Locke and the Non-Arbitrary
| Author | Lena Halldenius |
| Published date | 01 July 2003 |
| Date | 01 July 2003 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1474885103002003002 |
| Subject Matter | Journal Article |
Locke and the Non-Arbitrary
Lena Halldenius Lund University, and SCASSS, Uppsala
University
abstract: In this article, John Locke’s accounts of political liberty and legitimate
government are read as expressions of a normative demand for non-arbitrariness. I
argue that Locke locates infringements of political liberty in dependence on the
arbitrary will of another, whether or not interference or restraint actually takes place.
This way Locke is tentatively placed in that tradition of republican thought recently
brought to our attention by Pettit, Skinner and others. This reading shifts the focus
on legitimacy and identifies the independent moral argument for legitimate
government as ruling for the good of the people. Consent is left with a hypothetical
role to play.
key words: dependence, government, hypothetical consent, legitimacy, liberty, Locke,
non-arbitrariness, public good, republicanism, trust
Introduction
Throughout John Locke’s political theory runs a powerful argument against
arbitrariness. His ideas of political liberty and legitimate political power in the
Two Treatises of Government are threaded together by the moral notion of non-
arbitrariness required by both. That notion is the focal point of this article.
Locke’s conceptions of political liberty and of legitimate government are read
here primarily as expressions of an underlying normative demand for non-
arbitrary political relations. On this reading, his account of political liberty – of
which there has been a substantial number of different interpretations – ties
in with that interpretation of liberty which in recent years has been advocated
normatively and excavated historically by Philip Pettit, Quentin Skinner and
others.1This is an account of liberty that locates liberty infringements in the very
dependence on the arbitrary will of another, whether or not interference or
restraint actually takes place.2This reading also shifts the focus on Locke’s theo-
ry of legitimacy, from actual expressions of consent as a necessary condition for
legitimacy, to a moral demand that political rule shall not be arbitrary. The
article
261
Contact address: Lena Halldenius, Department of Philosophy,
Lund University, and SCASSS, Uppsala University, Sweden.
Email: lena.halldenius@fil.lu.se
EJPT
European Journal
of Political Theory
© SAGE Publications Ltd,
London, Thousand Oaks
and New Delhi
issn 1474-8851
2(3)261–279;033668
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criterion for non-arbitrariness is the natural morality that regulates the natural
state of mankind. I will consequently argue for the idea that consent has a differ-
ent role in Locke’s theory of legitimacy than is commonly supposed, and that this
role is predominantly hypothetical – confirming a criterion otherwise defined,
rather than being a constitutive part of it. Locke’s legitimacy criterion is found in
the ends of government to rule for the good – in a specific sense – of the people
and with accountability to the people as a requirement of reason that precludes
arbitrariness. The part played by consent is not an independent moral part.
Among the riches of Locke’s political texts, there are ambiguities and inconsis-
tencies (his account of consent to government being perhaps the greatest villain)
and we have to relate to this problem somehow. There are different ways of doing
that, all of which are perfectly honourable enterprises. One may simply point out
the inconsistencies and ambiguities, perhaps concluding that Locke’s political
project is a failure because of them. One might try to explain them, historically or
biographically. Or, proceeding from a careful interpretation, one might engage in
a partial reconstruction of the texts in the endeavour to see whether coherence is
possible. With the greatest respect to other approaches, the latter is what I will
attempt here.
Liberty in the Non-Arbitrary
For Locke, as we know, the image of the state of nature is an image of a state
imbued with and regulated by objective moral laws – the law of nature – since the
survival and furthering of the human species requires that human interaction be
regulated. The concern is with the preservation of mankind – not with the self-
preservation of each member – and this is a concern for everyone.
The law of nature – which is reason and the dictates of which are discernible
through reason3– states that all people are ‘equal and independent’ and that ‘no
one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions’.4The
social contract, by which people leave the state of nature for organized society and
consent to subsequent governments, should be understood as metaphorically con-
ceptualizing one of the most vital political points that Locke had to make, which
is that political power is in the hands of people; political rulers are not ordained
by God. Legitimate political power cannot be taken; it can only be entrusted to
you by those over whom you will govern. And the political brief entrusted to the
ruler is to rule so as to further the good of the people as set out by the law
of nature or natural morality. Liberty is part of this brief. So what is Lockean
liberty?
The widely differing interpretations of Locke’s notion of liberty bear witness to
the difficulty of placing him within ideological categories. Liberals claim him for
themselves, as the grandfather of liberal thought – ‘the arch-liberal’5– with its
connotations of negative liberty in the sense of non-interference. Berlin himself
seems to include Locke, at least initially, in the proponents of a negative liberty:
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