Ms Hulya Kars v Mr Lewis John Brown (Administrator and beneficiary of the estate of the late Mr Jon Lamb)

Hearing dates: 8–9 th October 2025

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely on 9 th January 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

Introduction

The matter before the Court is the Claimant's claim for reasonable financial provision under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (“the 1975 Act”) in respect of the estate (the “Estate”) of Jon Lamb (the “Deceased”) who died intestate on 30 December 2021.

The Claimant is the former spouse of the Deceased. The First Defendant is the Deceased's son, administrator of the Estate, and a beneficiary of the Estate under the intestacy rules. The Second Defendant is the Deceased's son and a beneficiary of the Estate. The Third Defendant is the son of the Claimant and the Deceased, and a beneficiary of the Estate. The Fourth Defendant is the estate of the Deceased's adoptive daughter and a beneficiary of the Estate. The Third and Fourth Defendants have played no active part in these proceedings.

There was an unhelpful lack of clarity regarding the capacity in which the First Defendant was defending the claim prior to the trial but Mr Uddin (acting on behalf of the First and Second Defendants) has subsequently clarified that he was acting on behalf of the First Defendant both in the First Defendant's capacity as administrator and as beneficiary of the Estate. The First and Second Defendants both contest the claim.

The Claimant and Deceased married on 8 June 2000, the Claimant petitioned for divorce in January 2019, and the decree absolute was pronounced on 13 May 2019. Matrimonial finance proceedings were ongoing at the date of death (“the matrimonial proceedings”).

The First Defendant obtained letters of administration on 17 August 2023. The net value of the Estate was recorded as £331,122. That figure includes the value of a freehold property, 47 Princes Street, Southend-on-Sea, SS1 1QA registered under title number EX121067 (“47 Princes Street”).

The Claimant brought possession proceedings (“the possession proceedings”) on 23 August 2023 in relation to 47 Princes Street. The Claimant is the sole registered proprietor of 47 Princes Street; the First Defendant currently lives there. There is a dispute as to who holds the beneficial ownership of 47 Princes Street with the Claimant arguing that she is the beneficial owner and the First and Second Defendants arguing that the Deceased was the beneficial owner. The possession proceedings have been stayed pending the outcome of these proceedings.

The Legal Framework: The 1975 Act

There is no dispute that the Claimant is eligible to bring a claim under the 1975 Act as a former spouse who has not remarried. She was given permission to bring the claim out of time by order of Mrs Justice Lieven in March 2025.

Section 2 of the 1975 Act provides for the court to make one or more of the orders specified therein if it is satisfied that the disposition of a deceased's estate is not such as to make reasonable financial provision for an applicant.

It is agreed that the two overarching questions for the court in a 1975 Act claim where there is an intestacy are: (1) whether the way in which the estate is disposed of under the intestacy rules fails to make reasonable financial provision for the claimant (‘ threshold question’); and (2) if reasonable financial provision has not been made, whether any, and if so what, provision should be made for the claimant (‘ the provision question’) (see Oliver J in Re Coventry [1980] Ch 461 at 469).

While the legislation formally requires both questions to be answered sequentially (the first question having been described by the Court of Appeal in Ilott v Mitson [2011] EWCA Civ 346 as a value judgment on the part of the court, the second being akin to the exercise of discretion), the Supreme Court has cautioned against too rigid an adherence to the two-stage approach: Lord Hughes in Ilott v The Blue Cross [2017] UKSC 17 at [23]. The court added that the 1975 Act “ plainly requires a broad-brush approach” and there is often “ a very large degree of overlap between the two stages.”

For applicants other than spouses and civil partners “ reasonable financial provision” means “ such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for the applicant to receive for his maintenance” (s1(2)(b)).

Section 3(1) of the 1975 Act directs the court to have regard to the following matters in exercising powers under section 2.

“(a) the financial resources and financial needs which the applicant has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

(b) the financial resources and financial needs which any other applicant for an order under section 2 of this Act has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

(c) the financial resources and financial needs which any beneficiary of the estate of the Deceased has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

(d) any obligations and responsibilities which the Deceased had towards any applicant for an order under the said section 2 or towards any beneficiary of the estate of the Deceased;

(e) the size and nature of the net estate of the Deceased;

(f) any physical or mental disability of any applicant for an order under the said section 2 or any beneficiary of the estate of the Deceased;

(g) any other matter, including the conduct of the applicant or any other person,

which in the circumstances of the case the court may consider relevant.”

Section 3(2) of the 1975 Act lists further matters to which the court should have regard in an application by a former spouse:

“(a) the age of the applicant and the duration of the marriage;

(b) the contribution made by the applicant to the welfare of the family of the Deceased, including any contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the family.”

Preliminary issue

While not formally advanced by way of a preliminary issue, Mr Uddin raised in his skeleton argument and opening submissions the question of whether these proceedings are an abuse of process in light of the ongoing possession proceedings in relation to 47 Princes Street and, relatedly, whether this Court can properly determine the question of the beneficial ownership of 47 Princes Street.

It is not an abuse of process for the Claimant to have brought this claim: she is eligible to do so under the 1975 Act, and she could not have brought the 1975 Act claim within the possession proceedings. In any event, the allegation of abuse of process had already been adjudicated by Mrs Justice Lieven who dismissed the First Defendant's strike out application dated 17 February 2025 which the First Defendant had brought on the basis that these proceedings were “ abuse of process due to duplicate proceedings”.

With regard to whether I can determine the question of beneficial ownership of 47 Princes Street in the context of these proceedings, Mr Uddin did not make any submissions beyond asserting that it is an abuse of process in light of the possession proceedings, or draw my attention to any relevant case law. Acting for the Claimant, Ms Blood-Halvorsen asserts that in order to determine the 1975 Act claim, the court must assess the size and nature of the net estate, which includes any property over which the Deceased could have exercised testamentary disposition, and that determining whether 47 Princes Street forms part of the Estate is therefore integral to the section 3 exercise. Ms Blood-Halvorsen drew my attention to other 1975 Act proceedings where questions of property law and beneficial ownership were required to be resolved: Ramji v Harvey [2023] EWHC 1664 and Burnard v Burnard [2014] EWHC 340.

It seems to me necessary to determine the question of beneficial ownership of 47 Princes Street in the course of these proceedings as it is fundamental to establishing the composition of the net Estate from which financial provision may be ordered. While there is no specific application for a declaration as to beneficial ownership before me, the Defendants have long been aware, given the possession proceedings, of the Claimant's assertion that she is the beneficial owner. Further, the point was fully argued in Ms Blood-Halvorsen's skeleton argument, referred to in her opening submissions, and is detailed in the Claimant's witness statement. I gave permission for the Defendants to put in a late witness statement from Mr Anderson in relation to the purchase of 47 Princes Street (on which he was cross-examined). I also indicated at the start of the hearing that I considered determining the ownership of 47 Princes Street to be a necessary part of my analysis. The Defendants have accordingly had ample opportunity to provide evidence on, and make submissions in relation to, this point.

Given that 47 Princes Street comprises a large proportion of the current valuation of the Estate, I will deal with the question of beneficial ownership prior to considering the section 3 factors. Beneficial ownership of 47 Princes Street The Law

Ms Blood-Halvorsen argues that the Claimant is entitled to the full beneficial ownership of 47 Princes Street on three grounds:

(i) The Claimant is the legal owner, and the beneficial ownership is...