Marketization in a state-centred policing context: The case of Sweden
| Published date | 01 November 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1477370819882905 |
| Date | 01 November 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370819882905
European Journal of Criminology
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/1477370819882905
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Marketization in a
state-centred policing
context: The case of Sweden
Cecilia Hansen Löfstrand
University of Gothenburg, Sweden
Abstract
This article examines how and why marketization of policing may occur in a historically state-
centred policing context in the absence of governmental policy promoting privatization and
marketization. In Sweden, a community-level marketization is increasingly becoming the new
norm. It is a result of a political mobilization by the private security industry, characterized by an
association of private security with the public interest in safety, an absence of national political
decision-making, and pragmatic local initiatives to increase public safety, but it results in the
dispersion of political decision-making that fails to ensure democratic governance of policing and
security provision.
Keywords
Policing, private security, marketization, community level
Introduction
Policing is increasingly pluralized, with multiple agents involved in policing (Boels and
Verhage, 2016; Devroe and Terpstra, 2015; Jones and Newburn, 2006). A common
explanation for the pluralization of policing is a strategic government policy to promote
the privatization and marketization of public policing. However, this explanation relies
on research based on only a small sample of Anglo-Saxon countries (Devroe and Terpstra,
2015). Thus, the scope of this explanatory theory needs to be investigated further through
research on pluralization processes in other European contexts. By studying the Swedish
case, characterized by an association of private security with the public interest in safety,
this article aims to contribute knowledge of how and why the marketization of policing
is becoming a reality in a state-centred country context and in the absence of a strategic
Corresponding author:
Cecilia Hansen Löfstrand, Department of Sociology and Work Science, University of Gothenburg, PO Box
720, Gothenburg, SE-40530, Sweden.
Email: Cecilia.Lofstrand@gu.se
882905EUC0010.1177/1477370819882905European Journal of CriminologyHansen Löfstrand
research-article2019
Article
2021, Vol. 18(6) 899–917
governmental policy promoting privatization and marketization. The contribution of this
study is to nuance the contemporary theoretical understanding of pluralization and mar-
ketization processes in policing. In the case of Sweden, the commonly held idea in polic-
ing research that the pluralization of policing inevitably entails a ‘shift away from a
state-centred policing framework’ on the level of governmental policy (Boels and
Verhage, 2016: 3) may have to be revised. In Sweden, as in other European countries
(Terpstra et al., 2013; Terpstra and van Stokkom, 2015), the pluralization of policing has
occurred in spite of a widely held view that policing should be a public task, and in
Sweden it is a peculiar outcome of a complex combination of public- and private-sector
initiatives as well as a diverse range of political decisions.
Mobilization of private security in an institutional void
States are necessary for any democratic governance of security (Loader and Walker,
2006; Wood and Dupont, 2006). The state needs to retain some control over policing
providers. Arguably, Swedish national policing policy has historically been inherently
‘state centred’ (Shearing, 2006). Swedish governments have aimed to reduce and/or take
control of the private security industry by legislation. A state-centred paradigm typically
assumes that the state is the only agent with a ‘legitimate monopoly of physical force’
(Shearing, 2006: 21). By legislation, part of this monopoly was delegated to private
security companies in 1974 and to private security officers in 1980. Private security
officers, trained and controlled by the Swedish police but employed by private security
companies, have been granted ‘limited policing powers’ to help the police to maintain
public order, for example in night clubs and pubs as well as during festivals and public
demonstrations. However, for more than a decade, private security companies have been
contracted to provide a distinctly new type of service. Local public-sector authorities are
increasingly hiring security services to provide visible patrols in public areas of the city.
This practice has emerged despite a government policy expressly opposing the delega-
tion of tasks seen to be the exclusive prerogative of the public police force (for example,
visible foot patrols in public areas) to private security providers. Furthermore, the change
has occurred in the name of the public good.
In Sweden, policy-making in regard to policing by non-state policing actors has
occurred in an institutional void. The concept denotes the absence of ‘generally accepted
rules and norms according to which policy making and politics [are] to be conducted’
(Hajer, 2003: 175, italics in original). Arguably, marketization of policing in Sweden
took off in parallel with a relaxation of up until then generally accepted rules and norms
in the country. Voids arise when political systems ‘lack the powers to deliver the required
or requested policy results on their own’ (Hajer, 2003: 175), for example, as in this case,
when the government depends on the support of labour market actors (unions and
employer organizations). When stakeholders discover that state institutions do not pro-
vide solutions to problems regarded as pressing, new forms of mobilization occur. Such
mobilization may take place parallel to the state institutional order, and thus challenge
existing rules and norms. State institutions have not suddenly vanished, but governmen-
tal agencies tend to not dominate the deliberation during the mobilization phase, and
outcomes in the form of new agreements are not necessarily ‘backed up by regulatory
900 European Journal of Criminology 18(6)
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