Mohammed Yasin Chaudhry v Abrar Qureshi

Hearing dates: 7 – 9 July 2025

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10:30am on 25 July 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

Introduction

The First Claimant is the Regional President of the Pakistan People's Party (“PPP”) in the state of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (“AJK”) in Pakistan and the current holder of a parliamentary seat in the AJK Legislative Assembly (“AJKLA”). The Second Claimant is the son of the First Claimant and also the current holder of a parliamentary seat in the AJKLA. They are well known politicians in AJK and beyond. They spend part of their time in the United Kingdom.

The Defendant is a journalist who is from the AJK region of Pakistan and now lives in the United Kingdom. He operates a YouTube channel and a Facebook page reporting, in particular, on matters relating to AJK. He acknowledges that he is famous as a journalist in the United Kingdom, AJK and worldwide amongst the Kashmiri Pakistani diaspora and that he currently has a social media following of over one million people.

The claim is for libel arising from the Defendant's publication of an interview he conducted on 1 November 2021 with a former employee of the First Claimant, Chaudhry Muhammed Sabeel. The Defendant posted a 22 minute and 2 second video of the interview on his YouTube channel and his Facebook page (“the Long Video”) and also an edited version running for 7 minutes and 31 seconds (“the Short Video”).

The Defendant acted as a litigant in person for most of these proceedings. Since the end of the week prior to trial, Mr Kelly has represented Mr Qureshi on a direct access basis.

The Claimants allege that the Defendant published false and defamatory statements which have caused serious harm to their reputations. Their case is that the statements imputed very serious criminal conduct to them including blackmail, sexual assault and corruption. They seek general and aggravated damages, injunctive relief and an order under section 12(1) of the Defamation Act 2013 (“the 2013 Act”).

There has been no trial of preliminary issues. The Defendant denies that the words complained of were defamatory of the Claimants and disputes the defamatory meanings relied upon by the Claimants (although he has not pleaded alternative meanings). He also denies that the Claimants have suffered serious harm and relies upon a defence of publication on a matter of public interest. It was unclear from the Defence document whether a defence of truth was advanced. A defence of honest opinion was raised. At the outset of the trial, Mr Kelly confirmed that the only defence now relied upon was publication on a matter of public interest. The Defendant admits that he published the videos and that the words complained of referred to the Claimants.

In relation to the publication on a matter of public interest defence, the Claimants accept that the relevant statement were statements on a matter of public interest. In his closing submissions, Mr Wilcox tried to argue that the Defendant did not honestly believe that publishing the statements was in the public interest. However, this had not been raised in the Claimants' Reply and had not been put to the Defendant when he gave evidence. Accordingly, I do not consider it just to permit the Defendant to raise this issue so belatedly. In any event, the central focus at trial was on whether the Defendant reasonably believed that publishing the statements complained of was in the public interest.

Accordingly, the disputed issues for the Court to resolve were as follows:

Defamatory at common law:

i) What is the natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of in Passages A – Q at para 27 of the Particulars of Claim;

ii) In each instance, did these words include a statement of fact or opinion;

iii) Whether the natural and ordinary meanings I identify are defamatory of the Claimants at common law;

Serious harm:

iv) Whether, in each instance, publication of the words complained of caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the Claimants;

Publication in the public interest defence:

v) Whether the Defendant reasonably believed that publishing the words complained of was in the public interest;

If liability is established:

vi) What compensation should be awarded to each Claimant by way of general and, if appropriate, aggravated damages;

vii) Whether the Court should grant an injunction to prevent the Defendant from repeating the words complained of or similar statements; and

viii) Whether the Court should make an order under section 12(1) of the 2013 Act requiring the Defendant to publish a summary of this judgment.

The trial was originally scheduled to start on 7 April 2025. It was adjourned by Nicklin J's Order of 4 April 2025 because of the Defendant's then ill health.

This judgment is structed as follows:

The evidence before the Court: paras 11 – 22;

The uncontentious facts: paras 23 – 37;

The words complained of: paras 38 – 54;

The legal framework: paras 55 – 76;

Defamatory meaning: paras 77 – 100;

Serious harm: paras 101 – 117;

Publication on a matter of public interest: paras 118 – 138;

Remedies: paras 139 – 159;

Overall conclusions: paras 160 – 161.

The evidence before the Court

The Long and the Short Videos were in Urdu. The parties had agreed translations of both of these videos. I append the agreed translation of the Long Video at Appendix 1 to this judgment; and the agreed translation of the Short Video at Appendix 2. The Defendant removed the videos approximately four days after their publication. On the first day of the trial, the Defendant provided sheets of comments that were made by viewers of the videos on his Facebook page, along with an Urdu to English translation. This document had not been disclosed earlier, as it should have been. Following helpful input from the Claimants' solicitor, Ushrat Sultana (who speaks Urdu), an agreed version of the translated comments was available by the start of the second day of the trial. The agreed translation of the comments appears at Appendix 3 to this judgment. Both videos were available for me to view.

There were a number of additional evidential issues that I had to deal with during the course of the trial.

Both of the Claimants filed and served witness statements and gave oral evidence. I permitted Mr Wilcox to ask supplementary questions relating to the alleged damage to their reputations.

The Defendant had filed and served a witness statement dated 11 November 2024. The statement was in English and included a Statement of Truth. At the start of the second day of the trial, Mr Kelly indicated that Mr Qureshi would require an interpreter when he gave evidence. He proposed that once the Claimants' evidence had concluded, the trial be adjourned to the following day to allow time for the interpreter arranged by Mr Qureshi to attend. This was a matter of concern as para 3 of Swift J's Order dated 6 March 2025 (following the Pre-Trial Review) had stated that the Defendant should make any application for permission to rely upon the services of a Court approved interpreter for the giving of his oral evidence by 4pm on 14 March 2025, but no such application had been made by the specified date or at all. However, there was also a more fundamental concern that I raised with Mr Kelly, namely that the Defendant's witness statement was in English, with no indication given in that document that he was not able to fully understand its contents and/or that parts of it had been informally translated for him. The unsatisfactory nature of this position was reinforced by the terms of para 7 of the Order of 29 February 2024 where Master Eastman had provided that if a witness was to give evidence at trial in a language other than English “the witness statement must be in that other language and must be served together with an English translation and a certificate from the translator verifying the translation”.

After reflecting on the matter, Mr Wilcox objected to the Defendant's witness statement being admitted in evidence and to him giving evidence, as the statement was in breach of the CPR, in that: (i) the statement of truth was not in the witness' own language, as required by Practice Direction (“PD”) 22 para 2.4 and PD 32 para 20.1; and (ii) the witness statement was not in the witness' own language as required by CPR Part 32.8 and PD 32 paras 18.1 and 19.1. Mr Wilcox submitted that the Court should refuse to admit the evidence, pursuant to PD 32 para 25.1, as applied by Garnham J in Correia v Williams [2022] EWHC 2824 (KB). Mr Kelly accepted that the identified breaches had occurred, but urged the Court to grant permission to rely on the defective witness statement under PD 32 para 25.2.

Having heard the respective submissions I gave an ex tempore ruling confirming that these breaches of the rules had occurred and that the Defendant's actions had been less than satisfactory. However, given the relatively limited compass of his relevant evidence, I was satisfied that the interests of justice would be best served by permitting the Defendant to give oral evidence in respect of those parts of his statement that were relevant. This text would be interpreted for him and he would then be asked to confirm that this was his evidence. I was satisfied that...