Lloyd v Sadler
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE MEGAW,LORD JUSTICE LAWTON,LORD JUSTICE SHAW |
| Judgment Date | 19 January 1978 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1978] EWCA Civ J0119-2 |
| Date | 19 January 1978 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
[1978] EWCA Civ J0119-2
In The Supreme Court of Judicature
Court of Appeal
(Civil Division)
(On appeal from Order of His Honour Judge McIntyre - West London County Court)
Lord Justice Megaw
Lord Justice Lawton and
Lord Justice Shaw
Mr. DAVID NEUBSRGER (instructed by Messrs. Halsey, Lightly & Hemsley) appeared on behalf of the Appellant (Plaintiff).
Mr. WILLIAM BIRTLES (instructed by Messrs. Tyrer, Roxburgh & Dawson) appeared on behalf of the Respondents (Defendants).
The relevant facts are simple. The question of law which arises on them is of importance, with possibly wide-ranging effects.
By an agreement in writing a tenancy of the top floor flat, 22 Cottesmore Gardens, London, W.8, was granted by Mr. J.M. Lloyd to Miss G. Sadler and Miss M. Lunt from 27th December, 1975, to 25th December, 1976. The tenancy was a protected tenancy under the Rent Act, 1968. About 28th October, 1976, Miss Lunt left the flat in order to get married. She did not intend to resume, and she did not in fact resume, occupation of the flat. Miss Sadler remained in occupation of the flat during the remainder of the contractual tenancy, and she continued in occupation after 25th December, 1976, when the contractual tenancy ended. In January, 1977, the landlord, Mr. Lloyd, started proceedings in the West London County Court, claiming possession of the flat. The defendants were Miss Sadler and three other ladies whom Miss Sadler had brought in to live in the flat as her licensees. No separate question arises as to them. Their right to stay in occupation stands or falls with that of Miss Sadler. So much for the relevant facts.
The question of law also can be simply stated: Was Miss Sadler a statutory tenant and thus entitled to the security of tenure given to statutory tenants by the Rent Acts, despite the fact that Miss Lunt, before the contractual tenancy had ended, had ceased, permanently, to occupy the flat?
The contractual tenancy was a joint tenancy of Miss Sadler and Miss Lunt. The contractual tenancy ended on 25th December, 1976. The right of Miss Sadler to remain in possession thereafter, if it existed at all, could exist only because she had become the statutory tenant under section 3 (1) of the Rent Act, 1968. (That wasthe statute in force at the time. The corresponding provision of the new Act, section 2 (1) of the Rent Act, 1977, is identical).
Section 3 (1) (a) of the Rent Act, 1968, provides: "After the termination of a protected tenancy of a dwelling-house the person who, immediately before that termination, was the protected tenant of the dwelling-house shall, if and so long as he occupies the dwelling-house as his residence, be the statutory tenant of it…."
The landlord contended that the contractual, admittedly protected, tenancy was a joint tenancy; and that, as a result of the doctrine of joint tenancy in the law of property, anything that had to be done in connection with the joint tenancy, to have any legal effect, had to be done by the joint tenant: that is, by all the individuals acting collectively. One of the joint tenants, it was submitted (otherwise than when in law one joint tenant could be treated as acting as agent for them all), could not achieve any result recognised by law - he could not act validly - by anything which he himself did as an individual. Hence Miss Sadler's continuance in occupation of the flat after the end of the contractual tenancy did not, in law, produce the result that "the protected tenant occupies the dwelling-house as his residence". Hence there was no statutory tenant. Miss Sadler did not achieve that status in law.
That submission by the landlord was rejected by Judge McIntyre in his judgment delivered on 16th May, 1977. The plaintiff landlord appeals to this Court.
This case has brought to light two remarkable facts. First, the Rent Acts through all their long history have never made any relevant express provision relating to joint tenants or joint tenancies, whether protected or statutory. Secondly, and perhaps even more strangely, there seems to have been no previous case decided by any court, or at least no reported case, in which a question such asfalls to be decided in the present case has been raised for consideration on section 3 (1) of the 1968 Act or its predecessors. Yet there must have been, over the years, thousands of instances in which one of two joint tenants has ceased to occupy the dwelling-house before the end of the contractual tenancy, and the other original joint tenant has continued to live there, on the assumption that he has become the statutory tenant. If the landlord's submission is right, that assumption has been wrong. Similar instances must have arisen thousands of times where two or more persons have duly become "the statutory tenant", and thereafter one or more of them has, or have, died or ceased to occupy the house as his, or their, residence. What is the effect on the legal status of the person, or persons, remaining in occupation? Does the statutory security of tenure cease?
I do not think that the absence of previous litigation helps one way or the other towards a decision of the issue. But the fact that there are likely to be very many cases with facts similar to those of the present case shows the practical importance of this issue. Whatever the answer be, it must affect many people, landlords and tenants, in a matter of great importance to them. If the landlord's submissions in the present case are wrong, the result may be a measure of prejudice to landlords. It would mean that a landlord who looked to two persons as both being liable to him for the rent might find that when the contractual tenancy ended there was only one person who was liable to him for the rent. On the other hand, if the landlord's submissions are right, the potential prejudice to joint tenants would be very much more serious: that is, the value of their legal rights as compared with what those legal rights would be if the landlord's submissions are wrong.
In view of the importance of the issue, it may be helpful to set out the landlord's submissions as they were convenientlysummarised by Mr. Neuberger in nine propositions, in the course of his very clear and careful argument:-
1. The grant to Miss Sadler and Miss Lunt of a contractual tenancy resulted in Miss Sadler and Miss Lunt being joint tenants.
2. Therefore 'the tenant' under the contractual tenancy was Miss Sadler and Miss Lunt.
3. The contractual tenancy was a protected tenancy.
4. Therefore 'the protected tenant' was Miss Sadler and Miss Lunt.
5. On the determination of a protected tenancy a statutory tenancy can only arise 'if….he occupies the dwelling-house as his residence'.
6. The 'he' in the above quotation clearly refers to 'the person who….was the protected tenant'.
7. On the determination of the protected tenancy in this case it cannot be said that Miss Sadler and Miss Lunt were occupying the dwelling-house as their residence.
8. Therefore the protected tenant was not occupying the premises in question on the determination of the protected tenancy in this case.
"9. Therefore no statutory tenancy can arise".
If the ordinary law as to joint tenancy, as it affects rights of property, is to be treated as applicable in all its strictness to section 3 (1) (a) of the Rent Act, 1968, the logic of Mr. Neuberger's propositions appears to me to be unassailable. I agree with the view expressed by Judge McIntyre that section 1 (1) (b) of the Interpretation Act, 1889, is not of assistance one way or the other.
I have come to the conclusion that, on the true construction of section 3 (1) (a) of the Rent Act, 1968, the ordinary law as to joint tenancy does not have to be, and ought not to be, applied in all its strictness. I base that opinion, primarily at least, on the judgment of Lord Justice Scrutton in Howson v. Buxton (1928) 97 Law Journal King's Bench 749. It is not a direct authority. There is no direct authority. There are various decided cases towhich we were properly referred as providing guidance by analogy, or as illustrating the general rule as to a joint tenancy. Some of them, or dicta in them, certainly lend support to the submissions on behalf of the landlord; but I find the most helpful guidance in Howson v. Buxton. It appears to me to decide that, where an Act of Parliament refers to "the tenant", and the letting is to two or more persons jointly, it is permissible for the court to hold, if so to do makes better sense of the relevant statutory provision in its particular context, that one of those persons, by himself, may for certain purposes be treated as being "the tenant". So here Miss Sadler can be treated, and should on the facts be treated, as having been "the protected tenant" immediately before the termination of the contractual tenancy, and as being "the statutory tenant" thereafter. Hence she has security of tenure under the Act.
I do not propose to discuss at length the cases which I have mentioned. I shall refer to them briefly.
In Fairclough v. Berliner (1931) 1 Chancery 60, Mr. Justice Maugham held that, where there are joint trustees, relief against forfeiture cannot be granted on the application of one person only. Otherwise, the joint tenant, who did not join in the application for relief, might find himself saddled with the continuance of obligations under an onerous lease, from which he would prefer to be free.
In Lloyds Bank Ltd v. Jones (1955) 2 Queen's Bench 298, a covenant in a lease of a farmhouse and cottages provided that the tenant should "at all times personally inhabit the farmhouse and cottages with his family and servants". "The tenant" was defined to include the...
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