Minorities overlooked: Group-based power-sharing and the exclusion-amid-inclusion dilemma

Date01 January 2020
Published date01 January 2020
DOI10.1177/0192512119859206
Subject MatterSpecial Issue Articles
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512119859206
International Political Science Review
2020, Vol. 41(1) 89 –107
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512119859206
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Minorities overlooked:
Group-based power-sharing and the
exclusion-amid-inclusion dilemma
Andreas Juon
University College London, UK
Abstract
Ethnic power-sharing has been accused of decreasing ethnic inequality in unequal ways: while benefitting larger
ethnic minorities, it often tends to overlook the smallest groups. Paradoxically, ethnic micro-minorities may
thus find themselves in even more marginalised positions in power-sharing regimes than under institutional
settings lacking any mandated inclusion. This article tests for the existence of this exclusion-amid-inclusion
dilemma using a new group-based dataset that distinguishes between different types of power-sharing. The
findings indicate that this dilemma indeed exists for ethnically based, but not for more liberal types of power-
sharing, which increase all minorities’ political status in an equal, albeit less strong, manner. The article
concludes that adopting one form of power-sharing or the other means not only prioritising one form of
equality over another, but also making a decision with severe political ramifications for the numerically most
vulnerable ethnic minority communities.
Keywords
Power-sharing, consociationalism, institutions, political inclusion, ethnic conflict, minorities, micro-
minorities
Introduction
Power-sharing is often as exclusionary as it is inclusive. Far from universally benefiting all minor-
ity citizens, in many cases its adoption risks including some minorities at the expense of others.
This is especially the case in corporate power-sharing systems that rely on the explicit predeter-
mination of ethnic groups between whom power is to be shared. Corporate power-sharing institu-
tions (e.g. ethnic quotas) may increase the political status of minorities who find their ‘name’ on
the list of groups targeted for inclusion, but exhibit none or even countervailing effects on those
who do not.
Corresponding author:
Andreas Juon, Department of Political Science, University College London, 29/31 Tavistock Square, London WC1H
9QU, UK.
Email: andreas.juon.16@ucl.ac.uk
859206IPS0010.1177/0192512119859206International Political Science ReviewJuon
research-article2019
Special Issue Article
90 International Political Science Review 41(1)
The ‘losers’ of this selection of groups between whom power is to be shared are often a coun-
try’s smallest ethnic groups – its micro-minorities. In many cases, they are excluded from formal
power-sharing which often only extends to its main ethnic segments. While only recently appear-
ing in the spotlight of the literature, examples of this particular ‘exclusion-amid-inclusion’ dilemma
have been widely documented across different consociational systems (Stojanović, 2018).
Does power-sharing, then, trade in the higher political status of the main ethnic segments for the
increased marginalisation of micro-minorities? And would micro-minorities be better off with
alternative institutions?
In spite of many suggestive examples, there is still a lack of evidence concerning these asser-
tions. On the one hand, it seems unclear whether micro-minorities would indeed fare better in
the absence of corporate power-sharing provisions, as the alternatives may well be even more
exclusionary (Lijphart, 2008: 73; McCrudden and O’Leary, 2013). On the other hand, the mer-
its of the main propagated institutional alternative, liberal power-sharing, have not yet been
investigated either.
These normative problems and the continuing lack of comparative evidence call for a quantita-
tive investigation of how different types of power-sharing institutions affect the political status of
micro-minorities. This article starts such an endeavour with a discussion of the existing literature,
showing that the exclusion of micro-minorities in power-sharing systems is a widespread, but
under-researched, phenomenon. Equipped with a new group-based dataset of power-sharing insti-
tutions, it then analyses these relationships comparatively. The results confirm the existence of an
institutional dilemma: while corporate forms of power-sharing offer strong inclusive guarantees
for the larger ethnic minority segments, they entail much weaker benefits for micro-minorities. In
contrast, liberal forms of power-sharing exert uniformly positive, but weaker, impacts on all minor-
ity groups. The results thus highlight a problematic choice for institutional ‘engineers’: the adop-
tion of a deeper form of accommodation for the most important segments or of a shallower but
more encompassing one for all ethnic minorities.
Power-sharing and the political outcomes of micro-minorities
Micro-minorities in corporate power-sharing systems
The central goal of power-sharing institutions is to increase the inclusiveness of the political system
for ethnic minorities. Scholars commonly cite four institutions designed to enable such beneficial
results (Binningsbø, 2013; Lijphart, 1977): first, grand coalition provisions (executive power-shar-
ing), prescribing the inclusion of ‘all’ ethnic segments into the government; second, clauses mandat-
ing proportional representation across important political offices; third, veto rights given to ethnic
minority representatives, which enable them to block legislation that they view as ‘especially detri-
mental’ to their interests; and, fourth, segmental autonomy which leaves decisions of exclusive
minority interest to each affected group itself. Together, these four institutions are supposed to pre-
vent the permanent exclusion of ethnic minorities from government (Lijphart, 1977).
Clearly, all four institutional components of power-sharing are relevant for the de facto political
outcomes of ethnic minorities. However, as this article focuses on government inclusion and as
previous research highlights the diverging impacts of horizontal and vertical power-sharing
(Cederman et al., 2015; Gates et al., 2016; Linder and Bächtiger, 2005), it limits its analytical focus
to the former three, horizontal, components. While leaving aside the investigation of autonomy to
future research, this does not exclude from the subsequent analysis inclusive institutions that are
based on territorial categories, such as territorial quotas for executive positions. Rather, these insti-
tutions are seen and discussed as part of the respective horizontal components of power-sharing.1

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