Mohammed Sarfraz Ali v Anisha Taj
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice MacDonald |
| Judgment Date | 27 November 2020 |
| Neutral Citation | [2020] EWHC 3195 (Fam) |
| Date | 27 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 2019/0154 |
| Court | Family Division |
[2020] EWHC 3195 (Fam)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
THE HONOURABLE Mr Justice MacDonald
Case No: 2019/0154
Ms Clare Stanley QC (instructed by Gentle Mathias LLP) for the Appellant
Mr Thomas Dumont QC (instructed by Ashfords LLP) for the Respondents
Hearing dates: 4 December 2019
Approved Judgment
I direct that no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic. Covid-19 Protocol: This judgment was handed down remotely by circulation to the parties' representatives by email. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be at 10.30am on 27 November 2020
INTRODUCTION
On 7 February 2020 I handed down judgment on the appellant's appeal summons against an order made by District Registrar Murphy on 7 August 2019 requiring the appellant to exhibit on oath a true and perfect inventory of the estate of Mohammed Taj (hereafter ‘the Deceased’) and render a true and just account of the administration of the estate of the deceased. The appellant, who is the younger brother of the Deceased, acts as an Executor of the estate of the Deceased, along with Mohamed Arshad Khan, who is the brother in law of the Deceased's second wife. The Respondents to the appeal are the persons entitled to a share in the residuary of the Deceased's estate under the terms of his will, namely the Deceased's widow and three children from his first marriage
Having considered carefully the comprehensive submissions of Ms Clare Stanley of Queen's Counsel on behalf of the appellant and Mr Thomas Dumont of Queen's Counsel on behalf of the respondents, and having approached the matter as a rehearing, I dismissed the appellant's appeal summons. That decision was reported as Ali v Taj (Probate: Inventory and Account) [2020] EWHC 213 (Fam).
I am now concerned with the question of costs. I offer my apologies to the parties for the length of time it has taken to give this judgment on the issue of costs. I am only able to pray in aid as an explanation for the delay the unprecedented level of work created by the COVID-19 pandemic, the impact of which started to be felt and thereafter grew exponentially shortly after I handed down my substantive judgment in this matter. In particular, I should make clear that both Mr Dumont and Ms Stanley provided their written submissions as to costs on time as directed. The delay in providing this decision lies entirely with the court.
The issue in respect of costs is a narrow one in circumstances where the appellant does not dispute that he must pay the costs of the respondents. Within this context, the only issues between the parties are (a) whether those costs should be assessed on the standard basis, or on the indemnity basis and (b) the quantum of our costs.
SUBMISSIONS
Conceding that costs must follow the event, Ms Stanley QC submits that the award of costs should be made on the standard basis and advances the following submissions with respect to the quantum of costs within the context of, as submitted by Ms Stanley, the respondents' solicitors incurring the bulk of their costs in relation to the summons before the District Registrar:
i) The amount for attendance on clients is excessive in circumstances where the respondents to the appeal were not required to put in further evidence. In the circumstances, 13.6 hours liaising with their clients is reasonable for the purposes of preparing the appeal and merits a reduction £3,888 to £2,500, i.e. a reduction of £1,388.
ii) The amount of time claimed for attendance on opponents of 10 hours is excessive in circumstances where the appellant's solicitors spent 2.5 hours in relation to such correspondence. This merits a reduction from £1,697 to £750, i.e. a reduction of £940.
iii) The amount of time claimed on attendances on others of 7.5 hours is excessive given that preparing the brief was been charged for separately, where the majority relates to time spent by a partner and where the Appellant's solicitors spent 3.5 hours on this element. This merits a reduction by half from £2,032 to £1,016, i.e. a reduction of £1,016.
iv) The amount of time claimed for attendance on documents is excessive in circumstances where the perusal of the appeal summons, grounds of appeal, and appellant's first Skeleton Argument should have taken no more than 30 minutes, not 3 hours by reference to the appellant's solicitors spending 30 minutes reviewing Mr Dumont's Skeleton Argument. This merits a reduction from £840 to £300, i.e. a reduction of £540.
v) The amount of time claimed for the preparation of leading counsel's brief of 13 hours by three fee earners is grossly excessive and unreasonable as demonstrated by the fact it is said to have cost £2,392 to prepare a brief for which leading counsel's fees were £6, 000 or 40% of the brief fee. This merits a reduction to £1,200 (equivalent to four partner hours, i.e. a reduction of £1,192.
vi) The time claimed of 4.5 hours for a partner to prepare a bundle index is likewise grossly excessive and in any event unnecessary where it was not the respondents' appeal. The appellant's solicitors simply needed to review the index and make suggested changes, which an associate could have completed. This merits a reduction on the fees from £1,757 to £530, i.e. a reduction of £1,227.
vii) The time claimed of 4.5 hours to prepare and update their Statement of Costs is excessive in circumstances where it took the appellant's solicitor 1 hour. This merits a reduction from £889, to £300, i.e. a reduction of £589.
Within this context, Ms Stanley submits that, standing back and asking what did the respondents actually need to do ahead of the hearing before this court, one sees matters which the respondents might be happy paying for, but not matters which it is reasonable for the appellant to be ordered to pay for.
Ms Stanley further submits that lest it be said that the appellant's statement of costs was far higher than the respondents', the appellant was...
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