More delegation, more political control? Politicization of senior-level appointments in 18 European countries
| Date | 01 January 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0952076718776356 |
| Published date | 01 January 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
More delegation, more
political control?
Politicization of
senior-level appointments
in 18 European countries
Tobias Bach
Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Norway
Gerhard Hammerschmid
Hertie School of Governance, Germany
Lorenz Lo
¨ffler
Prognos AG, European Center for Economic Research and
Strategy Consulting, Germany
Abstract
This article contributes to the literature on the politicization of appointments to increase
political control over public bureaucracies with often substantial managerial and policy
autonomy. Using data from a large-scale executive survey from central government
ministries and agencies in 18 European countries, the article provides a comprehensive
cross-national and cross-organizational analysis of the autonomy-politicization conun-
drum and the drivers of the politicization of senior-level appointments. We find that
national patterns of politicization correspond fairly well to country families as defined
by administrative traditions, with some traditions being more coherent than others.
At the organizational level, we find no evidence of efforts by politicians to compensate
for extended autonomy by politicizing senior-level appointments, yet we provide evi-
dence of differential effects of both formal and informal organizational characteristics
on patterns of politicization. Our analyses show that politicization of senior appointments
is lower in organizations with agency status, higher organizational social capital, higher
financial autonomy and more extensive use of managementtools. The article thereby not
only offers comprehensive evidence of cross-country differences in politicization; it also
adds to the literature on sub-national variation, by fleshing out an organizational perspec-
tive to the study of politicized appointments in the European context.
Public Policy and Administration
2020, Vol. 35(1) 3–23
!The Author(s) 2018
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0952076718776356
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Corresponding author:
TobiasBach, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, P.O.Box 1097 Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Norway.
Email: tobias.bach@stv.uio.no
Keywords
Agencies, patronage, political control, politicization, public sector reform, senior civil
service
Introduction
The exercise of controlover a highly specialized apparatus of hundreds or thousands
of permanent officialsis a formidable challenge for executivepoliticians, as they must
counterbalance the superior expertise and capacity of permanent bureaucracy.
A common strategy to ensure political responsiveness is the selection of senior offi-
cials on (party) political rather than meritocratic grounds (Dahlstro
¨mand
Holmgren, 2017; Kopecky´ et al., 2016; Meyer-Sahling, 2008). According to several
observers, we have been witnessing an increased involvement of politicians in senior-
level appointments (Dahlstro
¨m, 2009; Page and Wright, 1999; Peters and Pierre,
2004). This development is said to be driven by executive politicians’ attempts to
compensate for a loss of control over an increasingly decentralized and fragmented
bureaucracy. Dahlstro
¨m et al. (2011) argue that a strategy of ‘letting go’ through
administrativedecentralization has had a centrifugal effect on politico-administrative
systems, resulting in a loss of coordinative capacity and democratic accountability.
To deal with those centrifugal forces, governments have attempted to (re)centralize
control, through strengthening the administrative capacity of the prime minister’s
office (Dahlstro
¨m et al., 2011), or through the recruitment of political advisors to
support ministers in policy-making and political management (Eichbaum and Shaw,
2008). The politicization of senior-level appointments represents another strategy to
compensate for a loss of formal control over bureaucracy.
The increase in politicized appointments seems to be especially pronounced in
countries with a strong meritocratic tradition, such as Anglo-Saxon and
Scandinavian countries (Dahlstro
¨m et al., 2011). These countries have been
among the trailblazers of New Public Management (NPM) reforms in a European
perspective (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011), potentially lending credence to the notion
of compensation for managerial autonomy by politicized appointments. However,
there is little systematic evidence about the scope of these changes, and whether they
require an adjustment of our present-day knowledge about cross-national differ-
ences in politicized appointments. To address this research gap, we compare the
prevalence of politicized senior-level appointments in 18 European countries and
ask whether the observed variation corresponds to conventional country clusters in
terms of administrative traditions (Derlien, 1996; Kopecky´ and Mair, 2012; Page
and Wright, 1999). The concept of ‘administrative tradition’ assumes long-term
stability of fundamental aspects of politico-administrative relations, including pat-
terns of political influence on bureaucracy (Painter and Peters, 2010).
Any cross-country analysis of politics and administration runs the risk of over-
estimating national differences while underestimating within-country variation
(Aberbach and Rockman, 1987). This observation is especially relevant against
4Public Policy and Administration 35(1)
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