Mutuality or mutual dependence in the psychological contract: a power perspective
| Date | 06 January 2020 |
| Pages | 125-148 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/ER-09-2017-0221 |
| Published date | 06 January 2020 |
| Author | Haris Ali |
| Subject Matter | Hr & organizational behaviour,Industrial/labour relations,Employment law |
Mutuality or mutual dependence
in the psychological contract: a
power perspective
Haris Ali
Institute of Management Sciences,
Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan, Pakistan
Abstract
Purpose –There have been increasing calls to explore the psychological contract from the lens of power.
By addressing this gap, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the assumption of mutuality in relation to
power dynamics in the employment relationship.
Design/methodology/approach –A total of 43 in-depth interviews are conducted with 6 managerial and
37 non-managerial respondents in three major call center organizations in Pakistan. Template analysis is used
to analyze the data.
Findings –By undermining the ass umption of implicit mutuality, the anal ysis reveals indeterminacy, an
issue that has been frequent ly underplayed in the psychol ogical contract researc h. The results further
suggest that –in reality –employab ility, flexibility an d employee training do no t promote mutuality
to the extent that is the oretically assumed because of the emplo yers’manipulation of these issues in t heir
own favor.
Research limitations/implications –The focus on call centers limits the generality of findings with
further qualitative research needed in other industries to explore how power asymmetries impact upon
mutuality in different working environments.
Practical implications –The research implications suggest the significance of timely and explicit
communication in order to curtail indeterminacy in the employment relationship. This will not only reduce the
development of breach perceptions among employees but will also reinforce their psychological contracts
with the organization.
Originality/value –This research contributes by highlighting the significance of mutual dependence rather
than mutuality in the psychological contract. The mutual dependence approach efficiently acknowledges
the implications of power asymmetries which remain largely under-researched in the psychological
contract theory.
Keywords Interviews, Psychological contracts, Power, Mutuality, Call centres, Mutual dependence
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
This research aims to investigate the assumption of mutuality in the psychological contract.
The research paper comprises five major sections. The second section presents a critical
review of the literature concerning psychological contract and mutuality. From this
perspective, the discussion highlights the under-researched implications of power in relation
to mutuality in the domain of the psychological contract. The third section elaborates on the
methodology adopted in the study. With a qualitative orientation, the current research
follows a critical realist research philosophy and a case study research strategy. For the
purpose of data collection, 43 semi-structured interviews are conducted. The current
research employs the technique of template analysis for the analysis of data. The fourth
section presents the findings of the research. The results illustrate that, in comparison with
mutuality, the perceptions of mutual dependence play a critical role in the psychological
contract of employees. The fifth section discusses the research findings in the context of the
relevant literature. The discussion illustrates that the concept of mutual dependence rather
than mutuality fully acknowledges the critically important but largely underplayed
implications of power dynamics in the psychological contract literature. The last section
draws the study together by highlighting the principal conclusions. The discussion then
Employee Relations: The
International Journal
Vol. 42 No. 1, 2020
pp. 125-148
© Emerald PublishingLimited
0142-5455
DOI 10.1108/ER-09-2017-0221
Received 18 September 2017
Revised 25 March 2019
23 May 2019
Accepted 3 June 2019
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
www.emeraldinsight.com/0142-5455.htm
125
Mutual
dependence in
the psychological
contract
proceeds to the contributions the study makes to the body of knowledge in this area, the
limitations of the study, and the implications for academics and practitioners. Finally, areas
for future research are specified.
Psychological contract and mutuality
The psychological contract serves as an important organizational behavior construct in
order to understand the dynamics of the employment relationship (Guest, 2017). According
to Cullinane and Dundon (2006), the concept has captured researchers’attention to the
extent “that it is now firmly located within the lexicon of the Human Resource Management
(HRM) discipline”(p. 113). A frequently cited definition of the psychological contract is the
“individual beliefs, shaped by the organization, regarding terms of an exchange agreement
between the individual and their organization”(Rousseau, 1995, p. 9).
Shore et al. (2012), however, assert that there has been a dearth of critical accounts aimed
at the theoretical development of the concept. One major limitation impeding theoretical
development of the construct is associated with the assumption of mutuality. Cullinane et al.
(2014) explain mutuality as.
Although no exact definition of mutual gains exists, it might be interpreted as follows:
(1) management and workers are conscious of the shared consequences of their actions
and therefore openly exchange information in a cooperative fashion so as to
highlight areas of joint interest;
(2) they then generatedecision-making options, through problem-solving structures; and
(3) choose those options that offer the highest joint returns for the parties (p. 5).
The majority of the psychological contract literature, because of its emphasis on mutuality,
largely underplays the implications of power dynamics in the employment relationship
(e.g. Dick, 2010; Hess and Jepsen, 2009; Rousseau, 2016). Based on this line of argument, the
following discussion critically evaluates the notion of the psychological contract in relation
to the under-researched implications of power, particularly focusing on the assumption
of mutuality.
Two different approaches emerge in the various conceptualizations of the psychological
contract. The first comprises an exchange model between employees and the employer,
while the second is largely based on an employee’s mental model. The exchange approach is
based on the assumption of a bilateral agreement and focuses on the versions of both
parties, i.e. the employee and the employer. The notion of the psychological contract as an
exchange model was originally proposed by Argyris (1960) and followed by a number of
researchers (e.g. Aggarwal and Bhargava, 2014; Guest et al., 2010; Shore et al., 2012). The
social exchange theory serves as a basis for conceptualizing the psychological contract as
an exchange model. This approach appears to be more pertinent as it incorporates the
versions of both parties, i.e. the employee and the employer.
In comparison with the exchange approach, the relevant research, largely under the
influence of Rousseau (1995, 2001, 2011), conceptualizes psychological contract on the basis
of an employee’s mental model. Rousseau maintains that “it is the perception of mutuality
and not necessarily mutuality in fact that gives rise to creation of a psychological contract”
(p. 666). This approach lacks a holistic perspective as it focuses only on one party of the
contract, i.e. the employee. According to her, as psychological contracts are predominantly
subjective, employees do not necessarily need to agree or discuss their terms with the
employer (Rousseau, 2011).
Rousseau’s approach is helpful in avoiding the agency problem. However, focusing on a
single party’s perspective only, raises the question of whether this unilateral approach
fulfills the primary condition of a “contract.”Even if psychological contracts are assumed as
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