Multilateralism: America’s insurance policy against loss

DOI10.1177/1354066110372433
AuthorDominic Tierney
Date01 December 2011
Published date01 December 2011
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I
Article
European Journal of
International Relations
Multilateralism: America’s
17(4) 655–678
© The Author(s) 2010
insurance policy against loss
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DOI: 10.1177/1354066110372433
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Dominic Tierney
Swarthmore College, USA
Abstract
When the United States faces loss or defeat in war, it is often loath to negotiate, make
concessions to its adversary, and cut its losses. But the presence of allies and international
organizations in the US coalition can help to correct this bias against compromise
through a combination of simple bargaining, complex bargaining, and political cover. The
costs of multilateralism can be considered a premium that is paid when operations are
successful, so that the United States has an insurance policy to minimize loss in times of
failure. The article contributes to a number of major debates over the costs and benefits
of multilateralism and the impact of less powerful allies and international organizations
on US foreign policy.
Keywords
international relations, multilateralism, NATO, security, United Nations
Introduction
Americans have never lost and will never lose a war … the very thought of losing is hateful to
an American. (General George Patton, 1944, in Hirshon, 2002: 474)
There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.
(Winston Churchill, in Stoler, 2004: viii)
‘Once on the tiger’s back, we cannot be sure of picking the place to dismount’ (Logevall,
1999: 244). Undersecretary of State George Ball’s 1964 comment about escalation in
Vietnam proved prescient, as the United States was drawn into a disastrously costly
intervention in South East Asia.
When the United States faces defeat or stalemate in war, as in Vietnam, it is often
loath to make concessions to the adversary and negotiate an exit, due to psychological
Corresponding author:
Dominic Tierney, Swarthmore College, 500 College Avenue, 19081, PA, USA.
Email: dtierne1@swarthmore.edu

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European Journal of International Relations 17(4)
dynamics, reputational costs, and cultural factors. A multilateral setting for the use of
force can help to correct this bias against compromise through a number of pathways.
First, allies can directly pressure Washington to moderate its policy. Second, dovish
elements in the United States can utilize international actors to outmaneuver hardliners
at home. Third, allies and organizations can provide political cover for US compromise
by sharing responsibility for concessions. Multilateral uses of force produce inefficien-
cies and constraints, but these costs represent a premium that is paid when operations are
successful, in exchange for an insurance policy to minimize loss in times of failure.
This argument provides a novel contribution to the debate over the merits of multilat-
eralism for the United States, by highlighting the benefits when the use of force fails.
Furthermore, the article challenges the view expressed by realists such as Kenneth Waltz
(1979) and John Mearsheimer (1994–5) that weaker allies, as well as international orga-
nizations, have a marginal impact on the policies of great powers such as the United
States. In fact, allies and organizations can have a significant effect by helping to avert
a disastrous spiral of escalation. Michael Glennon (2003) suggested that the United
Nations Security Council is unable to effectively tackle ‘nerve-center security issues’.
The organization, however, may be especially useful for the United States in major con-
flicts such as Korea and Vietnam, where there is a significant risk of military loss, and
where the United States has the greatest difficulty making necessary concessions.
In the first section of the article, I briefly consider the balance sheet of costs and
benefits arising from multilateralism. In the second section, I argue that the United States
is biased toward escalation after military loss, especially in large-scale interstate wars. In
the third section, I contend that multilateralism can correct this bias. In the fourth and
concluding section, I consider the policy implications, by identifying the circumstances
when the restraining effect of allies and organizations serves US interests.
The multilateralism balance sheet
The United States acts multilaterally when it uses force (1) in coordination with other
states, and/or (2) with the authorization of international organizations such as the United
Nations (Keohane, 1990; Ruggie, 1992). Using force multilaterally offers Washington a
number of potential benefits: promoting American influence by creating and sustaining
a durable international order (Ikenberry, 2001; Nye, 2003); reducing the incentives for
other states to balance against American power (Mastanduno, 1999); improving the
legitimacy of US operations (Coicaud and Heiskanen, 2001; Gelpi, 2003; Luck, 2002);
providing specific forms of allied assistance such as troops, bases, and financial support
(Abbot and Snidal, 1998); strengthening communications, reducing transaction costs,
and monitoring agreements (Keohane, 1984; Martin, 1992); and increasing the chances
of public support (Eichenberg, 2005; Jentleson and Britton, 1998; Kull, 2002).
However, multilateralism can also produce significant costs for the United States:
policy outcomes may deviate from US preferences because of allied and organizational
pressure; the military pay-off from fighting with allies is often limited because of the
superiority of US armed forces (Krauthammer, 2002; Posen, 2003; Wohlforth, 1999);
and operating multilaterally can prove to be a cumbersome and inefficient experience
(Byman and Waxman, 2002; Hirsch and Oakley, 1995: 119; Ignatieff, 2000).

Tierney
657
How does the cost–benefit analysis of multilateralism alter for the United States if the
use of force fails? When Washington faces military stalemate or defeat, multilateralism
can offer a significant — and neglected — advantage by facilitating necessary conces-
sions and averting dangerous escalation.
America’s escalatory bias
Dan Reiter and Allan Stam (2002) argue that when democracies become engaged in
difficult and protracted wars, they are more willing than non-democracies to sue for
peace, make concessions, and accept a draw, because the public is sensitive to casualties
and pressurizes the administration to end the slaughter.
But despite being a democracy, the United States exhibits a bias in favor of escalation
following battlefield loss. Escalation refers to a broadening of wartime objectives, a
widening of the geographical scope of the fighting, and the removal of restraints on the
types of weapons used and the targets attacked. Identifying an escalatory bias is not
straightforward because if Washington sues for peace at point t, we can never know for
sure whether a continuation of the war would have proved costly or delivered victory.
There is a convincing case, however, for a US escalatory bias. First, the United States
consistently supports escalation following battlefield loss, even when American inter-
ests favor de-escalation. Second, Washington tends to be less willing than other states to
negotiate with an adversary. Third, the United States is prone to well-established psy-
chological, reputational, and cultural biases, promoting escalation.
Since the mid-19th century, the most significant instances of US battlefield defeat or
stalemate are the American Civil War, World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam
War.1 In each case, although actors in the United States displayed a range of tolerance
levels for concessions to the adversary, the tendency among decision-makers and the
public was to favor escalation rather than negotiation.
Unsurprisingly, escalatory preferences were evident when such action was clearly in
US interests. The American Civil War began as a limited conflict designed to restore
federal authority throughout the country, but in the face of stiff Confederate resistance,
northern war aims broadened to include the transformation of southern society through
emancipation. Similarly, the United States responded to military loss at Pearl Harbor in
1941 and in South East Asia in early 1942 with a relentless struggle against the fascist
states, resulting in their total defeat.
These examples illustrate that there is nothing inherently irrational in seeking to
persist in the face of military loss. Escalation can force an adversary to submit to a state’s
original aims, or it may bring entirely new objectives within reach (Labs, 1997). In the
Civil War and World War II, there was no viable compromise peace with the adversary
that would have safeguarded the US strategic position.
More surprisingly, the tendency to react to battlefield loss with escalatory preferences
was also evident when an extension of the conflict was not in US interests. Following
North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in June 1950, the United States organized a
multilateral coalition under the United Nations flag to defend South Korea. In the fall of
1950, UN forces crossed the 38th parallel and continued the offensive into North Korea,
in a bid to unify the peninsula under a non-communist regime. However, 250,000

658
European Journal of International Relations 17(4)
Chinese troops intervened in October and November, causing one of the biggest military
defeats in US history. Thousands...

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