Lilleyman v Lilleyman and another
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Briggs |
| Judgment Date | 04 April 2012 |
| Neutral Citation | [2012] EWHC 821 (Ch) |
| Docket Number | Case No: 1LS30170 |
| Court | Chancery Division |
| Date | 04 April 2012 |
[2012] EWHC 821 (Ch)
Mr Justice Briggs
Case No: 1LS30170
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CHANCERY DIVISION
LEEDS DISTRICT REGISTRY
Mr L Sartin (instructed by Gordons LLP) for the Claimant
Miss J Evans-Gordon (instructed by Bell & Buxton Solicitors) for the Defendants
Hearing dates: 12, 13, 14 March 2012
Introduction
This is an application by Mrs Barbara Lilleyman for reasonable provision out of the estate of her late husband Roy Lilleyman. The defendants Nigel and Christopher Lilleyman are the deceased's two sons by an earlier marriage, and are both the executors and principal beneficiaries under his last will dated 20 May 2008.
Mr and Mrs Lilleyman were married for only two and a quarter years before his premature death from heart-related illness aged 64 in January 2010. It is common ground that his net estate for the purposes of Sections 8 and following of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 is worth a little in excess of £6m. The result is that this case is, in the language of divorce litigation, a 'big money – short marriage' case. The result of those two features, and the requirement under Section 3(2) of the Act to have regard to the provision which the applicant might reasonably have expected to receive if the marriage had been terminated by divorce on the day of the deceased's death, is that the parties have approached this case with fundamentally different views as to its appropriate outcome which have, most unfortunately, proved to be irreconcilable.
There is recent Court of Appeal authority as to the proper approach to the resolution of big money — short marriage Inheritance Act cases such as the present, in the form of Cunliffe v Fielden [2006] Ch 361. Judgment in that case was handed down (in December 2005) shortly before either the hearing or the publication of the decision in the leading big money – short marriage divorce case, namely Miller v Miller [2006] 2A C 168. The Cunliffe case was referred to in argument in Miller v Miller, but not mentioned in their Lordships' speeches.
The essential difference separating the parties in the present case was whether, as Miss Evans-Gordon for the defendants submitted, reasonable provision was to be identified solely by reference to the claimant's reasonable needs, including a need for financial security for the rest of her life or whether, as Mr Sartin submitted for the claimant, reasonable provision called for her to be given a substantial share in what had been their matrimonial property, in excess of her reasonable needs. For the purposes of those opposing submissions Miss Evans-Gordon relied mainly upon Cunliffe v Fielden, whilst Mr Sartin relied primarily on Miller v Miller.
The Evidence
There were only limited areas of factual dispute between the parties. Mrs Lilleyman herself provided four witness statements and was cross-examined at length. She was a quiet and generally impressive witness, prepared in particular to be realistic rather than to exaggerate about her needs. Generally, I found her evidence to be reliable in relation to the matters upon which she was challenged, save for an apparent mis-recollection in her written evidence on one aspect of the chronology during the period between the commencement of her relationship with Mr Lilleyman and their marriage, which was cleared up in cross-examination.
Mrs Lilleyman relied upon the written evidence of her sons Andrew and Robert. Robert's evidence was accepted without cross-examination. Andrew was briefly cross-examined. Again, he seemed to me to be a reliable witness, doing his best to assist the court.
Mrs Lilleyman called a number of other witnesses, none of whom were cross-examined, but whose evidence added nothing of substance to the resolution of the small areas of disputed fact.
Both the defendants gave evidence and were cross-examined. Subject to one matter, I found the evidence of both of them to be reliable. My reservation concerned a payment of £160,000 to Christopher by cheque on 16 July 2004, drawn on his father's bank account. The relevant chequebook stub described it as a loan, whereas (save for £10,000) Christopher had described it as a distribution from his mother's estate by his father as her executor. For reasons which will become apparent, I have not found it necessary to resolve that issue, but I did not find Christopher's explanation for the description on the cheque stub convincing.
The defendants did not rely upon other witness evidence in relation to the matters of factual dispute. They did however rely upon, and call for cross-examination, the expert evidence of Mr Peter Kennan FCA, a partner in Hawsons, a long-standing Sheffield-based firm, concerning the value at various relevant dates of the main assets in the estate, namely shareholdings in three private companies. Mrs Lilleyman relied upon a report prepared by Annette Barker FCA, a director in KPMG, but she was not tendered for cross-examination. I found Mr Kennan to be a well-qualified, independent and reliable expert, upon whose opinion as to the value of those shares I could, as in the event both parties did, rely with confidence. The only slight shortcoming in his evidence was that, through pressure of time which was in no sense his fault or that of the defendants, he was obliged to rely in his supplemental report upon his own understanding of relevant historical commercial property values, rather than, as he would have preferred, upon the assistance of a qualified independent real property valuer. That did not detract from the reliability of his evidence to any significant extent.
As frequently happens in disputes between the surviving spouse of a second marriage and the children of an earlier marriage about the deceased's estate, the parties did in their written evidence descend into a limited exchange of irrelevant and unfortunate allegations about aspects of the deceased's and the claimant's conduct which, I have no doubt, contributed to their inability to compromise their differences. To their credit however, they resolutely avoided descent into allegations about those irrelevant matters in oral evidence during the trial. Furthermore, sensible co-operation and hard work between their respective legal teams, and counsel in particular, led to a very substantial narrowing of the apparent differences of relevant fact during the course of the trial, with the consequence that it was concluded in only three-quarters of the originally estimated time.
The Facts
Mr and Mrs Lilleyman were born within three months of each other, in September 1945 and January 1946 respectively. They were each previously married, and each had two sons by those first marriages. Mrs Lilleyman's first marriage ended in separation in 1999, decree nisi in August 2005 and decree absolute one month later. Mr Lilleyman's first marriage ended with the death of his wife Judith in January 2004. He was by then a successful and, by all accounts, hardworking businessman, and the 100% shareholder in two companies engaged in the steel stockholding business. The first (in time) Rigby Wireworks & Co (1982) Ltd had been formed to acquire part of the business of family companies which had gone into liquidation in 1982. The second, John Shackleton (Sheffield) Ltd ("Shackleton") was acquired in 1990. Mr Lilleyman formed a third company, Apollo Metals Ltd (2004) as a joint venture company with his two sons during the year after his first wife's death. Nigel Lilleyman had made his career working full-time in the family business from 1990. Christopher Lilleyman started working part-time in the business in 2004, and increased his commitment as his father's health declined. The business also provides employment for their uncle Ian and their cousin Jonathan, with a total workforce (by 2011) of about 30.
Mr and Mrs Lilleyman met each other in the Spring of 2004 at a social club. They were at that time each living in their former matrimonial homes, Mr Lilleyman at Draycott Place, Dronfield, Sheffield ("Draycott") and Mrs Lilleyman at 12 Robinson Drive, Worksop ("Robinson Drive"). Following the breakdown of his marriage, Robert King (Mrs Lilleyman's son) was also living at Robinson Drive. Mrs Lilleyman was earning a modest income from two part-time jobs. She eventually obtained sole ownership of Robinson Drive as part of the divorce settlement with her former husband, although this was not finalised until December 2005.
Mr and Mrs Lilleyman soon became friends after their meeting in 2004. They had formed a relationship by the end of the year, and went on holiday together in January 2005, when Mr Lilleyman suffered what then appeared to be a mild heart attack for which he later had stents fitted, and from which he appeared then to make a full recovery. In April 2005 Mrs Lilleyman gave up one of her two jobs at Mr Lilleyman's request, so as to be able to spend more time with him. By the end of the year they had decided to get married. In December 2005 they became engaged. They decided to find a new house to live in together, rather than to live in either of their respective homes. For that purpose they found 34 Water Meadows, Worksop ("Water Meadows"). In December 2005 Mr Lilleyman acquired it for £267,500, initially in his sole name, with the assistance of a bridging loan from his companies.
Water Meadows required considerable renovation, which was carried out mainly at Mr Lilleyman's expense but with a contribution of some £3,500 from Mrs Lilleyman. There is an issue whether the renovations cost...
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