Loyalty Rebates after Intel: Time for the European Court of Justice to Overrule Hoffman-la Roche

DOI10.1093/joclec/nhv023
Date09 September 2015
Pages579-615
Year2015
Published ByOxford University Press
LOYALTY REBATES AFTER INTEL: TIME FOR THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE TO OVERRULE
HOFFMAN-LA ROCHE
Damien Geradin
ABSTRACT
In June 2014, the GCEU confirmed the Decision of the European Commission
that condemned Intel for breaching Article 102 TFEU by adopting exclusive
rebates and “naked restrictions.”Thisjudgment, in which the GCEU considered
that in line with Hoffman-La Roche loyalty rebates should be quasi-per se illegal,
has been subject to many criticisms as it is not in line with the teachings of eco-
nomics. This article discusses the shortcomings of this judgment and argues that
it is a great time for the CJEU to abandon the application of its quasi-per se rule of
illegality approach to exclusive dealing and loyalty rebates and replace that appli-
cation with a structured rule of reason. Such an approach would have many
advantages and create greatercoherence in the case law of the CJEU on unilateral
pricing conduct.
JEL: D40; K21; L12; L22
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 12, 2014, the General Court of the European Union (GCEU) con-
firmed the Decision of the European Commission (Commission) that con-
demned Intel for breaching Article 102 of the Treaty on the European Union
(TFEU) by adopting exclusive rebates and “naked restrictions.”
1
The judg-
ment of the GCEU was appealed to the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU). This appeal is still pending at the time of writing.
The judgment of the GCEU was coldly received by the vast majority of aca-
demic and practicing lawyers and economists as unduly formalistic,
2
and also
Professor of Competition Law & Economics at Tilburg University and Professor of Law at
George Mason University School of Law. Visiting Professor, University College, London.
Founding Partner of EDGE Legal, a competition and litigation boutique law firm based in
Brussels. Email: dgeradin@edgelegal.eu.
1
Case T-457/08, Intel v. Comm’n, 2014 E.C.R. II-0000.
2
For critical reviews of this case, see, e.g., Case T-457/08, Intel v. Comm’n,2009 E.C.R. II-12.
This case generated an abundant number of papers. See also, e.g., Patrick Rey and James
S. Venit, An Effects-Based Approach to Article 102: A Response to Wouter Wils,38W
ORLD
COMPETITION 3 (2015); Lars Kjølbye, Jorge Padilla & Robbert Snelders, The Intel Controversy:
An Introduction,1C
OMPETITION L. & POL’YDEBATE 28 (2015); Alison Jones & Brenda Sufrin,
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 11(3), 579–615
doi:10.1093/joclec/nhv023
© The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
created some steer within the Commission with senior officials expressing con-
flicting views on the soundness of that judgment.
3
This judgment, like earlier
judgments of the EU courts on conditional rebates,
4
is seen by many as failing
to incorporate the teachings of economics and by pursuing a form-based ana-
lysis to the assessment of such rebates.
5
The Intel judgment also raises the
question of what is left of the Guidance Paper on Article 102 TFEU and the
effects-based approach it promotes, since the GCEU considered that it was
not necessary for the Commission to carry out an “as efficient competitor
test”to establish the potential anticompetitive effect of the rebates at stake.
Finally, the Intel judgment has triggered a debate about the goal of Article 102
The European Way—Reflections on the Intel Judgment,1COMPETITION L. & POL’YDEBATE 32
(2015); DanielA. Crane, ConditionalPricing and Monopolization:A Reflection on the State of Play,1
COMPETITION L. & POL’YDEBATE 44 (2015); Bill Allan, Loyalty and Fidelity Rebates: A Sense of
Déjà Vu Again,1C
OMPETITION L. & POL’YDEBATE 50 (2015); Christian Ahlborn & Daniel
Piccinin, The Intel Judgment andConsumer Welfare—A Response to Wouter Wils,1C
OMPETITION L.
&P
OL’YDEBATE 60 (2015); Maurits Dolmans & Thomas Graf, Dealing with Intel Intelligently
Delineating the Scope and Limits of the Court’sRuling,1C
OMPETITION L. & POL’YDEBATE 76
(2015); Damien Neven, A Structured Assessment of Rebates Contingent on Exclusivity,1
COMPETITIONL. & POL’YDEBATE 86 (2015);James S. Venit, Case T-286/09Intel v. Commission—
The Judgmentof the General Court:All Steps Backwardand No Steps Forward,10E
UR.COMPETITION
J. 203 (2014); Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, Intel and Article 102 TFEU Case Law: Making Sense of a
Perpetual Controversy (LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers, Paper No. 29/2014,
2014), http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2014-29_Colomo.pdf; Nicolas Petit, Intel,
Leveraging Rebates and the Goals of Article 102 TFEU (Feb. 20, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript),http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2567628.
3
Compare Wouter P.J.Wils, The Judgment of the EU General Court in Intel and the So-Called More
Economic Approach to Abuse of Dominance,37W
ORLD COMPETITION 405 (2014), with Luc
Peeperkorn, Conditional Pricing: Why the General Court Is Wrong in Intel and What the Court of
Justice Can Do to Rebalance the Assessment of Rebates,1C
ONCURRENCES REV. 43. (2015).
4
Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche &. Co. AG v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 461; Case 322/81,
Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie-Michelin v. Comm’n, 1983 E.C.R. 3461 [hereinafterMichelin
I]; Case T–203/01, Manufacture Française des Pneumatiques Michelin v. Comm’n[hereinafter
Michelin II], 2003 E.C.R. II-4071; Case T–219/99, British Airways plc v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R.
II-5917; Case C–95/04 P, British Airwaysplc v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331; Case T–155/06,
Tomra Systems ASA v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. I-865; Case C–549/10 P, Tomra Systems
v. Comm’n, 2012 E.C.R. 0000.
5
See Rey & Venit, supra note 2; Kjølbye, Padilla & Snelders, supra note 2; Jones & Sufrin, supra
note 2; Crane, supra note 2; Allan, supra note 2; Ahlborn & Piccinin, supra note 2; Dolmans &
Graf, supra note 2; Neven, supra note 2; Venit, supra note 2; Colomo, supra note 2; Bruce
Kobayashi, The Economics of Loyalty Discounts and Antitrust Law in the United States,1
COMPETITION POL’YINT’L115 (2005); Patrick Greenlee & David Reitman, Competing with
Loyalty Discounts, (Econ. Analysis Grp. Discussion Paper, Paper No. 04–2, 2004); David
Spector, Loyalty Rebates: An Assessment of Competition Concerns and a Proposed Structured Rule of
Reason,1C
OMPETITION POL’YINT’L89 (2005); Benjamin Klein & Andres V. Lerner, The
Expanded Economics of Free-Riding: How Exclusive Dealing Prevents Free-Riding and Creates
Undivided Loyalty,74A
NTITRUST L.J. 473 (2007); Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy,
Exclusive Dealing Intensifies Competition for Distribution,75A
NTITRUST L.J. 433 (2008).
580 Journal of Competition Law & Economics
TFEU—thatis, whether it was designed to protect the structure of competition
or consumer welfare.
6
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it
argues that the main criticism that can be made against the GCEU’sIntel judg-
ment is that, while this judgment identifies the ways in which “exclusive”
rebates (which, in this paper, will generally be referred to “loyalty”rebates
since the Intel judgment covers rebates that are not necessarily conditioned on
exclusivity) can harm competition, it fails to establish a coherent legal frame-
work to analyze them. Which legal framework should be applied to loyalty
rebates is by no means a trivial question. For instance, in the United States, a
debate is raging over which test should be used to separate procompetitive
loyalty rebates from anticompetitive ones. Some commentators have expressed
the view that loyalty rebates should be analyzed by analogy to predatory
pricing,
7
while others consider that the right analogy is exclusive dealing.
8
The
case law of the federal courts is divided on this point. As will be seen below,
the GCEU borrows from both analogies, but fails to draw the logical conse-
quence that whichever analogy is selected requires a foreclosure analysis based
on the available data or evidence concerning the rebate scheme. Instead, and
somewhat illogically, the GCEU decides to stick to the quasi-per se rule of il-
legality contained in Hoffman-La Roche.
Second, based on this observation, this article then argues that it is time for
the Court of Justice to abandon its Hoffman-La Roche line of case law on which
the controversial judgments of the EU courts on loyalty rebates are based, and
replace it with a structured rule of reason analysis. The CJEU can no longer
ignore the teachings of several decades of economic analysis that show that,
unlike hardcore cartels, rebates can be a source of efficiencies and should
therefore not be treated under a per se rule.
9
The Court should also aim to
create a greater degree of coherence in the EU courts’case law. The current
position of the EU courts on loyalty rebates is at odds with the position they
have taken on other forms of price-related unilateral conduct that can fall
within Article 102 TFEU,
10
but also with the way in which it has dealt with ex-
clusive agreements in the context of Article 101 TFEU.
11
6
Compare Wils,supra note 3, with Ahlborn & Piccinin, supranote 2.
7
See, e.g., Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusions, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 841 (2006).
8
See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright, Simple but Wrong or Complex but More Accurate? The Case for an
Exclusive Dealing-Based Approach to Evaluating Loyalty Discounts (June 3, 2013), https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/defau lt/files/documents/publi c_statements/simple-wrong-or-com plex-more-
accurate-case-exclusive-deali ng-based-approach-evaluating-l oyalty/130603bateswhite.pdf.
9
See Rey & Venit, supra note 2; Kjølbye, Padilla & Snelders, supra note 2; Jones & Sufrin, supra
note 2; Crane, supra note 2; Allan, supra note 2; Ahlborn & Piccinin, supra note 2; Dolmans &
Graf, supra note 2; Neven, supra note 2; Venit, supranote 2; Colomo, supra note 2; Kobayashi,
supra note 5; Greenlee & Reitman, supra note 5; Spector, supra note 5; Klein & Lerner, supra
note 5; Klein & Murphy, supra note 5.
10
See infra Part II.B.1.
11
See infra text accompanying notes 119–22.
Time for the European Court of Justice to Overrule Hoffman-La Roche 581

Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI

Get Started for Free

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex