Natalia Nikolaevna Potanina v Vladimir Olegovich Potanin
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Judge | Lord Justice Cobb,Lady Justice Falk,Lord Justice Moylan |
| Judgment Date | 04 September 2025 |
| Neutral Citation | [2025] EWCA Civ 1136 |
| Docket Number | Case No: CA-2024-001698 |
Lord Justice Moylan
Lady Justice Falk
and
Lord Justice Cobb
Case No: CA-2024-001698
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT (FAMILY DIVISION)
The Hon Mr Justice Cohen
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Charles Howard KC, Deepak Nagpal KC and Jennifer Palmer (instructed by Hughes Fowler Carruthers) for the Appellant
Lord Faulks KC, Rebecca Carew Pole KC, Rebecca Bailey-Harris (instructed by Payne Hicks Beach) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 22 July 2025
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 4 September 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
Introduction
This is the second occasion on which this court has considered an appeal against an order made by Cohen J, sitting in the Family Division, on 8 November 2019 in proceedings under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (‘the 1984 Act’).
By the order under appeal, Cohen J:
i) Set aside an earlier grant of leave to the Appellant (whom I shall hereafter refer to as ‘the wife’, adopting the convention used throughout in this litigation) to pursue a claim under the 1984 Act; leave to the wife had earlier been granted by Cohen J at a hearing conducted on 25 January 2019 without notice to the Respondent (hereafter ‘the husband’);
ii) Dismissed the wife's renewed application for leave to pursue an application for financial relief under Part III of the 1984 Act against the husband.
Cohen J's judgment explaining his reasons for these orders is reported as Potanin v Potanina [2019] EWHC 2956 (Fam); [2020] Fam 189 (hereafter ‘ Potanina (FD2)’).
The wife's first appeal from that order came before this court in January 2021 (King, David Richards and Moylan LJJ). The judgment in that first appeal is reported as Potanina v Potanin [2021] EWCA Civ 702; [2022] Fam 23 (hereafter ‘ Potanina (CA1)’). This court allowed the wife's appeal against the order summarised at §2(i) above; this had the effect of re-instating the original grant of leave. The court made clear that the appeal at that time had “been limited in its scope”, and the court expressly regarded it as “unnecessary to consider whether the judge was wrong in refusing leave when he reconsidered the application” under Part III of the 1984 Act (see Potanina (CA1) at [88]) (i.e., the order summarised at §2(ii) above). The court expressed no views as to the merits of the substantive application under the 1984 Act ( Potanina (CA1) also at [88]).
The husband successfully appealed the Court of Appeal's order to the Supreme Court. The judgments of that court are reported at Potanina v Potanin [2024] UKSC 3; [2024] AC 1063 (Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Leggatt and Lady Rose; Lord Briggs and Lord Stephens dissenting) (‘ Potanina (SC)’). The Supreme Court remitted the wife's appeal against the order summarised at §2(ii) back to this court by its order of 31 January 2024 (and see also Potanina (SC) at [108]).
Until now, the appeals in this case have focused upon the procedure which Cohen J had adopted when determining the wife's original application for leave under Part III (January 2019), the husband's application to set aside that grant of leave (October / November 2019), and upon the court's correct approach to an application for set-aside. This appeal focuses upon the threshold test for leave, and specifically whether Cohen J was wrong, by his order of 8 November 2019 (see §2(ii) above), to refuse the wife's renewed application for leave to bring a claim under Part III of the 1984 Act.
For the reasons set out more fully below, I conclude that Cohen J was indeed wrong to refuse the wife's application for leave. I propose that the appeal be allowed and his order set aside.
In advancing the case from here, I do not regard it as either necessary or proportionate to remit the wife's application to the Family Division for re-determination: see §109 to §116 below. I am satisfied that on the evidence which was before Cohen J in November 2019, the wife had demonstrated that she had substantial ground for making the application; she should have been granted leave.
Accordingly, I would grant the wife leave to make her application under Part III of the 1984 Act, and direct that the application returns to the Family Division for further case management.
Summary of the legal principles discussed in this appeal
Section 12 of the 1984 Act gives the English court the power to grant financial relief after a marriage has been dissolved (or annulled) in a foreign country (see §20 below). For an application for leave to succeed under Part III of the 1984 Act, the court must consider a “jurisdictional requirements” test (see (i) to (iii) below), and what I shall refer to as a merits-based ‘threshold’ test (see (iv) to (x) below). We have received extensive written and oral argument relating to both limbs of the test as they apply generally in cases of this kind, and as they apply specifically to the facts of this case. I summarise my views as follows:
i) In order for an application under Part III of the 1984 Act to be “entertained” in the English court, the applicant must show that they meet the statutory “jurisdictional requirements” (both quotes are from section 15 of the 1984 Act). In this particular case, this required consideration of both section 15(1) and section 15(1A) of the 1984 Act (as then in force); at the time of the decision, section 15(1A) led to Article 3 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on ‘Jurisdiction, Applicable law, Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions and Cooperation in Matters relating to Maintenance Obligations’ (hereafter the ‘Maintenance Regulation’). If the Maintenance Regulation did not apply (and it will in fact not apply to any case issued after 31 December 2020) then (subject to a more limited reservation – namely, article 18 of the 2007 Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance) section 15(1) of the 1984 Act will set the jurisdictional requirements. In that event, jurisdiction will be established by either:
a) proof of domicile of either party in England and Wales on the date of the application for leave or on the date on which the divorce, annulment or legal separation obtained in the overseas country took effect in that country;
b) habitual residence of either of the parties to the marriage in England and Wales throughout the period of one year ending with the date of the application for leave or throughout the period of one year ending with the date on which the divorce, annulment or legal separation obtained in the overseas country took effect in that country; or
c) the existence of a matrimonial home in which either party had a beneficial interest in possession in this jurisdiction on the date of the application for leave;
ii) It may well be that the court is not able to make any final determination of the jurisdictional requirements test at the leave stage, but (applying the “substantial ground” test discussed below) is sufficiently satisfied to allow the case to proceed, allowing full argument on this issue at the substantive hearing. In this regard, I note that section 14(2) of the 1984 Act contemplates that a final determination of the jurisdictional requirements test may not necessarily be reached at that stage;
iii) The jurisdictional requirements listed above are assessed as at “the date of the application for leave” under Part III, or the earlier date of divorce etc. (section 15(1) of the 1984 Act);
iv) As to the merits-based threshold test, the applicant must show that they have “substantial ground” (section 13 of the 1984 Act) for making “the application”; the word “substantial” is not defined in the 1984 Act and in this context it is accepted that it “means solid” (Lord Collins in Agbaje v Agbaje [2010] UKSC 13; [2010] 1 AC 628 (‘ Agbaje’) at [33], confirmed by Lord Leggatt for the majority of the court in Potanina (SC) at [89]–[92], and endorsed by the minority at [110]); (see, for discussion, §73 below);
v) In considering ‘substantial’ or ‘solid’ ground, the court will consider a theoretically unlimited range of factors, including the applicant's fulfilment of the jurisdictional requirements test (above); the court will have regard to the matters set out in section 16 of the 1984 Act at this stage to assess whether the application is ‘substantial’ or ‘solid’;
vi) In this regard, the court will consider the prospect of it being shown to be “appropriate” for an order to be made by a court in England and Wales (section 16(1) of the 1984 Act). Section 16(1) expressly requires the court to have regard to “all the circumstances” of the case, including specifically the matters set out in section 16(2) ibid; although not part of the statutory checklist, hardship and injustice may well be relevant (see, for discussion, §81 below);
vii) There is no hierarchy of factors in section 16(2) of the 1984 Act. Among those factors, the court will consider “the connection which the parties to the marriage have with England and Wales”; it is not a statutory requirement that this should be a substantial connection. However, plainly the stronger the connection, the stronger the application; indeed as Lord Collins observed in Agbaje, “where the English connections of the case are very strong there may be no reason why the application should not be treated as if it were made in purely English proceedings” (ibid at [73]); (see, for further discussion, §78-§80 below);
viii) Within the introductory words of section 16 of the 1984 Act there is a clear pointer to its further role in the determination of the...
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