Martin Glenn v Craig Kline

Hearing date: 9 February 2021

Approved Judgment

Richard SpearmanQ.C.:

Introduction and nature of the hearing

This is a remedies hearing in a claim for libel and harassment, brought by the Claimant, Martin Richard Glenn, a former Chief Executive Officer of The Football Association (“the FA”), in respect of a long series of publications, principally posts on Twitter, which began in November 2018 and ended in June 2020. The Claimant was represented at the hearing, as he has been throughout these proceedings, by Alexandra Marzec. I am grateful to Ms Marzec for her assistance, which included drawing to my attention some potential countervailing arguments, for example involving reliance on Article 10, which might be available to the Defendant, Craig Kline, in relation to some of the relief which the Claimant sought before me. This was relevant because the Defendant did not appear and was not represented at the hearing.

It is clear from a number of emails which were available at the hearing that the Defendant was aware of when it was to take place and decided not to participate. In an email containing 15 numbered paragraphs dated 8 February 2021, he explained that he was not prepared for the hearing as he had been “overwhelmed” by various matters. He asked for time to “make use of [his] legal rights”, and requested an adjournment to file an application to set aside the judgment of Nicklin J which I refer to below, and “get a hearing on the merits”. He asserted that all “[his] reporting on the disputed matters [is] accurate and true”; expressed a concern that his “opponents” would “try to force words into my mouth, falsely, such that my allegations are withdrawn or said to be false”; and asked that “no Order be fashioned so as to force me to say something false, such as withdrawing my allegations” and that “the Order allow me some opportunity to seek a variance”.

The hearing began at 2pm on 9 February 2021, and was conducted remotely using MS Teams. By an email dated 9 February 2021, which was sent in response to an email from the Court notifying all participants of the details of the hearing, the Defendant wrote: “Apologies that I am not represented nor prepared for this hearing. In order to save costs I will decline attendance so long as that does not offend the Court”.

These communications have to be viewed in the context of the events giving rise to these proceedings, the history of these proceedings (including the hearing before Nicklin J on 13 November 2020 and the Order of Nicklin J of 25 November 2020 (“the Judgment Order”)), and the engagement (or lack of engagement) of the Defendant in these proceedings both before and since the Judgment Order was made.

As a result of the Claimant's successful application before Nicklin J for judgment in default of Acknowledgment of Service, and in accordance with the Judgment Order, it fell to me to determine (1) the level of damages, (2) the Claimant's application for an order, pursuant to s12 of the Defamation Act 2013, that the Defendant should publish an agreed summary of the judgment of the Court, and (3) the costs of the claim. In accordance with the Judgment Order, (a) the Claimant was directed to file and serve any evidence relevant to the assessment of damages by 4.30pm on 18 December 2020, (b) the Defendant was directed to file and serve any evidence in answer to the Claimant's evidence by 4.30pm on 22 January 2021, (c) the Claimant was directed to file and serve a bundle for the assessment of damages hearing together with a skeleton argument at least 7 days prior to the hearing, and (d) the Defendant was directed to file and serve any skeleton argument in response 2 working days before the assessment of damages hearing. The Claimant complied with all of those directions. The Defendant did not comply with any of them.

Further, by the Judgment Order the Defendant was ordered to pay the costs of the Claimant's application for judgment in default of Acknowledgment of Service. Those costs were summarily assessed in the sum of £25,000, and were ordered to be paid by the Defendant by 4.30pm on 18 December 2020. However, the Judgment Order further provided that if, by 4.30pm on 11 December 2020, the Defendant issued, filed and served an Application Notice seeking to set aside the judgment in default granted by paragraph 2 of that Order, then the order for payment of those costs should be stayed until that application had been heard and determined. The Defendant has neither issued any application to set aside the default judgment nor paid all or any part of that sum of £25,000. Accordingly, it appears that the Defendant's lack of engagement in these proceedings, which Nicklin J commented on, has continued down to the present time.

In addition to the three matters which came before me pursuant to the Judgment Order, by application notice dated 21 December 2020, the Claimant sought permission to amend the Claim Form pursuant to CPR 17.1(2)(b) to increase the upper limit of the amount claimed in these proceedings from £25,000 to £100,000. That application summarised the correspondence relating to this issue. This included a letter sent by the Claimant's solicitors on 17 December 2020 stating that, if the Defendant did not respond by the close of business on 18 December 2020, the Claimant would apply to the Court for permission to amend the Claim Form; and included also the explanation that it was proposed that this application would be heard at the start of the hearing to assess damages. The reasons for seeking permission were set out in §47 of the Claimant's witness statement for this hearing dated 17 December 2020, which had already been served on the Defendant in accordance with the Judgment Order, as follows:

“When I first commenced these proceedings, I limited the amount claimed on the Claim Form to £25,000. The motivation for these proceedings has never been financial and so I elected to keep the relevant Court fee at a lower level despite the fact I was aware that the level of damages might be considerably higher. However, since the Claim Form was issued, Mr Kline has continued to exhibit contempt for my rights and feelings, and an unwillingness to cease his actions. I have therefore come to the conclusion that it is important that the damages award is sufficiently substantial in order to mark the gravity of the wrong done to me and properly to vindicate my reputation, as well as to compensate me for damage to my reputation and feelings. I need to be able to point to the size of the damages award should I ever need to explain the matter in future, as indicating that these serious allegations were without any foundation. I therefore respectfully ask the Court to grant me permission to amend my Claim Form to increase the damages claimed to £100,000. If permission is granted, I will undertake to pay the additional court fee appropriate to the sum claimed.”

The Defendant attended the hearing before Nicklin J on 13 December 2020. He applied for an adjournment (which was refused). The Defendant subsequently gave permanent undertakings to the Court (1) not to publish or cause to be published all or any of the allegations set out in Schedule 2 to the Judgment Order, or any similar allegations, and (2) not to pursue any conduct which amounts to harassment of the Claimant by publishing or causing to be published any derogatory or defamatory allegations to the same or similar effect as all or any of those allegations. The content of the allegations which are covered by those undertakings reflects the breadth and the manifest seriousness of the Claimant's grounds for seeking relief against the Defendant. The allegations covered by those permanent undertakings are:

“1. The Claimant used his role as a key regulator in football actively to protect, facilitate and cover up fraud and money laundering within football, which was carried out by organised crime networks using football recruitment networks.

2. The Claimant is aware of fraud and criminal activity in the football industry, but rather than attempting to stop it actively facilitates that criminal activity.

3. The Claimant:

a. corruptly facilitated and enabled criminal activity within football; and

b. sought to protect crime rings and to punish whistleblowers including the Defendant; specifically, when the Defendant had rightly denounced him as a criminal, the Claimant had tried to silence the Defendant with threats of legal action; and

c. only resigned from being CEO of The FA in order to avoid the Defendant exposing his (the Claimant's) guilt to investigators looking into his corrupt activities.

4. The Claimant is part of an international criminal conspiracy that permits organised crime to run English football, and to cover up child abuse, racism, fraud, money laundering, misogyny and fraudulent science; and that he delayed his departure date from The FA in order to ensure that his corruption was covered up.

5. The Claimant is a criminal who has enabled fraud and has negotiated a corrupt deal to pay players large bonuses.

6. The Claimant helped to facilitate criminal money laundering by Will Salthouse, a football agent representing Harry Kane.

7. The Claimant protects or...