Nation State Escalation and International Integration

Date01 March 1967
AuthorPaul Smoker
Published date01 March 1967
DOI10.1177/002234336700400105
Subject MatterArticles
NATION
STATE
ESCALATION
AND
INTERNATIONAL
INTEGRATION*
By
PAUL SMOKER
Peace
Research
Centre,
Lancaster,
and
Northwestern
University,
Evanston,
Illinois
1.
Introduction
In
this
paper
we
shall
be
dealing
with
international
integration
and
nation
state
escalation.
Escalation
is
defined
here
in
a
rather
broad
sense
to
include
the
phenom-
ena
of
the
run-away
arms
race.11t
refers
to
an
interactive
situation
where
increases
of
tension
become
manifest
through
increas-
ing
national
defense
expenditures.2
Interna-
tional
integration
here
means
transnational
bonds
that
bring
individuals
in
one
country
into
direct
cultural
and
social
relations
with
individuals
in
another
country.
While
inter-
national
integration
as
defined
here
can
be
exhibited
through
national
behavior,
as
in
the
case
of
joint
governmental
cultural
agreements,
this
need
not
be
the
case.
Inte-
gration
can
also
take
place
through
non-
governmental
activity,
such
as
international
scientific
conferences
or
football
matches.
To
clarify
the
theoretical
argument
that
follows,
we
must
define
what
will
be
meant
by
the
’international’
and
the
’na-
tion
state’
systems,
terms
that
are
used
here
in
a
particular
way
for
the
sake
of
the
theoretical
argument.
A
nation
state
system
is
defined
here
as
a
system
in
which
nations
are
the
only
actors,
and,
therefore,
the
nation
is
the
only
behavioral
group3
for
the
purpose
of
analysis.
An
internation-
al
system,
however,
is
defined
to
include
a
variety
of
actors,
from
individuals
to
nations
to
international
organizations
of
both
the
governmental
and
non-govern-
mental
kinds.4
Here
there
are
many
dif-
ferent
behavioral
groups,
although
one
could,
for
example,
take
nations
as
the
central
actors
and
try
to
analyze
behavior
within
the
international
context.5
2.
The
three
world
arms
races6
Richardson,
in
his
analysis
of
arms
races,
worked
within
the
nation
state
system
framework.
He
assumed
that
in
a
two-
nation
arms
race
the
rate at
which
the
first
nation
arms
depends
upon
the
amount
of
armament
the
other
nation
has,
the
colossal
costs
of
armaments,
and
the
feel-
ings
toward
the
other
nation
(for
instance,
as
expressed
in
treaties’) .
He
expressed
these
assumptions
in
mathematical
iornx8
and
tested
his
mathematical
model
against
the
behavior
of
nations
in
the
first
and
second
world
arms
races.9
Given
the
sim-
plicity
of
his
model
and
the
many
problems
of
measurement
involved,
the
model
was
remarkably
consistent
with
the
facts.
For
the
first
world
arms
race,
however,
the
agreement
was
better
than
for
the
second.10
For
a
two-nation
nuclear
arms
race
within
the
nation
state
context,
Richardson
argued
that
a
submissiveness
or
fear
factor
should
be
included
to
allow
for
the
mutual
fear
induced
by
nuclear
weapons.ll
This
submissiveness
model,
when
applied
to
the
present
arms
race,
for
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
suggested
the
possibil-
ity
that
this
fear
factor
was
completely
ab-
sent
before
1952
but
came
into
being
quite
suddenly
during
that
year.12
In
terms
of
the
Richardson
models,
this
meant
that
the
present
arms
race
behaved
in
the
same
way
as
the
previous
two
up
to
1952,
in
that
the
growth
of
defense
expenditure
was
exponential;
and
then
after
1952
behaved
in
a
way
consistent
with
the
assumptions
of
the
submissiveness
model.13
This
paper
relates
this
change
in
be-
havior
to
the
possible
change
from
a
nation

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