the proceedings would be over in July and did not wish to prejudice this.
The course of the trial was far from smooth. It was originally estimated to last 3 days, but it was clear almost from the start that this was not enough. The 7th July 2005 was lost because of the terrorist activity in London and the trial was adjourned to November 2005. However the time set aside to complete the hearing was insufficient, and after a further 3 days in January there was difficulty in finding a convenient date for final speeches. In the course of final speeches it became clear that certain matters advanced by the defendant, and also by Mark Ledger-Beadell, had not been put to their adversaries in cross-examination, in circumstances in which their importance, at the time of the cross-examination, was not obvious. Therefore, I decided to hold another day's hearing to accommodate this, for reasons which I explained in my written ruling on 15th March 2006. It then again proved very difficult to find an alternative date convenient to all. While expressing frustration at the delay in correspondence with me, according to his e-mail to Mr. Prentis of 11 th April 2006 Mark Ledger-Beadell wished to delay if possible and he offered few available dates.
He has also claimed, on several occasions, that his inexperience as a litigant, and the pressures of having to deal with his business affairs and at times look after his children, severely prejudiced him. I consider that these claims, while not wholly unfounded, were exaggerated. He has been involved in lengthy litigation before, and was no doubt able to consult Mr. Prentis if he needed advice, and the extended timetable of the case left him with plenty of time to prepare. He was able to make his points effectively. That said, I accept that it is always difficult for a litigant in person to conduct any but the simplest cases, of which this was not one.
During the hearing, both Mr. and Mrs. and Mark Ledger-Beadell ascribed the length of the hearing to unnecessary issues raised by Miss Peach, but I do not think that this was justified. It is true that she tended to give diffuse answers, but some of the overrun was due to lengthy cross-examination by Mark Ledger-Beadell, for which as a litigant in person he is not to be blamed, and generally it proved to be a much more complex case than anyone (including me) had foreseen. Neither side had a monopoly as far as unnecessary issues were concerned. During the course of the hearing there were a number of applications to call further witnesses (in particular Mrs. Philippa Ledger-Beadell and Miss Peach's former husband) and for disclosure of documents relating to the matrimonial proceedings. I refused these applications because I thought they would lead to a proliferation of side issues and to undue prolongation of the trial.
District Judge Burgess began her judgment by saying that he found it difficult to know where the truth lay. I find myself in the same position. In the case of each of the parties, there is an important issue on which I have found their evidence implausible and ultimately not possible to accept. In particular, I do not accept Mr. and Mrs. Ledger-Beadell's case that this was a loan for which Miss Peach was solely and unconditionally liable, and that she alone bore the risk of loss from the purchase of Waterside Oast. This would make little sense in a transaction which they entered into, on their own case, for the benefit of their son and to provide him and his children with a home. I do not believe Miss Peach's evidence that it was expressly agreed that the £200,000 was a gift. This is inconsistent with the particulars of her case which had been given earlier, in which she said that Mark Ledger-Beadell would not agree to give her the money, saying that it did not matter whether it was a gift or a loan as they were shortly to marry. I do not believe her oral evidence that these particulars were a mistake. I do not believe Mark Ledger-Beadell's evidence that he was Miss Peach's "erstwhile boyfriend" and that there was no agreement that they were to be married, but merely a discussion of this as a possibility or an assumption; this is inconsistent with other evidence including documents on which he relies.
It is therefore not at all easy to know where the truth lies on the numerous other issues of fact which arise in this case. Many of them are of no or peripheral relevance. For example, Mrs. Ledger-Beadell gave evidence that Miss Peach telephoned her to ask if she knew someone who would murder Philippa Ledger-Beadell. This was indignantly denied by Miss Peach, who said that she had remonstrated with Mrs. Ledger-Beadell when she had said that she had clients who could harm Philippa and also that...
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