Narrative Counterspeech
| Published date | 01 May 2024 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00323217221129253 |
| Author | Maxime Lepoutre |
| Date | 01 May 2024 |
https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217221129253
Political Studies
2024, Vol. 72(2) 570 –589
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/00323217221129253
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Narrative Counterspeech
Maxime Lepoutre
Abstract
The proliferation of conspiracy theories poses a significant threat to democratic decision-
making. To counter this threat, many political theorists advocate countering conspiracy theories
with ‘more speech’ (or ‘counterspeech’). Yet conspiracy theories are notoriously resistant to
counterspeech. This article aims to conceptualise and defend a novel form of counterspeech
– narrative counterspeech – that is singularly well-placed to overcome this resistance. My
argument proceeds in three steps. First, I argue that conspiracy theories pose a special problem
for counterspeech for three interconnected reasons relating to salience, emotion and internal
coherence. Drawing on recent work in social epistemology, philosophy of emotion and cognitive
science, I then demonstrate that narrative forms of counterspeech constitute an apt response
to this diagnosis. Finally, I forestall two objections: the first questions the likely effectiveness
of narrative counterspeech; the second insists that, even if it were effective, it would remain
unacceptably manipulative. Neither objection, I contend, is ultimately compelling.
Keywords
conspiracy theories, disinformation, counterspeech, fact-checking, narrative, manipulation, social
epistemology, philosophy of emotion, political theory
Accepted: 12 September 2022
Introduction
In March 2020, as the first wave of the coronavirus pandemic was spreading rapidly across
the world, a conspiracy theory followed closely in its wake. COVID-19, the theory alleged,
was nothing else than a Big Pharma scam engineered to stimulate demand for vaccines
(EU vs Disinformation, 2020). As vaccination campaigns subsequently accelerated, so too
did the conspiracy theories. COVID-19 vaccines, some claimed, were designed to alter
human DNA. Others worried – and continue to worry – that Bill Gates was using these
vaccines to implant microchips in recipients (Carmichael and Goodman, 2020).
COVID-19 vaccines are not an isolated case. Conspiracy theories more generally have
flourished across the world in recent years – aided, often, by social media platforms that
allow them to be shared widely and rapidly in more or less insulated arenas (Uscinski,
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading, Reading, UK
Corresponding author:
Maxime Lepoutre, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading, Shinfield Road,
Reading RG6 6EL, UK.
Email: m.c.lepoutre@reading.ac.uk
1129253PSX0010.1177/00323217221129253Political StudiesLepoutre
research-article2022
Article
Lepoutre 571
2020; Walter and Drochon, 2022). MMR (measles, mumps and rubella) vaccines are said
to be associated with autism (Boseley, 2019). Climate change is portrayed as nothing
more than a hoax (Worland, 2019). And, perhaps most infamously, the US Democratic
Party is believed by many Americans to be run by a cabal of Satanic child sex-traffickers
(Nagesh, 2021).
This proliferation is dangerous. Exposure to conspiracy theories can meaningfully
influence our beliefs and intentions (e.g. Jolley and Douglas, 2014; Jolley et al., 2020;
Romer and Jamieson, 2020; Uscinski, 2020: 6–10). This, in turn, may have devastating
consequences. For instance, insofar as conspiracy theories fuel resistance to COVID-19
vaccines, they endanger the unvaccinated and prolong a global health crisis. Likewise, by
fuelling climate scepticism, conspiracy theories undercut public support for policies
aimed at mitigating the climate emergency.1
This danger calls for an urgent response. One proposal here might be for the state, act-
ing directly or indirectly, to censor dangerous conspiracy theories. For example, some
political philosophers have suggested that the state could legally require social media
companies to remove posts promoting such conspiracy theories (Brown, in press; Howard,
2021a). But censorship remains controversial for a number of reasons. Some worries are
principled – for instance, the worry that censorship would violate freedom of expression.
Others are more practical – for instance, the worry that the state (or social media compa-
nies) cannot be trusted to implement censorship in an accurate and fair manner (Lepoutre,
2021: chs. 3–4).
In part because of these difficulties, many political philosophers emphasise a differ-
ent response to conspiracy theories: namely, the use of ‘more speech’ (or ‘counter-
speech’). Russell Muirhead Nancy Rosenblum (2020: 143) clearly illustrate this
position. Their influential diagnosis of ‘the new conspiracism’ recommends, first and
foremost, ‘speaking truth to conspiracy’. Quassim Cassam (2019: 105) concludes his
own examination of conspiracy theories with a similar recommendation. ‘[W]hen faced
with theories that distort the facts’, he declares, ‘the motto should be: rebut, rebut,
rebut’.2
Counterspeech can be deployed instead of censorship, and this is often what advocates
of counterspeech appear to be recommending. But it can also be deployed in conjunction
with censorship – say, out of recognition of the fact that, in practice, prohibiting danger-
ous conspiracy theories is highly unlikely to eliminate them altogether. Jeffrey Howard,
for example, expresses openness to deploying legal restrictions and counterspeech in
response to dangerous communications (Howard, 2021a, 2021b). Either way, the funda-
mental point remains that counterspeech (whether it replaces or complements alternative
strategies) has emerged as one of the most popular – if not the most popular – response to
conspiracy theories.
Yet this popular proposal, too, faces enormous difficulties. Countering conspiracy
theories with more speech is notoriously challenging – even more challenging, as I will
argue shortly, than countering other forms of disinformation with more speech. Hence,
when applied to conspiracy theories, counterspeech runs the risk of being ineffective or
even counterproductive.
The present article aims to tackle this problem in two ways: first, by offering a
clearer account of why conspiracy theories are unusually resistant to counterspeech;
and second – and more positively – by conceptualising and defending a novel form of
counterspeech (‘narrative counterspeech’) that is distinctively well-placed to overcome
this resistance.
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