Luis I. Gordillo, Interlocking Constitutions: Towards an Interordinal Theory of National, European and UN Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012, 410 pp, hb £66.00.
| Author | Vito Breda |
| Published date | 01 September 2014 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12084_3 |
| Date | 01 September 2014 |
Just as Cinderella’s fortunes were changed so dramatically following Prince
Charming’s observation that the glass slipper comfortably fitted her foot, so too
must we endeavour to understand precisely how artistic expression operates as a sui
generis category and thereby determine how it can be considered to best ‘fit’, in its
own distinct way, within the broader context of freedom of expression specifically
and law more generally. The collection of essays in Freedom of Artistic Expression
offers a highly readable and compelling, if at times controversial, basis from which
such an understanding can be gleaned and in so doing paves the way for future
discussion on what is an at times vexing but always fascinating area of law.
James Lowe*
Luis I. Gordillo,Interlocking Constitutions: Towards an Interordinal Theory
of National, European and UN Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012, 410 pp,
hb £66.00.
Interlocking Constitutions delivers a highly articulate analysis of the dynamic inter-
action between European final appellate jurisdictions at the international and
national levels. Through a series of case studies, Gordillo examines how various
international and national jurisdictions have interacted with one another over the
past fifty years. The historical inheritance of these dialogues is a European-wide
interlocked legal system that includes national and international jurisdictions as
well as international institutions such as the UN Security Council.
The interactions between these institutions take a functional approach that
seeks to prevent conflicts ex ante or to minimise their consequences ex post.An
important corollary of this is that the book provides an argument against the
cognitive persuasiveness of epistemic models such as constitutional cosmopoli-
tanism and constitutional pluralism. Constitutional cosmopolitanism, Gordillo
argues, is unsuitable for explaining horizontal interactions between final appellate
jurisdictions because it assumes, implicitly or explicitly, the existence of a global
order based on shared values. However, from the analysis of the very large
sample of cases considered in Interlocking Constitutions, it appears that constitu-
tional and international courts either resist the idea of global values or, in the few
instances in which they might qualify as shared, judgments are nonetheless
grounded in courts’ pre-existing lines of authority.
By contrast, the wide spectrum of theoretical stances that endorse constitutional
pluralism generally assume a looser connection between legal systems. One of the
key dilemmas that supporters of legal pluralism face is in defining the criteria that
establish a relation between legal systems. In other words, how loose should the
connection between systems be for them to be considered pluralistic? This point
has been well explored by Murkens (‘Neither Parochial nor Cosmopolitan:
Appraising the Migration of Constitutional Ideas’ (2008) 71 MLR 303). Echoing
*University of Southern Queensland.
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© 2014 The Authors. The Modern Law Review © 2014 The Modern Law Review Limited. 827(2014) 77(5) MLR 823–829
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