Legitimizing Illegal Protest: The Permissive Ideational Environment and ‘Bossnappings’ in France
| Author | Nick Parsons |
| Date | 01 June 2013 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.2012.00899.x |
| Published date | 01 June 2013 |
Legitimizing Illegal Protest:
The Permissive Ideational Environment
and ‘Bossnappings’ in Francebjir_899288..309
Nick Parsons
Abstract
In France, in 2009–2010, on several occasions, managers announcing redun-
dancies were held hostage by workers. Public opinion polls show widespread
support for the ‘bossnappers’, while the State did not taken action against them.
Employing the insights of new institutionalism and social movement theory, this
article explains the legitimization of such radical, illegal action through the
notion of a permissive ideational environment resulting from a tradition of trade
union militancy, pre-existing concerns over globalization and more recent fears
of, and government and trade union responses to, globalization and the current
economic crisis.
1. Introduction: institutions and ideas
Ideas have never been absent from analysis in the field of industrial relations
(Jacobsen 1995). Marxist analysis, for example, is based upon the founda-
tions of the role of dominant ideologies in explaining power relations, while
Dunlop’s (1958) industrial relations system relies upon the notion of a
common ideology to bind the system together. However, these have usually
been in the background of analysis, as with Dunlop, or have been treated in
terms of power and interests, as in the Marxist tradition. With the odd
exception such as Hyman and Brough (1975), the role that ideas per se play
in explaining action within the sphere of industrial relations has received little
systematic analysis. In the field of political economy, on the other hand, it has
received increasing attention since the 1990s. However, much of this atten-
tion has focused on explaining the outcomes of public policy and policymak-
ing with a particular emphasis on the role of policy paradigms, or cognitive
frameworks, in constraining choice and in explaining long-term stability
(Campbell 2002; Lieberman 2002). Where change is dealt with, it is usually in
Nick Parsons is at Cardiff University.
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British Journal of Industrial Relations doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8543.2012.00899.x
51:2 June 2013 0007–1080 pp. 288–309
© John Wiley & Sons Ltd/London School of Economics 2012. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
terms of explaining the shift from one policy paradigm to another, with
long-term consequences for policymaking and public policies (Hall 1989). As
in political economy, in the field of industrial relations, the role of ideas in
facilitating and legitimizing conflict has received little attention.
More recently, in the field of political economy, the ‘new institutionalisms’,
and particularly historical institutionalism, have fostered an interest in how
institutions and ideas interact. Insights here suggest that structures of politi-
cal opportunities shape the strategies of organized actors, but not in any
deterministic manner as cognitive and interpretative frameworks as well
as rules and procedures influence action, while individual preferences are
shaped by collective actors and institutions that bear the mark of their own
history, including their own interpretative frameworks (Campbell 2002;
Immergut 1998). In this view, institutions embody and disseminate ideas and
information, creating a shared belief system about co-operation and defec-
tion, thereby embodying and perpetuating a normative belief system (Blyth
1997). In effect, they act as filters that favour certain interpretations, goals
and actions, thereby limiting the range of possible political action, through
the discourse employed and the manner in which policy issues are framed for
public acceptability and legitimacy (Blyth 1997; Campbell 1998, 2002). This
function is facilitated by cognitive clarity — or a lack of complexity in the
discourse and arguments marshalled — and the use of powerful symbols
(Campbell 1998).
Thus, for Lieberman (2002), ‘understanding change lies in the intersection
of ideas and institutions and the tension between ideological traditions and
institutional capacities’ (p. 709). While the emphasis of historical institution-
alism has focused upon explaining stability and long-term changes in policy
paradigms, the role ascribed to cognitive and interpretive frameworks means
that these insights can be utilized to analyse conflict. Indeed, signalling theory
has, since the 1970s, suggested that actors interpret signals from their envi-
ronment and that such interpretations are updated in line with experience
(Spence 1973). However, such signals are rarely unambiguous, leading to the
possibility of conflict when belief systems are incoherent, or when two dif-
fering belief systems, or elements of a political system with differing cognitive
frameworks, clash over the interpretation of an issue and the consequent
action required (Busch 1999; Lieberman 2002). When explaining such con-
flict, the assumptions that actors make about the cognitive frameworks,
strategies and consequent actions of other actors also need to be taken into
account (Busch 1999).
Such insights have been applied to the study of social conflict by Tarrow
(1994), who argues that ‘changes in the political opportunity structure create
incentives for collective actions’ (p. 6). These changes in the political oppor-
tunity structure lead to collective action and social movements that challenge
governing elites through the use of ‘cultural and ideological frames to mobi-
lize consensus’ (Tarrow 1994: 7) and organizational resources to co-ordinate
and sustain action. In other words, action occurs not just because there is a
grievance but also because the political context provides the potential for
Legitimizing Illegal Protest 289
© John Wiley & Sons Ltd/London School of Economics 2012.
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