Matrimonial Relief for Sexual Frustration: For and Against

Published date01 September 1965
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1965.tb02915.x
AuthorNaomi Michaels
Date01 September 1965
606
THE
MODERN
LAW
REVIEW
VOL.
28
The decision in
Church
fails to distinguish between these different
grounds of liability for
constructive manslaughter.”
It
is
compatible with the last (and strictest) of them; the most that can be
said
is
that
it
does not positively support
it.
RICHARD
F.
SPARKS.
MATRIMONIAL
RELIEF
FOR
SEXUAL FRUSTRATION
:
FOR
AND
AGAINST
Two recent divorce cases have raised once again the delicately
balanced question as to whether persistent refusal of marital inter-
course due to invincible repugnance
or
other uncontrollable psycho-
logical inhibitions can amount to cruelty in matrimonial law.
Hitherto, the general attitude of the courts has been to refuse
decrees in such cases.‘
A
line has been drawn between them and
cases where the refusal has proceeded from the guilty spouse’s desire
to cause misery,
or,
more commonly, his indiiference to the suffering
caused. Here, the courts’ attitude has been more favourable to
petitioners, especially where the respondent’s conduct has resulted
in frustration of the petitioner’s natural desires for parenthood.2
Now, however, the House of Lords decisions in
Gollins
v.
Gollins
and
Williams
v.
Williams
have indicated that a fresh
approach may be possible in cases where the respondent has been
inhibited by psyqhological difficulties. Yet, in the case of
P.
v.
P.,5
the court declined to reconsider its earlier attitude in the light
of
Gollins
and
Williams.
The wife had left the husband in
1963
after
some seventeen years of marriage.
No
marital intercourse had taken
place since the end of
1948
and even before that date sexual relations
had been minimal. There was one child of the marriage, born in
October
1947.
The reason for this unusual marital relationship was
the husband’s total lack of interest in the sexual side of marriage.
To use the words of the learned judge,
the husband was under-
sexed and was just not interested in women physically, neither in
his wife nor in other women.’’ No other allegations were made
against him, but it was urged on the wife’s behalf that he had
refused to discuss the subject of intercourse and had refused to read
a book on the subject. The husband did not defend his wife’s suit,
and for that reason the hearing was adjourned to enable the court
to obtain the assistance of the Queen’s Proctor. His Honour Judge
Harold Brown,
Q.c.,
sitting as a special commissioner in divorce,
reluctantly dismissed the wife’s petition. While admitting both the
gravity of the charge and its deleterious effect on the wife’s health,
1
See,
for
example,
Beecor
V.
Beevor
[1945] 2
All
E.R.
200.
2
See,
for example,
White
V.
White
1948;
P.
330,
Cackett
v.
Cackett
[1950]
P.
253.
Knott
v.
Knott
r19551
P.
24
5,
and
Forbes
v.
Forbes
r19561
P.
16.
--
8
19641
A.C.
644.
4
119641
A.C.
698.
5
By
coincidence
the
second case
to
be reviewed here
See
P.
(D.)
V.
P.
(J.)
[1965] 2
All
E.R.
456,
below
6
[1964]
3
All
E.R. 919
at
p.
920.
19641
3
All
E.R. 919.
ears
the mme name.
L
p.
607.

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