Middleweek v Chief Constable of Merseyside (Note)
Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
Judgment Date | 24 July 1985 |
Judgment citation (vLex) | [1985] EWCA Civ J0724-1 |
Docket Number | 85/0404 |
Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
Date | 24 July 1985 |
and
[1985] EWCA Civ J0724-1
Lord Justice Ackner
Lord Justice Slade
and
Lord Justice Glidewell
85/0404
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
MANCHESTER DISTRICT REGISTRY
(Mr. Justice Eastham)
Royal Courts of Justice
MR. ANDREW RANKIN, QC. and MR. M.S.E. GRIME (instructed by Messrs A.W. Mawer & Co., Manchester) appeared on behalf of the Appellant/First Defendant.
MR. T.M. SHIELDS (instructed by Messrs Shammah Nicholls Marson & Co., Manchester) appeared on behalf of the Cross-Appellant/ Respondent/Plaintiff.
The Second Defendant did not appear and was not represented.
Judgment of the Court prepared by Lord Justice Ackner:
The respondent to this appeal, Mr. Middleweek, is a partner in a firm of Manchester solicitors and he personally is concerned mainly with criminal cases. On 15th May 1980 he issued a writ against the Chief Constable of Merseyside, the appellant, claiming damages for trespass, wrongful arrest, false imprisonment and defamation, all of which was alleged to have occurred on 25th April 1980 in the police station, the Main Bridewell, Liverpool. His claim was heard over a number of days in December 1983 by Mr. Justice Eastham, and a jury, at the Manchester Courts of Justice and on 19th December 1983 he obtained judgment for the sum of £500, with an order that the Chief Constable should pay one third of his costs. It is against that order that the Chief Constable now appeals, and Mr. Middleweek cross-appeals.
The circumstances out of which Mr. Middleweek's claims arose are as follows. One of Mr. Middleweek's clients was a Mr. B.F. Wylie. He had been a serving police officer with the rank of Inspector in the Merseyside police until he resigned when disciplinary proceedings were about to be initiated in 1977. It was the contention of the Merseyside police that this former police officer had set about perverting the course of justice in a most dangerous manner, viz by arranging for false alibis, supported by false evidence and persuading witnesses who were prejudicial to the defence not to attend to give evidence. In 1980 there was a pending prosecution. Detective Inspector Coady was the senior officer in charge of those proceedings and responsible for making enquiries in regard to them. Police Officers rely on getting information from other police forces on sheets which are called "General Crime Information Sheets". Any senior officer such as Mr. Coady can ask for the insertion on those sheets of particulars of the man he is investigating together with the nature of the enquiries which are being made • in relation to him. At some time prior to 5th February Mr. Coady made a request for an insertion in the General Crime Information Sheet, and on Sheet No. 25 dated 5th February 1980 there appeared a photograph of Mr. Wylie, together with particulars of offences which he was suspected of having committed. In the insertion Mr. Coady sought further information concerning Mr. Wylie.
Mr. Wylie instructed Mr. Middleweek to seek the relaxation of the strict conditions which had been imposed upon the grant to him of bail. He was further instructed to apply for the 6-weeks period of remand to be reduced. On 25th April 1980 there was a hearing in Court No. 1 at the Liverpool Magistrates' Court, when Mr. Middleweek made the appropriate applications, albeit unsuccessfully. Mr. Coady, who was in court, happened to notice that in Mr. Middleweek's file was a General Crime Information Sheet. Those sheets are marked "Confidential—for Police use only". They should never be removed from the police station and are circulated to police stations for information of the police only. This particular sheet was the property of the Chief Constable.
When Mr. Middleweek left court Mr. Coady, who had moments before discussed the matter with Police Superintendent Robinson, introduced himself and Mr. Robinson to Mr. Middleweek in the ante-room to the court and asked if he could ask Mr. Middleweek a few questions. This was agreed and they proceeded down the public foyer into the corridor. In the presence of Mr. Robinson, Mr. Coady asked the following three questions and received from Mr. Middleweek the following answers:
"Q. I saw you in possession of a document which I suspect to be a General Crime Information Sheet, which is the property of the Chief Constable. Have you got such a document?
A. You say so, but have I? This is confidential."
Referring to the entire file.
"Q. I suspect you do possess such a document, but I must
ask you where you got it.
A. I refuse to discuss what is in this [again pointing to his folder of papers].
Q. Have you got a confidential police document, the property of the Chief Constable in that folder?
A. I will not discuss what is in this folder with you."
Having heard the replies Mr. Coady decided that he had reasonable cause to suspect that Mr. Middleweek had committed the arrestable offence of theft and they moved away to a private place, where at 10.45 am. he arrested Mr. Middleweek in the presence of Mr. Robinson.
The learned judge, having sought and obtained from the jury answers to certain questions relating to disputed issues of fact, which we need not recount, concluded and so directed the jury that the arrest was a lawful one. He further ruled, for reasons which are in no way criticised by Mr. Middleweek, that the Chief Constable had no case to answer with regard to the alleged libel and slander.
Although the learned judge had ruled that the arrest was lawful and had withdrawn from the jury the claim in libel and slander, it was common ground between Mr. Hugill QC who appeared for Mr. Middleweek and Mr. Rankin QC who appeared for the Chief Constable, that the jury had to decide whether or not Mr. Middleweek was detained for longer than was necessary. If he was so detained, then he would have established that he had been falsely imprisoned. Mr. Hugill's contention was that he should have been released at 11.05 am., some 20 minutes after he had been arrested, because during that period he had been taken to the Constables' Reading Room where there was a short interview. During that interview he produced the General Crime Information Sheet, explained that he had received it from his client Mr. Wylie, and said, "If you prove it is stolen I will give it to the Chief Constable." Mr. Hugill further contended that if his client ought not to have been released at the end of that interview when Mr. Robinson left, then he should have been released some 17 minutes later, at 11.22 am., when further questioning ceased. However, at 11.25 am. Mr. Coady took Mr. Middleweek before the Inspector, informed him that he had arrested him on suspicion of theft and he wanted him to be detained while he, Mr. Coady, made further enquiries. Mr. Coady then left to look for Mr. Wylie. Mr. Middleweek, after a search, to which we will refer in more detail later, was allowed to telephone a solicitor, a Mr. Makin and then locked in a cell. It was not until some twenty minutes later when Mr. Makin arrived that he was released from his cell. Following an interview between Mr. Makin and Mr. Middleweek, which lasted approximately 25 minutes, Mr. Middleweek informed the police that he wished to make a statement. At 12.24 pm. he began the statement, at 12.44 pm. the statement was completed and just before 1.00 pm. he was bailed.
It was accordingly agreed between counsel that the first question the jury had to decide at the conclusion of the learned judge's summing up was—"Was the period of the plaintiff's detention unreasonably long?" If the answer to that question was in the affirmative, then there were supplemental questions as to when Mr. Middleweek should have been released and the sum which should be awarded to him by way of damages—compensatory, aggravated, exemplary or punitive.
At one stage, prior to the learned judge's ruling and when discussing the potential consequences with counsel, he expressed the view that if Mr. Middleweek was entitled to damages for unlawful detention, then the jury could take into account, if they thought that it aggravated the position, the fact that Mr. Middleweek had been searched and subsequently locked up in a cell. However, immediately after making that observation he expressed the view that a wrongful search would amount to a tort (presumably trespass to the person) and "that certainly would remain before the jury". He further added: "I think, although there is no decided authority, there might be a tort about being put into a cell if it is unnecessary." Accordingly, with the concurrence of counsel, the jury were asked the specific question: "Was it reasonable to detain the plaintiff in a cell?". They were further informed that if the answer was in the negative, then they had to go on and consider what sum they should award by way of compensatory and/or aggravated damages.
As to the search, which apparently involved requiring Mr. Middleweek to empty his pockets and then checking that he had done so, Mr. Hugill submitted that the search had been made pursuant to a standing practice, without having regard to the particular facts, accordingly it was unlawful and the only issue was the quantum of damages. The learned judge took the view that the essential issue was whether or not the search was reasonable, and accordingly the jury were asked to answer the question: "Was it reasonable to search the plaintiff and take away his possessions?" If they answered that question in the negative,...
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