Liberty, Economics, and Evidence
| Author | Fred M. Frohock,David J. Sylvan |
| Published date | 01 December 1983 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1983.tb01352.x |
| Date | 01 December 1983 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Politicalstudies (1983),
XXXI,
541-555
Liberty, Economics, and Evidence*
FRED
M.
FROHOCK
AND
DAVID
J.
SYLVAN
Syracuse University
Relationships in liberal theory between liberty and economic well-being are
empirical propositions: (a) economic conditions can reach a level so low as to make
the effective establishment of liberty impossible; (b) the marginal value of economic
gain diminishes with respect to the value of liberty as economic conditions improve;
and (c) the priority standing of liberty requires the development of social forms and
conditions necessary for the establishment of liberty. Empirical data, however, do
not support these assumptions.
A
more complex relationship between liberty and
economic well-being is suggested, where (a) liberty is needed as a first condition to
increase economic well-being, and (b) the very distinction between political values
like liberty and economic values is jeopardized.
A
fusion of politics and economics
may be required to account for these relationships, a point re-emphasizing the
sensitivity of normative theory to empirical evidence.
I
One of the more firmly established relationships in liberal political theory is
between liberty and economic well-being. The relationship, moreover, is
founded
on
a clear and specific understanding of liberty. Liberty in Berlin’s
famous dichotomy is both negative and positive.’ More recent statements,
however, have expressed both negative and positive liberty in a triadic
conception. MacCallum sets out three components in the concept of liberty:
agent, constraints, and acts/persons. Then
a
single expression captures both
sides of Berlin’s dichotomy. An agent is (is not) free from constraints to do
(not do), become (not become) some act, person.2 The key component
incorporating negative and positive liberty is ‘constraint’, which is sufficiently
robust to cover both obstacles and those conditions in the absence
of
which the
agent cannot exercise liberty.
For
example, both the coercive threat of
imprisonment (an obstacle) and the absence
of
adequate education (adequate
education as a condition) are included in the notion of a constraint.
Economic conditions in liberal thought are developed as constraints on
liberty. Economic well-being is seen as a necessary condition to the exercise
of
liberty, and as desirable primarily as
it
provides for the effective exercise of
liberty. The relationship
of
liberty and economic well-being is in this way
*
Authorship is joint, authors are listed alphabetically. Professor Frohock wrote section
I,
I
Isaiah Berlin,
Two
Concepts
of
Liberty (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1958).
2
Gerald C. MacCallum, ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’,
Philosophical Review
(1967),
Professor Sylvan wrote section
11,
and section
111
was written jointly.
312-34.
0032-32 17/83/O4/054 1
-
15/$03.00
0
1983
Political Studies
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