Limitation Act 1975
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Citation | 1975 c. 54 |
Limitation Act 1975
1975 CHAPTER 54
An Act to amend the law about the limitation of actions and other proceedings.
[1st August 1975]
Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:
Personal injuries
1 New time limits.
1. After section 2 of the Limitation Act 1939there shall be inserted the following sections—
2A ‘Time limit for personal injuries.
(1) This section applies to any action for damage for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or of provision made by or under a statute or independently of any contract or any such provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff for the negligence, nuisance or breach of duty consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person.
(2) Section 2 of this Act shall not apply to an action to which this section applies.
(3) Subject to section 2D below, an action to which this section applies shall not be brought after the expiration of the period specified in subsections (4) and (5) below.
(4) Except where subsection (5) applies, the said period is three years from—
(a ) the date on which the cause of action accrued, or
(b ) the date (if later) of the plaintiff's knowledge.
(5) If the person injured dies before the expiration of the period in subsection (4) above, the period as respects the cause of action surviving for the benefit of the estate of the deceased by virtue of section 1 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 shall be three years from—
(a ) the date of death, or
(b ) the date of the personal representative's knowledge,
whichever is the later.
(6) In this section, and in section 2B below, references to a person's date of knowledge are references to the date on which he first had knowledge of the following facts—
(a ) that the injury in question was significant, and
(b ) that that injury was attributable in whole or in part to the act or omission which is alleged to constitute negligence, nuisance or breach of duty, and
(c ) the identity of the defendant, and
(d ) if it is alleged that the act or omission was that of a person other than the defendant, the identity of that person and the additional facts supporting the bringing of an action against the defendant,
and knowledge that any acts or omissions did or did not, as a matter of law, involve negligence, nuisance or breach of duty is irrelevant.
(7) For the purposes of this section an injury is significant if the plaintiff would reasonably have considered it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment.
(8) For the purposes of the said sections a person's knowledge includes knowledge which he might reasonably have been expected to acquire—
(a ) from facts observable or ascertainable by him, or
(b ) from acts ascertainable by him with the help of medical or other appropriate expert advice which it is reasonable for him to seek,
but a person shall not be fixed under this subsection with knowledge of a fact ascertainable only with the help of expert advice so long as he has taken all reasonable steps to obtain (and, where appropriate, to act on) that advice.
(9) For the purposes of this section 'personal representative' includes any person who is or has been a personal representative of the deceased, including an executor who has not proved the will (whether or not he has renounced probate) but not anyone appointed only as a special personal representative in relation to settled land; and regard shall be had to any knowledge acquired by any such person while a personal representative or previously.
(10) If there is more than one personal representative, and their dates of knowledge are different, subsection (5)(b ) above shall be read as referring to the earliest of those dates.
2B Time limit for actions under Fatal Accidents Act 1846.
(1) This section has effect subject to section 2D below.
(2) An action under the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 shall not be brought if the death occurred when the person injured could no longer maintain an action and recover damages in respect of the injury (whether because of a time limit in this Act or in any other Act, or any other reason).
Where any such action by the injured person would have been barred by the time limit in section 2A above, no account shall be taken of the possibility of that time limit being overridden under section 2D of this Act.
(3) An action under the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 shall not be brought after the expiration of three years from—
(a ) the date of death, or
(b ) the date of knowledge of the person for whose benefit the action is brought,
whichever is the later.
(4) Subsection (3) above shall not apply to an action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by or under any Act other than this Act, and section 2A above shall not apply to an action under the Fatal Accidents Act 1846.
(5) An action under the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 shall be one to which section 22 of this Act (persons under disability) applies, but otherwise Part II and Part III of this Act shall not apply to the action.
2C Dependants subject to different time limits.
(1) This section applies where there is more than one person for whose benefit an action under the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 is brought.
(2) Section 2B(3)(b ) shall be applied separately to each of them, and if that would debar one or more of them, but not all, the court shall direct that any person who would be so debarred shall be excluded from those for whom the action is brought unless it is shown that if the action were brought exclusively for the benefit of that person it would not be defeated by a defence of limitation (whether in consequence of section 22 of this Act (persons under disability), or an agreement between the parties not to raise the defence, or otherwise).
2D Court's power to override time limits.
(1) If it appears to the court that it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed having regard to the degree to which—
(a ) the provisions of section 2A or 2B of this Act prejudice the plaintiff or any person whom he represents, and
(b ) any decision of the court under this subsection would prejudice the defendant or any person whom he represents,
the court may direct that those provisions shall not apply to the action, or shall not apply to any specified cause of action to which the action relates.
(2) The court shall not under this section disapply section 2B(2) except where the reason why the person injured could no longer maintain an action was because of the time limit in section 2A.
If, for example, the person injured could at his death no longer maintain an action under the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 because of the time limit in Article 29 in Schedule 1 to the Carriage by Air Act...
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