Morris v Crown Office

Last Wednesday; just a week ago, Mr. Justice Lawton, a Judge of the High Court here in London, was sitting to hear a case. It was a libel case between a Naval officer and some publishers. He was trying it with a jury. It was no doubt an important case, but for the purposes of today it could have been the least important. It matters not. For what happened was serious indeed. A group of students, young men and young women, invaded the Court. It was clearly pre-arranged. They had come all the way from their University of Aberystwyth. They strode into the well of the Court. They flocked into the public gallery. They shouted slogans. They scattered pamphlets. They sang songs. They broke up the hearing. The Judge had to adjourn. They were removed. Order was restored.

When the Judge returned to the Court, three of them were brought before him. He sentenced each of them to three months imprisonment for contempt of Court. The others were kept in custody until the rising of the Court. 19 were then brought before him. The Judge asked each of them whether he or she was prepared to apologize. 8 of them did so. The Judge imposed a fine of £50 on each of them and required them to enter into recognisances to keep the peace. 14 of them did not apologize. They did it, they said, as a matter of principle and so did not feel able to apologize. The Judge sentenced each of them to imprisonment for 3 months for contempt of Court.

In sentencing these young people in this way the Judge was exercising a jurisdiction which goes back for centuries. It was well described over 200 years ago by Mr. Justice Wilmot in an opinion which he prepared but never delivered. "It is a necessary incident", he said, "to every Court of Justice to fine and imprison for a contempt of the Court acted in the face of it." That is The King v. Almon 1765 (Wilmot's Reports at page 254). The phrase "contempt in the face of the Court" has a quaint old-fashioned ring about it; but the importance of it is this. Of all the places where law and order must be maintained, it is here in these Courts. The course of justice must not bedeflected or interfered with? Those who strike at it strike at the very foundations of our society. To maintain law and order, the Judges have, and must have, power at once to deal with those who offend against it. It is a great power – a power instantly to imprison a person without trial – but it is a necessary power. So necessary indeed that until recently the Judges exercised it without any appeal. There were previously no safeguards against a Judge exercising his jurisdiction wrongly or unwisely. This was remedied in the year 1960. An appeal now lies to this Court; and, in a suitable case, from this Court to the House of Lords. With these safeguards this jurisdiction can and should be maintained.

11 of these young people have exercised this right to appeal; and we have put all other cases aside to hear it. For we are here concerned with their liberty, and our law puts the liberty of the subject before all else.

At this point I would pay a tribute to the way in which Mr. Watkin Powell conducted this appeal on their behalf. He did as well as any advocate I ever heard. We have been much assisted too by the Attorney-General, who came here, not as prosecutor, but as a friend of the Court, he put all the relevant considerations before us to our grateful benefit.

Now I must turn to the points, technical as they may seem, which arise in this appeal; but you must remember that, by our law, everyone who is accused is entitled to avail himself of every point which can legitimately be raised on his behalf, no matter how technical.

The first point taken by Mr. Watkin Powell was that the requirements of section 17(2) of the 1948 Act were not complied with. That section says; "No court shall impose imprisonment on a person under twenty-one years of age unless the court is of opinion that no other method of dealing with him is appropriate; and for the purpose of determining whether any other method of dealing with any such person is appropriate the court shall obtain and consider information about the circumstances and shall takeinto account any Information before the court which is relevant to his character and his physical and mental condition."

Mr. Watkin Powell says that those requirements were not complied with, and that, on that account, the sentence of imprisonment was bad. I cannot accept this point. I think that those requirements were fulfilled. The Judge was clearly of opinion that no other method was appropriate. He had before him all necessary information about the circumstances of the offence, because it had taken place before his very eyes. He had taken into account, no doubt, that they were of excellent character and were entirely fit; for they were students of the University of Aberystwyth, which is itself high commendation. In any case, however, even if the Judge did fail to obtain any necessary information, that would not make the sentence bad; for the-provisions in this regard are not mandatory but directory only.

The second point taken by Mr. Watkin Powell was that as the Judge sentenced them to 3 months, he was bound by statute to suspend the sentence and not imprison them at once. This depends on section 39 (1) and (3) of the Criminal Justice Act of 1967, which says, so far as material

"A court which passes a sentence of imprisonment for a term of not more than 6 months in respect of one offence shall order that the sentence shall not take effect unless, during a specified period, the offender commits in Great Britain another offence punishable with imprisonment end thereafter a court, having power to do so, orders that the original sentence shall take effect."

It is to be noticed that a Court is not bound, even under that section, to suspend the sentence "if the act or any of the acts constituting that offence consist of an assault on, or a threat of violence to another person." But these young people did not assault anyone; nor did they threaten violence to anyone. Accordingly, if the committal for contempt falls within section 39, the Court was bound to suspend the sentence.

This raises the important point in the case; Does a committal for contempt fall within the statutory provisions under which sentences are to be suspended? Mr. Watkin Powell took us word by word through section 39; and I must say that, taken word by word, there is much to be said for his submission. Take first the word "Court". It is not defined in this statute except to say that it "does not include a court martial". So it appears to include the High Court. It is not cut down by the reference in the preamble to "criminal courts". If section 39 does apply to a committal for: criminal contempt, it would be absurd to say that it applied to a disturbance in the Crown Court but not to a disturbance in the civil Courts or that it applied to the Criminal Division of this Court and not to the Civil Division. It must apply to both or neither. Moreover, as Mr. Watkin Powell submitted, when a Judge, who is hearing a civil case, puts it on one side and adjourns it so as to deal with a criminal contempt, for which he gives a sentence of imprisonment, then for that purpose he is acting as a Criminal Court. So I hold that the word "Court" taken literally includes the High Court.

The next word is "offence". That is wide enough to include a contempt in the face of the Court. All our old books from the earliest times say that it is a misdemeanour at common law which is punishable on indictment, by fine or imprisonment, as all misdemeanours are. It is rare nowadays to punish it on indictment. It is nearly always punished summarily by the Court itself. But that it is an "offence" there can be no doubt.

Finally the words "sentence of imprisonment", when the Judge commits a person to prison for 3 months, he is inflicting a "sentence of imprisonment". There is no doubt about it – unless, of course, there is something in the statute which says it is not to be regarded as a sentence. In this statute there is a provision in section 104 which excludes certain matters from being sentences of imprisonment. It excludes committal forany non-payment of money (like a committal for debt on a judgment summons); or committal for non-payment of rates (when there is not sufficient distress); or committal in respect of a civil contempt (as for failing to obey an injunction). All those are civil matters which are excluded. Section 104 does not in terms exclude criminal contempt as it was excluded in the Criminal Justice Act of 1961. Prima facie therefore it is included in the words "sentence of imprisonment".

So taking section 39 literally, word by word, there is a great deal to be said in favour of Mr. Watkin Powell's argument. But it is a mistake to take words in a statute too literally. The whole scheme of the Act must be considered. If you read this Act as a whole, you will find that the legislature never intended section 39 to apply to a committal for criminal contempt. I say this because there is no power...