Michael Hobbs Michelle Hobbs v London Borough of Sutton
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE RALPH GIBSON,LORD JUSTICE STUART-SMITH,LORD JUSTICE McCOWAN |
| Judgment Date | 06 July 1993 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1993] EWCA Civ J0706-7 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Date | 06 July 1993 |
[1993] EWCA Civ J0706-7
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(Sir Louis Graham Blom-Cooper Q.C)
Before: Lord Justice Ralph Gibson Lord Justice Stuart-Smith Lord Justice Mccowan
MR N PRIMOST (instructed by OLIVER FISHER & CO, LONDON W8 4LQ) appeared for the Appellants
MR T STRAKER (instructed by MR W BARTON, BOROUGH SOLICITORS, SURREY SMI IEA) appeared for the Respondents
(APPROVED BY THE COURT)
Tuesday, 6th July 1993
This is an appeal by Mr Michael Hobbs and by Mrs Michelle Hobbs from the decision of
Sir Louis Graham Blom-Cooper Q.C, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, which he made on 24th August 1992, whereby he dismissed this application for judicial review made by them, of the decision of the London Borough of Sutton to which I will refer as "The Council".
The appellant submits that the learned deputy judge was wrong in law in refusing to quash the decision of the Council, made on 14th February 1991, that the appellant had become intentionally homeless, within the meaning of s. 60 of the Housing Act 1985, and was therefore not entitled to be provided with permanent accommodation by the Council notwithstanding the fact that they were homeless and had a priority need for accommodation.
The decision as first made was set out in a letter of 14th February 1991, to which the judge referred, in which it was said:
"Further to your application to this authority on 8 January 1991 for assistance under the above Act, I write to inform you that although this authority considers you to be homeless and in a priority group, your homelessness is regarded as intentional as it was brought about by persistent rent arrears at 56 Ockley Road Croydon."
The letter did not comply with the statutory requirements of s. 64 (4) of the 1985 Act to notify the applicant of the reasons for the decision. Reference can be made to ex parte Monaf, Ali & Miah [1988] 20 H.L.R, p. 529 and ex parte Joyce [1983] H.L.R. Nothing however turns on this failure. The appellants were later provided with a full disclosure of the reason why the Council regarded them as intentionally homeless. No reliance has been placed on this point.
Those full reasons, as later disclosed, were in short that Mrs Esme Green, the Chief Homeless Person Officer of Sutton, after consideration of the applicant's account of why the rent arrears had arisen under the tenancy, 76 Ockley Road and as a result of inquiries made by offices of the Council, did not believe the account given by the applicants was given in good faith. The consideration of the applicant's case by the Council —and the later reconsideration of that case and the words in which the decision of the Council was expressed —were affected by the decision of this Court in Rouf.
The substance of that decision should be stated at once in order to explain the sequence of events in these proceedings and the submissions which have been made. The Deputy Judge observed that the decision required a significant alteration in the way in which local authorities approached the question of "intentionality" of homeless persons.
In that case, in 1984 Mr Rouf obtained a secure tenancy of a flat in Hackney. In July 1985 he went back to Bangladesh leaving a friend from the flat as a caretaker on the understanding that the friend would pay the rent to Hackney Borough Council. The friend did not pay the rent. Hackney obtained an order for possession of the flat.
In June 1988 Mr Rouf returned to England; discovered that the flat had been repossessed; and applied to the Borough of Tower Hamlets for accommodation. That Council found Mr Rouf to be intentionally homeless because "the length of his absence was over three years and it was not therefore reasonable for him to suppose that that accommodation would still be available for him in June 1988" and that it would have been reasonable for him to continue to occupy his accommodation at Bangladesh. Popplewell J. found that Tower Hamlets were entitled to consider Mr Rouf's view that his flat would still be available to him was unreasonable, and that therefore the decision that he was intentionally homeless was unimpeachable. Mr Rouf's appeal was allowed by this Court.
The reasoning of the decision turns upon the language of s. 60 (1) (2) (3) of the 1985 Act.
"1. A person becomes homeless intentionally if he deliberately does or fails to do anything in consequence of which he ceases to occupy accommodation which is available for his occupation and which it would have been reasonable for him to continue to occupy.
2. A person becomes threatened with homelessness intentionally if he deliberately does or fails to do anything the likely result of which is that he will be forced to leave accommodation which is available for his occupation and which it would have been reasonable for him to continue to occupy.
3. For the purposes of subsection ( 1) or (2) an act or omission in good faith on the part of the person who was unaware of any relevant fact shall not be treated as deliberate."
The question decided in Rouf's case concerned the interplay of subsection (1) and (3).
The last words of subsection (1): "and which it would have been reasonable for him to continue to occupy" required the local authority to consider the question whether the local authority was satisfied that it would have been reasonable for the applicant to stay where he was. It was not sufficient for the applicant's purposes that the local authority should conclude merely that it was reasonable for him to leave. In short, if on the facts it would have been reasonable for him either to depart or to remain then his application would fail.
The question, however, under s. 60 (3) whether a person is or is not unaware of a relevant fact, was held in Rouf's case to be a straightforward question of fact. The provisions of s. 60 did not provide that the question whether a person was ignorant of a relevant fact was to be decided by reference to the reasonableness of that person's conduct in ignorance of or without inquiry as to a material fact. The local authority in that case had addressed the wrong question, namely, whether it was reasonable for
Mr Rouf to have returned to Hackney, without making inquiries, expecting the flat would be available to him although in truth it was not. They should have addressed the question whether Mr Rouf was acting in good faith.
Some passages in the judgments must be cited. Much reliance has been placed upon them in this Court.
P. 467 Dillon L.J. said:
"The emphasis in subsection (3) is whether the act or omission was good faith and whether the person was unaware of a relevant fact. There is every reason to suppose that this appellant was aware that there had been repossession of the flat. Whether his leaving Bangladesh in the consequent belief that he had the flat available for him to reoccupy when he wished was in good faith, may be questioned in the light of his failure to make any inquiries. I express no view on the outcome of any questioning but it does not automatically follow that he was acting in bad faith merely because he took a course which in the view of the local authority was unreasonable. As I have said, it was not put to him, as it should have been if that was the point then to be taken by the local authority, that he was acting otherwise than in good faith. The authority felt that his conduct had to be reasonable as well as in good faith."
There is a similar passage at p. 470 in the judgment of Stocker L.J.
Those judgments were given on 15th May 1991. They were reported shortly thereafter. The application for leave in this case was made on 16th May 1991. The first decision letter was, as I have said, 14th February of that year. The question thus raised whether this Council in holding that the appellants were intentionally homeless had decided the question according to the Council's view of the objective reasonableness of the conduct of Mr and Mrs Hobbs or whether the Council had addressed the right question, namely, whether the Council did or did not find that the applicants were acting in good faith in their account as to what they had known or not known at different stages of the story.
I must now state the account of the relevant facts as given by Mr Michael Hobbs in his affidavit of 15th May 1991 which I will do in summary form.
In September 1989, a friend, a Mr John Malloy, suggested that the applicant take a house with him, at 56 Ockley Road, Croydon.
They entered into a tenancy agreement beginning 30th September 1989 —the rent was to be paid to a rent collector, a Mr Boyer.
The rent was £105 per week and an immediate payment of £910 was required… [that was provided by Mr Hobbs] … and Mr Malloy agreed to pay the next six months' rent and it was agreed that the applicants would purchase all the food for the three of us.
On or about 4th January 1990 Mr Malloy left the house never to return and without informing the applicants that he was going. They believed that Malloy paid the rent for the months of November, December and January.
Mr Hobbs was out of work and was staying at home to help his pregnant wife. He did not have the full name, or any address, for the landlord. He did not know the address of the rent collector —doing the best he could have saved £10.
What he did not do, and would have done had he known of its availability, was to apply for housing benefit...
To continue reading
Request your trial