Meyappa Chetty v Supramanian Chetty
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judgment Date | 1916 |
| Date | 1916 |
| Year | 1916 |
| Court | Privy Council |
Limitation - Executor - Accrual of Right to sue - Testator domiciled Abroad - Probate - “Capable of instituting suit” - Devolution of Interest - Substitution of Plaintiff -
Straits Settlements Ordinance No. 6 of 1896, which deals with the limitation of suits, provides as follows:– Sect. 17, sub-s. 1: “When a person who would, if he were living, have a right to institute a suit or make an application, dies before the right accrues, the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when there is a legal representative of the deceased capable of instituting or making such suit or application.” Sect. 22: “When, after the institution of a suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall as regards him be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party ….”:—
Held, (1.) that the executor of a will capable of probate in the Straits Settlements is a legal representative capable of instituting a suit, within the meaning of s. 17, sub-s. 1, from the date of the testator's death and not only from the date when he obtains probate: quaere as to an executor who renounces probate; (2.) that, according to the English practice (which is made applicable in the Straits Settlements in the absence of any other provision), the will of a testator domiciled in British India, or elsewhere outside the Straits Settlements, although not proved in the place of the testator's domicil, is capable of probate in the Straits Settlements if (a) it is valid according to the law of the testator's place of domicil, and (b) if there are assets of the testator in the Straits Settlements; (3.) that s. 22 contemplates cases in which a suit is defective by reason of the right persons not having been made parties, but not cases in which the suit was originally properly constituted but has become defective owing to a devolution of interest; in the latter circumstances a carrying-on order should be made under s. 169 of the Civil Procedure Ordinance No. 31 of 1907.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements (Settlement of Singapore), delivered June 26, 1914, reversing the judgment of the judge at the trial.
S. A. Supramanian Chetty, who was a native of and domiciled in British India, died on November 11, 1904, having by his will appointed as his executors S. R. M. Ramasamy Chetty (hereinafter called the executor) and another person who renounced probate at some date prior to August, 1907. For some years before his death the deceased had carried on a business at Singapore in partnership with the respondent. In December, 1904, the will was presented to the Court in British India for registration and probate. The respondent entered a caveat and contested its validity. After being set aside by the District Judge the will was affirmed by the High Court at Madras, probate being eventually granted to the executor in India on March 10, 1912.
Meanwhile, on March 10, 1910, the Supreme Court at Singapore granted to P. L. M. A. V. Meyappa Chetty, as representing the widow of the deceased, letters of administration pendente lite as to the assets within the jurisdiction of that Court. On October 23, 1911, he, as administrator pendente lite, commenced the present suit in the Supreme Court, claiming a declaration that the partnership in Singapore between the deceased and the respondent was dissolved by reason of the death of the deceased, and for the usual accounts and realization.
After the executor had obtained probate in India he appointed the appellant by power of attorney to obtain in the Straits Settlements a grant of letters of administration with the will annexed, and the grant was accordingly made. On April 11, 1913, it was ordered by consent that the name of P. L. M. A. V. Meyappa Chetty should be struck out as plaintiff in the suit and the name of the appellant substituted.
The respondent by his defence pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation, and the question of law so raised was subsequently argued upon an agreed statement of the facts.
The Straits Settlements Limitation Ordinance No. 6 of 1896, by s. 4 and Sched. II., art. 86, provides that the period of limitation in the case of a suit for an account and a share of the profits of a dissolved partnership shall be three years from the date of the dissolution. Sect. 17, sub-s. 1, and s. 22, which were also material, are set out in the head-note.
Sproule J. held that the suit was not barred. Upon appeal this decision was reversed by Bucknill, acting C.J., and Sercombe Smith J., Ebden J. dissenting.
1916. Jan. 20, 21, 23. Holman Gregory, K.C., and Jowitt, for the appellant. Sect. 17, sub-s. 1, of the Limitation Ordinance applies to the present suit; it applies to all suits in which the right of action has not accrued to the deceased before his death. There was no personal representative capable of instituting the suit until March 10, 1910, when the original plaintiff was granted letters of administration pendente lite. The suit was commenced on October 23, 1911, and was therefore in time within Sched. II., art. 86. The title of an...
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Re Ong Soon Chuan
...be made. See 17 Halsbury`s Laws of England (4th Ed, 1976) Executors and Administrators para 731, Meyappa Chetty v Supramanian Chetty [1916] 1 AC 603, Re Masonic and General Life Assurance Co [1886] 32 Ch D 373, Biles v Caesar [1957] 1 All ER 151[1957] 1 WLR 156 (CA) and Lee Han Tiong v Tay ......
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Biles v Caesar
... ... opeaks from the Will, as Lord Parker pointed out in the case of ( Chetty v. Chetty 1916 Appeal Cases at page 603). In this case the executor, the ... ...
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Action
...letters at the time the writ was taken out. The reason is that a beneficiary has a right to protect the estate; see Chetty v Chetty (1916) 1 A.C. 603 and Ingall v. Moran (supra) at pp. 102 and 103. In other words, if this suit was at the instance of 4th and 5th respondents, to whom it is co......