Loyalty Rebates and the Competitive Process
| DOI | 10.1093/joclec/nhs023 |
| Date | 04 October 2012 |
| Pages | 717-768 |
| Year | 2012 |
| Published By | Oxford University Press |
LOYALTY REBATES AND THE COMPETITIVE
PROCESS
Hans Zenger
ABSTRACT
The degree of divergence between U.S. and European case law on the proper
legal treatment of loyalty rebates is larger than in almost any other field of
international antitrust law. Whereas U.S. jurisprudence has traditionally con-
sidered loyalty rebates to be a procompetitive business practice, the Court of
Justice of the European Union has repeatedly held that loyalty rebates are an
illegal means of distorting competition. This ar ticle challenges the Community
Courts’ conviction that loyalty rebates do not constitute competition on the
merits and claims the opposite. The adoption of loyalty rebates is a direct con-
sequence and a vital expression of the competitive process. The need for differ-
ent forms of loyalty rebates naturally emerges from the diverse market
conditions that prevail in different industries, which explains the widespread
use of diverse loyalty rebates in business practice. It is the heterogeneity of
commercial pressures that dominant firms are facing that determines the com-
petitive structure and size of their rebates. By suppressing competition in
rebates, orthodox legal doctrine in Europe has distorted the competitive
process in a variety of global markets, and thereby caused significant har m to
competition and consumers. Since loyalty rebates are an efficient and healthy
form of competition, plaintiffs and competition authorities that allege anticom-
petitive foreclosure as a result of loyalty rebates should generally carry the
burden of proving the existence of a restriction of competition. The Court’s
prevailing interpretation of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU), by contrast, is bound to punish successful innova-
tors and to protect less effective rivals from the inconveniences of the competi-
tive process.
JEL: K21; L13; L41; L42
Senior Consultant, Charles River Associates, Brussels. E-mail: hzenger@crai.com. I would
like to thank Miguel de la Mano, Damien Neven, Greg Werden, Svend Albaek, Gianluca
Faella, Giulio Federico, Derek Ritzmann, and Patrick Rey for helpful comments and
discussions. The views expressed in this article represent those of the author only, and do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of other CRA staff or of CRA’s clients. All decisions of the
Court of Justice of the European Union (“the Court”) that are cited in this article were
preceded by prior prohibition decisions of the European Commission (“the Commission”).
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 8(4), 717–768
doi:10.1093/joclec/nhs023
Advance Access publication 4 October 2012
#The Author (2012). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
I. INTRODUCTION
In an area of antitrust law that does not lack controversial rulings, the treat-
ment of loyalty rebates under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU) is perhaps the most heavily disputed field
of European competition policy. Relying mainly on a presumption that
rebates are incompatible with the competitive process, the Community
Courts have consistently prohibited pricing schemes by dominant firms that
involve loyalty discounts unless they are cost-based. This article investigates
the economic foundations that underlie this legal rule by analyzing the com-
petitive effects of loyalty rebates (defined in the broader sense as any
payment schedule that rewards larger orders with lower prices). Specifically,
it explores the function that loyalty rebates fulfill in the competitive inter-
action between firms and outlines the legal consequences that flow from this
analysis.
As a matter of economics, rebate schemes are a form of price discrimin-
ation, as they allow sellers to charge different prices for different units of a
purchaser’s demand. Since any “rebate” on purchases above Xunits could
equally be interpreted as a “surcharge” on purchases below Xunits, the ex-
istence of a rebate does not automatically imply that prices would be higher
in the absence of rebates.
1
It has therefore sometimes been suggested that
rebates tend to raise, rather than lower, prices.
2
In addition to this exploit-
ative concern, the use of loyalty rebates by large firms has also been sus-
pected of causing exclusionar y effects, as discounts might foreclose
competing producers from the market.
3
Indeed, the desire not to forgo pos-
sible rebates from a large supplier might discourage buyers from sourcing
additional quantities from smaller producers, even if it would be socially effi-
cient to do so. In such cases, loyalty rebates can generate economic effects
akin to exclusive dealing. Plaintiffs sometimes argue that through such ex-
clusionary rebates, a dominant competitor leverages its market power over
part of its customers’ requirements (the “non-contestable share” of
demand) into purchases that would be under competitive challenge in the
absence of the rebate (the “contestable share” of demand).
There is a long-standing controversy about the significance and frequency
of these concerns, from which U.S. and European courts have drawn mark-
edly different conclusions. Indeed, the degree of divergence between the as-
sessment of rebates under section 2 of the Sherman Act and Article 102 of
1
See Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory,
123 HARV.L. REV.397, 402– 03 (2009) (“If the unbundled price exceeds the but-for level,
then the price difference we call a ‘discount’ is really a penalty imposed on buyers who refuse
to bundle.”).
2
Id. at 459– 61.
3
See, e.g., Willard K. Tom, David A. Balto & Neill W. Averitt, Anticompetitive Aspects of
Market-Share Discounts and Other Incentives to Exclusive Dealing,67A
NTITRUST L.J. 615, 622
(2000).
718 Journal of Competition Law & Economics
the Treaty could hardly be larger. In the U.S., a strong presumption of legal-
ity prevails for single-product rebates, unless they are predatory, because
“cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of
competition, which antitrust laws were designed to encourage.”
4
In Europe,
by contrast, the Court of Justice of the European Union has consistently
held that conditional rebates “[do not] constitute a mode of exercise of the
normal operation of competition.”
5
The extent of disagreement was lucidly illustrated by the contrarian
rulings that U.S. and European courts issued on British Airways’ quantity
rebates, which were under litigation on both sides of the Atlantic. While the
Court of First Instance held that BA’s discounts infringed competition law
because they “had as their object and effect ...the reward of the loyalty of
those agents to BA,”
6
the corresponding U.S. Appeals Court considered
BA’s pricing to be lawful precisely because “[r]ewarding customer loyalty
promotes competition on the merits.”
7
The much less permissive European approach toward loyalty rebates has
had a significant impact not only on European firms but also on many of
their U.S. competitors. Most recently, this jurisdictional interdependence
became apparent again in Intel, where the European Commission imposed a
fine of more than one billion dollars on the U.S. chipmaker after finding its
rebate schemes to be unlawful.
8
Due to the global implications of European
antitrust law, it has even been suggested that, for U.S. corporations, “the
EU position on antitrust issues is not just relevant but generally matters
more because, as the more aggressive antitrust enforcement agency, it
4
Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp. 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000). See also Barry
Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that above-cost
price cuts “are normally desirable (particularly in concentrated industries)”); Virgin Atlantic
Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256 (2nd Cir. 2001) (“As long as low prices
remain above predatory levels, they neither threaten competition nor give rise to an antitrust
injury.”). Only bundled discounts have sometimes been prohibited. See SmithKline
Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1978); Le Page’s v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3rd
Cir. 2003).
5
Case T-219/99, British Airways v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-5917, }291 (Ct. First Instance)
[hereinafter BA/Virgin]. See also Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v. Comm’n,
1979 E.C.R. 461, }6 (Eur. Ct. Justice) (characterizing loyalty rebates as “recourse to
methods different from those governing normal competition”) [hereinafter Hoffmann-La
Roche]; Case T-203/01, Manufacture Franc¸aise des Pneumatiques Michelin v. Comm’n, 2003
E.C.R. II-4071, }97 (Ct. First Instance) (holding that loyalty rebates constitute “recourse to
means other than those within the scope of competition on the merits”) [hereinafter Michelin
II].
6
BA/Virgin, 2003 E.C.R. II-5917, }299.
7
Virgin Atlantic, 257 F.3d at 265.
8
Commission Decision of 13 May 2009 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 82 of the EC
Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, Case COMP/C-3/37.990—Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc. v. Intel, 2009 O.J. (C 227) 13, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
sectors/ICT/intel_provisional_decision.pdf [hereinafter Commission Decision in Intel].
Loyalty Rebates and the Competitive Process 719
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