Legitimation strategies of informal groups of states: The case of the E3 directoire in the nuclear negotiations with Iran
| Author | Benjamin Kienzle,Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi |
| Published date | 01 September 2020 |
| Date | 01 September 2020 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0010836720907630 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836720907630
Cooperation and Conflict
2020, Vol. 55(3) 388 –405
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0010836720907630
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Legitimation strategies of
informal groups of states: The
case of the E3 directoire in the
nuclear negotiations with Iran
Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi
and Benjamin Kienzle
Abstract
The European Union has seen the rise of informal groups of states as an increasingly important
governance mechanism within its formal structures. Such groups can make decision-making
processes more efficient, but they also suffer from a substantial lack of legitimacy in the eyes of
the non-members. In this article, we examine how informal groups overcome this fundamental
dilemma between efficiency and legitimacy and sustain themselves at the forefront of important
policy areas. To this end, we trace the development of what we argue to be a particularly useful
case: the E3 directoire in the nuclear negotiations with Iran. The empirical results point to
new insights into how directoires – and informal groups in general – can use different types of
legitimation strategies to gain and maintain legitimacy. More specifically, the E3 implemented
three successive legitimation strategies – detachment, co-optation and integration – using
different types of legitimacy sources, in particular problem-solving, institutional adjustments and
fostering institutional and policy congruence.
Keywords
European Union, foreign policy, informal governance, informal groups, leadership, legitimation
strategies, Iran
Introduction
Informal groups of states have emerged as a widely studied phenomenon in the European
Union (EU) and other international organizations (Christiansen and Neuhold, 2013;
Stone, 2011). In foreign and security affairs, however, research is still trailing behind.
Although pioneering work has been published on different aspects (Aggestam and
Corresponding author:
Benjamin Kienzle, Joint Services Command and Staff College, King’s College London, Shrivenham SN6 8TS,
Wiltshire, UK.
Email: ben.kienzle@kcl.ac.uk
907630CAC0010.1177/0010836720907630Cooperation and ConflictBassiri Tabrizi and Kienzle
research-article2020
Article
Bassiri Tabrizi and Kienzle 389
Bicchi, 2019; Elgström, 2017; Gegout, 2002; Prantl, 2005), the phenomenon of informal
groups in foreign and security policy cooperation appears to be more widespread than is
currently recognized in the literature, particularly in highly institutionalized settings such
as the EU (Justaert and Keukeleire, 2012).
Informal groups are a particularly controversial phenomenon in the EU, as they chal-
lenge and blur the already contested and complex nature of European leadership in for-
eign and security policy (Aggestam and Johansson, 2017: 1205). At the heart of the
controversy of informal groups is the relationship between groups of EU member states
as leaders and the other EU member states as followers. As will be shown in this article,
directoires, that is, self-appointed ad hoc groups of a small number of usually the most
influential states within an international organization, are the most controversial type of
informal group, as they establish a hierarchical relationship between powerful and less
powerful EU member states and, thus, undermine the basic idea of European integration
transcending hierarchies between large and small member states. Surprisingly, one of the
most prominent cases of a directoire in European foreign and security policy has attracted
scant attention from an explicitly institutional design perspective that problematizes the
relationship between the informal group and the wider EU: the E3 format consisting of
France, Germany and the UK, which led the nuclear negotiations with Iran (2003–2015).1
Although Harnisch (2007) offers insights on ‘minilateral cooperation’ between the E3
and the USA and Alcaro (2018) and Hill (2011) examine the E3’s policies, most works
on the E3 consider questions of institutional design and organizational behaviour of
informal groups only in the margins. Sauer (2019), for his part, considers institutional
design by analysing the choice of ad hoc informal groups as tools to resolve the Iranian
nuclear crisis through diplomatic means.
In contrast, this article argues that the E3 format is a particularly useful case to exam-
ine crucial issues of institutional design and organizational behaviour regarding the lead-
ership of informal groups within international organizations. As a directoire consisting of
the three most powerful member states in the EU, it brings to the fore the controversial
hierarchical relationship between members and non-members of the directoire (Lake,
2009). It is a particularly clear-cut reflection of the fundamental dilemma between effi-
ciency and legitimacy that can be found in all forms of informal groups of states (Delreux
and Keukeleire, 2017). On the one hand, a directoire is an effective way of organizing
and implementing common policies, as it circumvents the structural constraints of an
international organization’s formal decision-making process, while bringing to bear the
combined resources and expertise of the most influential members of an organization.
On the other hand, however, the existence of a closed group of influential states usually
provokes the fear, resentment and resistance from those member states that are bound to
accept the authority of the directoire. More specifically, following Reus-Smit’s (2007:
157) definition of political legitimacy, their ‘decisions and actions’ are not readily
‘socially sanctioned’ by the non-members. That is, directoires always suffer from a sub-
stantial lack of legitimacy.
Given this inherent shortcoming, the existence of a directoire can be generally consid-
ered to be a rare phenomenon in EU foreign and security policy. Yet, if a directoire comes
into existence and persists for a longer period of time, it is likely to have a significant
impact on EU foreign and security policy due to its high degree of efficiency. It is,
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