Looking inward: How does Chinese public diplomacy work at home?
Author | Yifan Yang |
DOI | 10.1177/1369148120917583 |
Published date | 01 August 2020 |
Date | 01 August 2020 |
917583BPI0010.1177/1369148120917583The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsYang
research-article2020
Original Article
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
Looking inward: How does
2020, Vol. 22(3) 369 –386
© The Author(s) 2020
Chinese public diplomacy
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https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120917583
DOI: 10.1177/1369148120917583
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Yifan Yang
Abstract
Although public diplomacy is not intended for domestic consumption, it can still have an internal
impact. It has been observed that China’s huge investment in public diplomacy has not resulted in
a proportionate increase in its international image. However, Chinese public diplomacy not only
tells China’s story and communicates its voice to the world, but also shoulders the responsibility
of accruing legitimacy for the country, both internationally and domestically. By looking at the
news reports on the Confucius Institutes and China’s National Image Film – two public diplomacy
programmes implemented by the Chinese government – in the mainstream media in both the
United States and China, this paper will assess how these influence domestic perceptions of China
and the Chinese government, and help enhance the legitimacy of the ruling party. This is important
in evaluating the effectiveness of Chinese public diplomacy.
Keywords
China, Confucius Institute, domestic perceptions, effectiveness measurement, national image
film, public diplomacy
Introduction
Public diplomacy is a tool utilised by almost every international actor on the world stage.
It is not intended for domestic consumption (Cull, 2010a: 11), but aims to engage the
publics of other countries, in order to influence foreign perceptions and even the foreign
policies of recipient countries towards the implementer (Edward Murrow Centre, 1965).
By studying the various practices of different countries, scholars connect public diplo-
macy with objectives such as increasing soft power, changing foreign perceptions or serv-
ing national interests. As an emerging economy, China’s embrace of public diplomacy
has drawn attention from both academia and political circles around the world.
The year 2003 marked a watershed for China’s international strategy because of its
proactive participation in regional and global issues in concert with a series of public
diplomacy campaigns and programmes launched at that time (Zhao, 2015: 167). According
to scholarly research, the task of promoting China’s soft rise by projecting its soft power
Department of Politics, East China Normal University, Shanghai, China
Corresponding author:
Yifan Yang, Research Associate in Politics and International Relations, Department of Politics, East China
Normal University, 500, Dongchuan Road, Shanghai 200241, China.
Email: yangyifanblue@gmail.com
370
The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 22(3)
falls to public diplomacy (Wang, 2008: 267). Enhancing China’s cultural soft power has
been frequently mentioned in President Xi Jinping’s public speeches on domestic develop-
ment and international relations (CPC.people.com.cn, 2015). In recent years, a series of
public diplomacy programmes have been launched throughout the world, including
China’s media ‘go global’ strategy, the Confucius China Studies Programme, and the
Confucius Institutes. There is little doubt that China has spent more money on implement-
ing public diplomacy than any other country in the world (Rawnsley, 2012: 126).
Despite such a huge investment, however, Chinese public diplomacy programmes that
target foreign countries do not result in a proportionate increase in its image on the world
stage (Nye, 2015). Although diplomats and researchers emphasise the impact of public
diplomacy programmes on foreign attitudes, foreign perceptions of China have declined,
according to two surveys conducted by the Pew Research Centre in 2002 and 2011,
respectively (Pew Research Centre, 2013). Over 60% of the interviewees in the
Philippines, Japan, Vietnam, South Korea, Australia and India were concerned about ter-
ritorial disputes with China (Pew Research Centre, 2015). Still worse, China’s soft power
is judged in terms of the power of ‘money’ (Troyjo, 2015).
Correspondingly, scholars have noted that the Chinese government approaches public
diplomacy in the same way as it builds infrastructure: by investing money and expecting
returns. Yet soft power cannot be bought, and must instead be earned (Shambaugh, 2015).
In this sense, Chinese public diplomacy has not achieved the objectives it set out to when
it was launched.
In fact, any measurement of the effectiveness of public diplomacy programmes needs
to be conducted according to its specific objectives; if a customer’s original order was to
‘follow that car’, he or she cannot later complain to the taxi driver that the journey did not
follow the most scenic route, as that was not the objective (Wilding, 2007: 1). However,
scholars have different opinions about the objectives of Chinese public diplomacy. Some
argue that China wields it as an important tool for promoting its soft power in general,
while others believe that its effect has functional aspects, including publicising China’s
intentions to the outside world, cultivating a favourable international image of the state,
criticising Western news reports demonising China, creating a desirable international
environment for Chinese policy implementation and exerting global influence (Hartig,
2016: 674). In other words, it is debatable whether Chinese public diplomacy has been
implemented through mutual understanding and engagement or is based on pragmatic
considerations on increasing China’s comprehensive strengths.
Nevertheless, as Zhao argues (2015: 189), the objectives of Chinese public diplomacy
have been changing over time; it is not intended merely to enhance its soft power world-
wide or shape its international image abroad. Instead, the strategic motivation has evolved:
from optimising the environment of international opinion to enhancing China’s interna-
tional discourse rights and upholding its political legitimacy domestically (Zhao, 2015:
189–192). Although upholding legitimacy at home seems not to appear in classic defini-
tions of the role of public diplomacy in influencing foreign perceptions (Edward Murrow
Centre, 1965; Malone, 1985: 199–213; Tuch, 1990: 2), Cull discusses the internal func-
tion of public diplomacy utilised by government to maintain power (Cull, 2010b: 117).
Whatever the influence of public diplomacy exerted overseas, the term has made an
immense contribution to its implementer’s battles for recognition (Cull, 2019: 14).
Therefore, Cull’s suggestion that public diplomacy ‘is not a performance for domestic
consumption’ was made in the context of what should be rather than what actually is; it
seems to be a common practice for nation-states to use it to target domestic audiences.
Yang
371
Whether the effectiveness of Chinese public diplomacy is measured according to
enhancement of China’s soft power in general or improvement of its international image,
it is easy to jump to the conclusion that it has failed to achieve its objectives. However,
when we look at it from the perspective of upholding political legitimacy, a different story
emerges. This paper argues that Chinese public diplomacy, in fact, works well when its
strategy has been understood correctly. Despite Zhao’s emphasis on its role in upholding
political legitimacy, he does not address the mechanisms of how this works. This paper,
therefore, examines how best to evaluate the effectiveness of Chinese public diplomacy
programmes in enhancing the political legitimacy of the ruling party and, put simply, why
it works. Based on these two research questions, this paper concludes that the domestic
consumption of public diplomacy programmes through mass media helps communicate
outputs of public diplomacy programmes to Chinese audiences, leading to a self-percep-
tion of a rising China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and
thus increasing its political legitimacy at home.
In order to reach these conclusions, the paper will conduct a content analysis, looking
at the news reports on the Confucius Institute and the National Image Film – two impor-
tant Chinese public diplomacy programmes – in the mass media in both China and the
United States, to ascertain how Chinese and Western media frame these programmes in
their different discourses. Such is the agenda- and frame-setting functions of the mass
media in forming public opinion, this will reflect how Chinese public diplomacy pro-
grammes have been framed in the Chinese and American media, further influencing pub-
lic opinion about these programmes in China and the United States. On this basis,
comparative research between different media frames will be conducted in order to study
why the Chinese media adopt a different approach to reporting Chinese public diplomacy
endeavours at home, and how this helps the ruling party obtain public support. The paper
offers a new, very significant perspective from which to evaluate Chinese public diplo-
macy; one which is different from previous research.
The remainder of this paper is structured in five sections. The first will look at Chinese
understandings of public diplomacy and measure its effectiveness within a theoretical and
practical...
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